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Abstract 
This dissertation, which examines the literary representation of childhood trauma, is held 
together by three threads of inquiry. Firstly, I examine the stylistic devices through which 
three contemporary African writers – NoViolet Bulawayo, Uwem Akpan, and Mia Couto – 
engage with the subject of childhood trauma in five of their short stories: “Hitting Budapest”; 
“My Parents’ Bedroom” and “Fattening for Gabon”; and “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” 
and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab,” respectively. In each of these narratives, the use of 
ingén(u)s in the form of child narrators and/or focalisers instantiates a degree of structural 
irony, premised on the cognitive discrepancy between the protagonists’ perceptions and those 
of the implied reader. This structural irony then serves to underscore the reality that, though 
in a general sense the precise nature of traumatic experience cannot be directly 
communicated in language, this is exacerbated in the case of children, because children’s 
physical and psychological frameworks are underdeveloped. Consequently, children’s 
exposure to trauma and atrocity results in disruptions of both personal and communal notions 
of safety and security which are even more severe than those experienced by adults.  
Secondly, I analyse the political, cultural and economic factors which give rise to the 
traumatic incidents depicted in the stories, and the child characters’ interpretations and 
responses to these exigencies. Notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, identity and 
community, victimhood and survival, agency and disempowerment are discussed here in 
relation to the context of postcolonial Africa and the contemporary realities of chronic 
poverty, genocide, child-trafficking, the aftermath of civil war, and the legacies of 
colonialism and racism. Thirdly, this dissertation inspects the areas of congruence and 
divergence between trauma theory, literary scholarship on trauma narratives, and literary 
attempts to represent atrocity and trauma despite what is widely held to be the inadequacy of 
language – and therefore representation – to this task. 
 There are certain differences between the three authors’ depictions of children’s 
experiences of trauma, despite the fact that the texts all grapple with the aporetic nature of 
trauma and the paradox of representing the unrepresentable. To this end, they utilise various 
strategies – temporal disjunctions and fragmentations, silences and lacunae, elements of the 
fantastical and surreal, magical realism, and instances of abjection and dissociation – to 
gesture towards the inexpressible, or that which is incommensurable with language. I argue 
that, ultimately, it is the endings of these stories which suggest the unrepresentable nature of 
trauma. Traumatic experience poses a challenge to representational conventions and, in its 
resistance, encourages a realisation that new ways of writing and speaking about trauma in 
the African continent, particularly with regards to children, are needed. 
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Introduction 
Perhaps I should start by explaining that the idea for my dissertation was initially sparked by 
my first encounter with Uwem Akpan’s “An Ex-Mas Feast,” the opening story of Say You’re 
One of Them, during the Christmas holidays of my Honours year. The story is set in Kenya 
and is narrated by an eight-year old boy, Jigana, who lives in a one-room shack with his 
unemployed, alcoholic parents, four prepubescent siblings, and a pregnant dog. Jigana relates 
the events leading up to his eldest sister, Maisha, who is thirteen-years old and has been 
‘working’ as a prostitute to support the family, eventually running away from home. The 
desensitised tone which Jigana employs to describe his mother swearing at Maisha and 
accusing her of being a whore who wants to escape with some white client of hers, Maisha’s 
increasing restlessness and rebellion against her parents, and the younger children’s daily 
routine of going out to town in order to beg for food and money while their parents sleep off 
their hangovers and sniff glue to keep hunger at bay, was extremely unsettling. It is precisely 
this discomfort which led me to question my position in my own community, as a relatively 
middle-class person living in Johannesburg at the time. Nevertheless, the reality of an entire 
family sharing a small shack and children rummaging through bins for food over Christmas 
was not entirely alien. Indeed, as any South African will confirm, the incidence of very 
young, seemingly neglected children either begging or otherwise roaming the streets at any 
time of the day or night in this country is far from a stretch of the imagination. Given this 
context, then, the debasement, subjugation, and depravity of the children depicted in “An Ex-
Mas Feast” raised grave concerns regarding the status of children in impoverished societies, 
especially since human rights discourse seems only to be relevant to the privileged and to 
have some purchase among the educated elite. Moreover, the representation of such children 
in fiction raises questions of an ethical nature, such as whether or not the very attempt to 
reproduce their suffering in literature is an exploitative act.  This led me to question whether, 
as readers in the academic community, “we come to respond more acutely to literary sorrow 
[and suffering] than to the misery next door” (Steiner 22), a question which, although not the 
subject of my study, led to my interest in trauma fiction involving children in the African 
context.  
 The phrase which introduces my thesis title, “The Wings of Whipped Butterflies,” is 
derived from the Cameroonian novelist, painter and poet, Mbella Sonne Dipoko’s poem “Our 
History to Precolonial Africa,” a poem which laments the disavowal and subjugation of 
African people at the onset of colonialism. The reason behind this choice, apart from the 
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obvious correspondence between suffering children and the poignant image of maimed and 
innocent butterflies, is that my thesis seeks to draw correlations between postcolonial 
Africa’s identity and the systemic violence and atrocity which are, to a large extent, a 
colonial inheritance. In this regard, private traumas, in one way or another, arise from or are 
symptomatic of a collective legacy.  My objective is to highlight the fact that even those 
traumas, such losing a loved one or being abandoned by one’s parents, which may be 
considered to fall outside of the scope of public memory since they seem to be confined to 
the domestic sphere, have their roots in this profound legacy of intergenerational transmission 
of trauma. Nevertheless, I am concerned with trauma insofar as it is “a wound in the mind, 
not a wound in society; it is a personal experience, not a social one” (Herrero x) and, more 
specifically, with individual and juvenile reactions to instances of collective violence. 
Therefore, while acknowledging the inescapable impact of socio-political forces on each of 
the societies depicted in the selected stories, my focus is primarily on the individual’s 
reception and interpretation of atrocity, particularly when that individual is one of the most 
vulnerable and, perhaps paradoxically, most resilient of its members – a child.  A close 
analysis of the representation of the impact of trauma on the individual child is facilitated by 
the fact that all the narratives under scrutiny are short stories. Indeed, it is the singularity of 
subject matter and the brevity of these narratives which enable their undeniable effect, since, 
in addition to outlining discord in both the public and private domain, they also seek to 
explore alternative ways of narrativising trauma within a circumscribed space.   
There also exists a substantial body of research on trauma and narrative, both in the 
field of trauma studies in fiction and in psychology, such as Anne Whitehead’s Trauma 
Fiction, Laurie Vickroy’s Trauma and Survival in Contemporary Fiction, George Steiner’s 
Language and Silence, Kali Tal’s Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma, and 
Dori Laub and Shosana Felman’s Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis and History, to name but a few. In this regard, my thesis highlights the 
relationship between traumatic experience and silence, as evidenced by the incapacity of 
linguistic structures to adequately signify trauma. By the same token, the problem of 
language’s inadequacy is premised on the disjunction between words and reality.  As Steiner 
observes, when an individual is confronted with atrocity, “what is seen can be transposed into 
words; what is felt may occur at some level anterior to language” (36).  In other words, it is a 
generally accepted principle in contemporary poststructuralist literary studies that language 
can only ever partially succeed in signifying that which it purports to signify. Where the 
profoundly dislocating experience of trauma is concerned, language loses even this partial 
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success, and the victim of psychic violence is forced to resort to silence, a silence which is all 
the more expressive precisely because it overwhelms language. Thus, trauma fiction reveals 
what Steiner refers to as “the revaluation of silence,” a revelation which emphasises “the 
conceit of the word unspoken, of the music unheard and therefore richer” (67). All the 
narrative voices in the texts selected here are concealed behind several screens of silence, the 
principal manifestations of which may be located in the narratives’ reliance on symbolism, 
irony and, ultimately, bodily or corporeal expressions of abjection.  It is therefore not solely 
what the narrators/focalisers report or observe that generates meaning in these stories, but 
also that which they cannot say, let alone fathom by using literal language. Notably, by 
drawing attention to the singularity of the body in pain, these narratives also emphasise the 
extraverbal nature of suffering. Thus, even though a child narrator/focaliser cannot articulate 
his/her anguish in words, it is nonetheless inscribed into his/her body.  
It may be argued that the implied reader’s response to depictions of the traumatised 
child’s body is, on the one hand, an empathetic act of recognition but, on the other, a 
questionable, voyeuristic or morbid indulgence. The latter charge surfaced, for example, in 
comments on this study such as, “It’s such an ugly subject. Why would you want to do your 
thesis on something so ugly?” and, “I don’t think these stories are literary. They merely rely 
on shock-value. There is no aesthetic to them” – both by senior professors. Despite the fact 
that these remarks are dismissive, they are noteworthy in rehearsing elitist notions of 
aesthetic worth. Firstly, both commentators equate literariness with beauty and a comfortable 
reading experience, the antithesis of which is ‘ugliness’ and unsettlement.  Secondly, they 
question the relevance and ‘aesthetic value’ of trauma fiction to literary studies as a whole. 
Thirdly, they implicitly pose the challenge of whether or not these kinds of narratives 
reinforce contemporary pessimistic perceptions of Africa as beyond redemption, a continent 
ravaged by starvation, poverty, and internecine conflict, whose inhabitants are unable to fend 
for themselves, let alone their children.  Although the third of these concerns falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis, I do hope, at the very least, to gesture towards a possible answer by 
drawing on theories derived from Holocaust and slave testimonies, as well as trauma fiction 
in general, in order to argue for the importance of the individual subject’s experience of self 
and others in traumatic circumstances. 
Each chapter of my thesis involves some investigation of the specific socio-political 
contexts which inform the representation of suffering children in NoViolet Bulawayo’s 
“Hitting Budapest,” Uwem Akpan’s “My Parents’ Bedroom” and “Fattening for Gabon,” and 
Mia Couto’s “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab”. This is 
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followed by a close reading of the texts in question, paying specific attention to the ways in 
which silences and narrative discontinuities function in the representation of traumatised 
psyches. An examination of the installation and subversion of the normative social realist 
mode of representation evident in Bulawayo and Akpan’s stories, and the magical/fantastical 
realist mode employed in Couto’s narratives, forms an integral part of the discussion. Given 
that my research analyses five selected short stories by a Zimbabwean, Nigerian, and a 
Mozambican author respectively, it employs a broadly postcolonial framework, but also 
refers to theoretical works which deal specifically with literary representations of suffering 
and trauma, where these are relevant to the African context.  All of the stories interrogate the 
suffering of the child narrator/focaliser  as a result of various causes, such as parental neglect, 
socio-economic deprivation, and atrocity.  
The specific questions  I address include the following: how do these writers attempt 
to capture children’s subjective experience of suffering; what narrative strategies do they 
utilise to negotiate the dilemma of the (in)adequacy of language in this regard; in what ways 
do their texts contribute to an understanding of the mechanisms by which children process 
traumatic experiences and of their developing sense of selfhood and community (or the lack 
thereof); and how are these authors’ works positioned in relation to contemporary critical 
understandings of trauma fiction and in relation to each other? In addressing these areas, the 
thesis opens with a theoretical chapter which contextualises contemporary concerns of fiction 
emerging from the African continent in relation to conceptions of trauma, language, and 
narrative mode. The chapter also examines the installation of the stylistic device of structural 
irony, which accompanies the use of child narrators/focalisers in literary representations of 
atrocity and trauma. Chapter Two comprises a thematic reading of the NoViolet Bulawayo’s 
short story “Hitting Budapest.” I examine the text’s use of symbolism, specifically as it 
undermines the ostensible realism of the story, and the representation of hunger, abuse, 
neglect and deprivation as seen through the eyes of the story’s child narrator. Chapter Three 
analyses Uwem Akpan’s “My Parents’ Bedroom” and the (mis)perceptions of an ethnically 
ambiguous child caught in the cross-fire of the Rwandan genocide. I interrogate notions of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity as they manifest themselves during an atrocity which robs 
this child of both of her parents, her home, and, ultimately, her innocence. Concerns 
regarding memories of childhood trauma and its retrieval, as depicted in Akpan’s “Fattening 
for Gabon,” are the focus of Chapter Four. Finally, Chapter Five provides a reading of “The 
Day Mabata-bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab” by Mia Couto, and examines 
the context in which these stories are framed and Couto’s use of the fantastic in his depiction 
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of the child protagonists’ experiences. In my concluding chapter, I indicate the importance of 
trauma fiction as a site upon which individual experiences, which are not a part of 
historiography, are acknowledged. Trauma fiction, I argue, inserts into the public memory the 
singularity of suffering and, in so doing, highlights the convergence of historiography, and 
public and private narrative. I also postulate that such fiction exposes the reader to what 
Geoffrey Hartman, in another context, terms some of the “darkest visions of human nature” 
(“The Holocaust” 30). It is this exposure, whether met with a voyeuristic or an empathetic 
response from the implied reader, which renders these narratives important archives of 
cultural memory.  
My particular interest in each of these texts stems from the ways in which these 
authors innovatively endeavour to expand both the vocabulary and narrative modes through 
which suffering children have been depicted in African narratives. Though Couto has 
received considerable attention in relation to his vision of post-independence Mozambique, 
little to no critical work to date has emerged on Akpan and Bulawayo.   Nevertheless, both 
authors have received critical acclaim: “My Parents’ Bedroom” was shortlisted for the 2007 
Caine Prize, and Say You’re One of Them won the Commonwealth Writers Prize and the PEN 
Beyond Margins Award in 2009.  Oprah Winfrey selected the collection as the book of the 
month in November 2009 and it was number one on the New York Times best-seller list in 
the same year. Similarly, Bulawayo’s “Hitting Budapest” won the 2011 Caine-Prize. Given 
that the former’s collection was published in 2009, and Bulawayo’s as recently as 2011, this 
thesis constitutes a new contribution in focusing on the theoretical and representational 
implications of all three authors’ engagement in the writing of trauma as experienced by 
children in specific African contexts.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Trauma, Sublimity and the Representation of the Suffering Child 
 
We must begin to probe the function of African literature as an instrument that 
wills new African realities into being, that imagines alternative configurations 
of our “real histories” either to affirm or transcend them. We must develop 
new ways of looking at African fiction.  
– Simon Gikandi (Reading Chinua Achebe 2) 
Violence is generative. In that sense, it’s like narration where the act of telling 
produces more story. Violence, too, reproduces itself.   
– Zoë Wicomb (“Washing Dirty Linen in Public” 22) 
 
1.1  Trauma and Postcolonial Narrative 
 
There exists a general consensus among trauma theorists that the postcolonial condition is, by 
definition, one of sustained social trauma (van Boheemen-Saaf 27; Laub 57). It is, indeed, 
from this position that Sam Durrant opens his thesis on mourning: 
Postcolonial narrative, structured by a tension between the oppressive 
memory of the past and the liberatory promise of the future, is 
necessarily involved in a work of mourning. Its principal task is to 
engender a consciousness of the unjust foundations of the present and to 
open up the possibility of a just future. (1) 
 
The past, in the African setting, is characterised by a series of traumatic events which 
emerging narratives not only reiterate, but also attempt to reconfigure into the continent’s 
contemporary identity within the literary landscape. Thus, the tension lies not only in the 
nexus between the indelible past and a potential future, as Durrant argues, but also between a 
traumatic past and an inexplicable present. In light of this, the incomplete process of healing 
suggested by Durrant’s use of the term “mourning” further suggests that the confines of the 
present are restrictive to the extent that, even when acknowledged, they still problematise the 
notion of a potentially non-traumatic future. Accordingly, the kind of future envisioned by 
contemporary postcolonial fiction in an Africa setting is, in essence, post-traumatic rather 
than liberatory.  For, as Kali Tal argues,  
Trauma is a transformative experience, and those who are transformed 
can never entirely return to a state of previous innocence . . . the bizzare 
encounter with atrocity . . . can never be purified again. (119) 
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As a result, Durrant’s thesis is not so much concerned with the future as it is with a violent 
history’s irreducible impact on the present and the consequent work of mourning this 
recognition necessitates. With regards to the nature and impact of trauma on the public 
sphere, Neil J. Smelser argues that “it is possible to describe social dislocations and 
catastrophes as traumas if they disrupt organised social life” (37). The contemporary African 
setting, both literary and otherwise – still haunted by the spectre of its colonial past, the 
ravages of internecine conflict, socio-political instability and the prevalence of chronic 
poverty and economic hardship – is characterised by a disintegration of “the basic tissues of 
social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense 
of communality” (Erikson 460). Consequently, “We no longer exists as a connected pair or as 
linked cells in a larger communal body” (Alexander 4), but rather emerges as fragmentary 
and volatile. Despite this dissolution of community, however, Cathy Caruth observes of 
traumatic history that it “is never one’s own . . . we are all implicated in each other’s 
traumas” (Explorations 192). Collective traumas, then, affect notions of community and 
individual traumas are reflective of a communal malfunction precisely because they do not 
occur in isolation.  
  Durrant contends that postcolonial narratives are “confronted with the impossible 
task of finding a mode of writing . . . that can bear witness to [their] own incapacity to 
recover [the past and rediscover the present]” (6). Contemporary African narrative may 
therefore be classified as trauma fiction which not only “attest[s] to the frequency of trauma 
and its importance as a multicontextual social issue” (Vickroy 2), but also “offer[s] . . . 
alternatives to often depersonalised or institutionalized historiographies” (4). Such 
achievements through narrative are, however, complicated by the very nature of the 
phenomenon these texts seek to account for, namely the individual and collective trauma of 
the African continent.   
 With regard to Africa’s collective trauma, if we adopt Elaine Scarry’s observation, on 
the nature of pain, that “given any two phenomena, the one that is more visible will receive 
more attention . . . [the interior one is, by contrast,] so nearly impossible to express, so flatly 
invisible” (13) that it is misrepresented at the very moment one attempts to articulate it by 
using language, then bodily trauma may be relatively easy to describe in terms of its physical 
manifestations, whilst psychological suffering is not, primarily because it has no external 
object. Thus, theorists working from within the psychoanalytic model of trauma emphasise its 
interiority:  
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 A wound of the mind – the breach in the mind’s experience of time, self, 
 and the world – [ ] is not, like the wound of the body, a simple healable 
 event, but rather an event that . . . is experienced too soon, too 
 unexpectedly, to be fully known. 
                                                                                                   (Caruth, Unclaimed 4) 
 
This description highlights several characteristics of psychological trauma, the first of these 
being its disruption of temporal structures; the second, its disturbance of the notion of 
subjectivity and the stability of ‘reality’; and the third, its unknowability. Trauma thus 
“impair[s] normal emotional or cognitive responses” (Vickroy i) and presents itself as a 
challenge both to therapeutic and literary practice. Literature underscores the limitations of 
language’s referential capacity both in personal and literary narratives of trauma, limitations 
which will form a substantial part of the discussion which follows. Furthermore, the 
psychological disruption evoked by the aporia of traumatic experience, as suggested earlier, 
has an enduring impact on collective notions of identity; this affects intersubjective relations 
within the contexts in which it occurs because “individualised relational situations reflect the 
impact of more generalized social situations” (Vickroy 5). Trauma is therefore never purely a 
subjective experience suffered in isolation from social or cultural structures. Every trauma is 
indicative of collective dysfunction precisely because, in a community, what is personal is 
not “the secret of one person alone, as it [breaks] the boundaries of the person and [demands] 
to be shared” (Blanchot 19). What is shared in such a context then is also, ironically, 
precisely that which cannot be shared, expressed in language, or any other imaginable form 
of social engagement between subjects. 
The relationship between trauma and narrative is thus paradoxical since, as Anne 
Whitehead observes, the narrativisation of trauma necessarily raises questions of 
representation. In other words, because trauma presents itself as “that which, at the very 
moment of reception, registers as a non-experience” (Vickroy 5), it “does not simply resist 
language, but actively destroys it” (Scarry 4). In literary narrative, this tension arises not only 
because atrocity presents itself as a “discursive deadlock in which language and 
representation are no longer able to express the horror or import of the experience” (van 
Boheemen-Saaf 2), but also because, in postcolonial societies, “cultural hegemony has been 
maintained through colonial assumptions about literary activity” (Ashcroft et al, The Empire 
Writes Back 7). If language is the “medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is 
perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘order’ and ‘reality’ 
become established” (7), then language itself is implicated in the conditions that give rise to 
trauma.  
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 Christine van Boheemen-Saaf therefore argues that the postcolonial writer invents a 
“curiously hybrid and covert strategy of storytelling in the oppressor’s language, which 
unweaves its very texture as it narrates” (5). “Writing in the English language,” she contends, 
“points . . . to a presence of an absence, a lacuna at the very heart of  . . . linguistic 
subjectivity” (6) which, in the postcolonial setting, signifies an “alienated relationship to . . . 
language” (4). Accordingly, in writing about trauma, the postcolonial author is engaged in a 
schizophrenic project of attempting to represent the unknowable in a language characterised 
by an alienating force, and the very act of writing is therefore itself inherently traumatic.   
 In addition, post-structuralist conceptions of language as an inadequate means of 
signification also play a role in the representational difficulties authors encounter in 
attempting to depict trauma. The inadequacy of language is taken up by silences which are 
not only indicative of linguistic deficiency, but also suggestive of trauma’s symptomatic 
impact on the collective consciousness of postcolonial subjects. In Silences and Related 
Syndromes in African History, Jacques Depelchin insists that 
 Among those who have suffered enslavement, colonialisation, steady and 
 relentless economic exploitation, cultural asphyxiation . . . gender, race 
 and class discrimination and political repression, silences should be read 
 as facts . . . which have not been accorded the status of facts.  
                 (3-4, emphasis added)  
 
Although made with reference to historical writing, Depelchin’s claim here suggests that the 
ubiquitous silences in literatures arising from the postcolony are themselves highly revealing, 
since they signal the effects of atrocity and trauma. They are lacunae in these respective 
communities’ sense of coherence, and are facts insofar as they are the custodians of an 
invisible truth which can be hinted at in art, psychology, and historiography, but never fully 
recovered. Accordingly, Vickroy argues that “scholarship and literature on trauma is an 
important part of a group support process, attesting to diverse voices articulating 
extraordinary experiences and uncovering what has been suppressed and hidden” (19). 
Trauma fiction arising from the African continent may thus be regarded as an imaginary site 
at which historiography, and public and private narrative converge. 
 
1.2 The Suffering Child in Trauma Fiction 
 
The latter part of the twentieth century witnessed a burgeoning of literary research focusing 
on trauma narratives as “personalised responses to this century’s emerging awareness of the 
catastrophic effects of wars, poverty, colonialisation, and domestic abuse on the individual [as 
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well as the collective] psyche” (Vickroy x).  Laurie Vickroy, Sam Durrant and Shane Graham, 
in particular, have highlighted the area of trauma representation in postcolonial literature, 
suggesting that the figure of the suffering child is integral to such research. Vickroy, for 
instance, contends that “traumatized children become poignant metaphors and individualised 
examples of the neglect, exploitation, disempowerment, and disavowal of communities, or 
even entire cultures” (xv). Yet, despite Vickroy’s observation, little research has been 
dedicated solely to representations of suffering children in the field of trauma fiction. 
 With regards to the international socio-political discourse surrounding the plight of 
children, particularly in the African context, Michael Fleshman observes: 
In 1990, the international community declared, “Together, our nations have the 
means and the knowledge to protect the lives and to diminish enormously the 
suffering of children.” [Twenty-two years later] it is clear that, in fundamental 
ways, world leaders have failed to deliver on their promises to improve the 
lives of Africa’s children. (9) 
 
In this excerpt from a United Nations report, “the suffering of children” alludes to inadequate 
living conditions, including education, health care, and the scarcity of resources. However, it 
may also be applied to the aftermath of colonialism, sexual exploitation and abuse. The 
contemporary African author, in attempting to engage with questions of the representation, 
agency and subjectivity of children affected by trauma, has to contend with the fact that, in a 
general sense, “the word [suffering] bears witness to an inexpressible reality” (Steiner 66). 
Moreover, discussions of the representation of children in trauma fiction emerging from the 
postcolonial setting must necessarily begin with the issue of marginality.  bell hooks argues 
that: 
Marginality [is a] central location for the production of a counter-
hegemonic discourse that is not just found in words but in the habits of 
being and the way one lives . . . [It is] the site one stays in, clings to 
even, because it nourishes one’s capacity to resist. It offers the possibility 
of radical perspectives from which to see and create, to imagine 
alternatives, new worlds. (341) 
 
While hooks’s contention may be applicable to Africans, Holocaust survivors and African 
Americans, in a general sense, the notion that one might ‘cling to’ or affirm one’s sense of 
being on the fringes is directly related to issues of personal agency and, ultimately, the 
amount of power and freedom one has in altering one’s circumstances. Personal agency, 
according to Michael White, is  
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a sense of self that is associated with the perception that one is able to 
have some effect on the shape of one’s own life . . .  that one is able to 
intervene in one’s own life as an agent of what one gives value to and as 
an agent of one’s own intentions, and  . . .  that the world is at least 
minimally responsive to the fact of one’s existence. (150)  
 
 In light of White’s definition, it may be deduced that, where children are concerned, 
particularly those of a prepubescent age, personal agency is, at best, under construction and, at 
worst, altogether absent. In attempting to represent the suffering of marginalised children, 
therefore, postcolonial trauma narratives may indeed function as a socio-political tool through 
which “radical perspectives” (hooks 341) on marginalised children’s traumatic experiences 
may be examined.  
Each of the authors selected for this study use child narrators or focalisers as vehicles to 
explore the effects of trauma, and each text constitutes an imaginary reconstruction of 
traumatised children’s experiences within their respective settings. Ten-year old Darling’s 
narration of extreme poverty in Zimbabwean author NoViolet Bulawayo’s story “Hitting 
Budapest”, is characterised by its non-committal delivery of what the implied reader 
nonetheless perceives as a terrifying struggle to survive.  Similarly, nine-year old Monique, in 
the Nigerian author Uwem Akpan’s short story, “My Parents’ Bedroom,” from his collection 
Say You’re One of Them, comes to signify a generation of children affected by the 1994 
Rwandan genocide. Akpan’s “Fattening for Gabon,” from the same collection, constitutes a 
specifically African account of both the effects and the causes of child-trafficking told from 
the perspective of ten-year old Kotchikpa. The child protagonists in the Mozambican author 
Mia Couto’s “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded,” from his collection Voices Made Night, and 
“The bird-dreaming baobab,” from Every Man is a Race, abandon their corporeal existence, 
an existence which is characterised by seemingly meaningless violence arising from external 
forces which they do not understand. The common thread of all these narratives is therefore 
not merely the respective child characters’ struggle to survive under horrific circumstances, 
but also each author’s attempt to engage with and represent the aporia of trauma through the 
limited perspective of child subjects.   
 
1.3 Unhinged Narrative and the Invisibility of Crisis 
 
Atrocity, which is the precursor of trauma in Bulawayo, Akpan, and Couto’s texts, is 
essentially devoid of recuparable meaning. In writing about the problems of representation in 
Holocaust literature, for example, R. Clifton Spargo claims that 
12 
 
Atrocity is quite simply the negative of all that is interpretable and all that 
might provide the foundation of historical consciousness and present 
understanding. As an event that is by definition entirely empty of meaning, 
atrocity resists continuity even in the ordinary sense of living our lives 
forward in time, and so casts suspicion on all redemptive or therapeutic 
endeavours to mend it. (5) 
 
It goes without saying, therefore, that atrocity shares distinctive structural similarities 
with trauma, similarities which present themselves as discursive blockages to artistic 
representation. “In trauma,” Juliet Mitchell argues, “we are untimely ripped  . . . a trauma 
. . . [creates] a breach in a protective covering of such severity that it cannot be coped 
with by the usual mechanisms by which we deal with pain and loss” (121).  The “breach” 
inherent in all definitions of trauma may well be extended to its textual depictions. In 
other words, just as trauma disrupts the experience of self and others, it also fractures the 
narrative conventions by which identity and community are commonly represented. It is 
precisely this “formlessness [or] absence of form,” according to Jean-Francios Lyotard, 
that is “a possible index to the unrepresentable” (Lyotard 78), or the sublime – that which 
poses a challenge to all forms of representation. With regards to the above, Leicht 
contends that Lyotard defines the sublime as 
  a category for dealing with experiences which are beyond categories. It is  
  a sort of self-negating name for the experience of alterity so ‘unnameable’  
  that it may be ascribed to . . . absolute transcendence . . . The sublime is  
  that mark of the unforeseeable and incommensurable, of the inexplicable  
  and incomprehensible, which defies all rules and reasons, and ultimately  
  reduces us to silence – that “most indeterminate of figures.”  (1610) 
 
 The sublime, he goes on to argue, “takes place . . . when the imagination fails to present an 
object which might, if only in principle, come to match a principle” (78); it is the locus of 
what Richard Kearney terms an “ontological dislocation” (493).  Trauma, however, has no 
external object; it is visible only in that it is invisible, and thus manifests as that which, to use 
Lyotard’s terms, “exceeds both calculation and understanding” (77). Additionally, according 
to Kearney,  
[For] Lyotard [,] even ugliness . . . the monstrous and the formless have 
their rights because they can be sublime . . . [He] retains the curious 
association of sublimity with “terror” – a terror which is in turn linked 
with the danger of impending death or destruction . . . the privation of 
good [and even the] terror of evil! (493) 
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With regards to terror and atrocity, in his essay on Holocaust historiography and fiction, 
Geoffrey Hartman addresses Theodore Adorno’s famous assertion that writing poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric by postulating that  
Even if art is viewed with suspicion because, as Adorno feared, it may 
stylize suffering in order to serve it up for popular consumption, this 
simply underscores the difficulty of transmitting . . . manmade 
inhumanity – of conveying it in the way Shakespeare’s King Lear allows 
one of the darkest visions of human nature to be absorbed into the mind 
and heart. (“The Holocaust” 30) 
 
Like Adorno, Lyotard maintains that “any attempt [to textualise the aporia of trauma] is a 
form of tyranny or totalization” (92). However, in line with Hartman’s faith in the imaginative 
potential of literature, Lyotard also proposes that any narrative engaged in representing 
trauma should not so much endeavour to “say the unsayable, but [rather say] that it cannot say 
it” (92). As a result of the paradoxical trust in and suspicion of literary representation in 
relation to the terrifying and inexplicable, trauma narratives have traditionally attempted to 
articulate the inarticulable by “internalis[ing trauma’s] rhythms, processes, [and] uncertainties 
. . . within [their] underlying sensibilities” (Vickroy 3), and to elude the preconfigured 
boundaries of established representational codes. According to Jonathan Culler, because genre 
“signals a particular relation to the world which serves as a norm or expectation to guide the 
reader” (159), it is implicated in the relation between textual form and generated meaning: 
“conventions stipulate what kind of pattern one is reading towards” (173). Therefore, 
representational issues surrounding trauma are profoundly affected by an author’s choice of 
genre and mode.  
In this regard, both Akpan’s and Bulawayo’s short stories may initially be regarded as 
realist, in that they enact most of the “self-imposed limits of [the] realist aesthetic” (Wonham 
721), which is characterised by a “choked representation” (718) that cannot withstand the 
inadequacy of language in communicating experience. Burdened with the undertaking of 
“imagin[ing] or invent[ing] a fictional world which is more or less a copy of the real one” 
(Fowler 156), the realist aesthetic is heavily reliant on a clearly defined sense of space, 
temporality, and chronology. According to Louise Bethlehem, realism or, as she calls it, 
“representational literalism [is] constrained . . . not by ‘free imagination’ but by ‘real life’ as it 
presents itself everywhere” (2). However, she qualifies this by citing Michael Vaughan’s 
assertion that “perception of reality is [in itself] a [problematic] issue” (Bethlehem 8). 
Consequently, in relation to trauma, which is implicitly characterised by non-perception, 
realist conventions are not only destabilised, but are also rendered null and void. Thus, Akpan 
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and Bulawayo’s short stories utilise this representational mode, whilst simultaneously 
questioning its very efficacy in representing trauma. Their texts, involving the installation of 
child focalisers/narrators, symbolism and an extensive use of irony, at times gesture towards 
the impossibility of articulating trauma, while simultaneously proposing the need for 
supplementation or the creation of a new mode of expressing the effect of atrocity on the 
psychic well-being of the subjects depicted. 
By contrast, Couto’s fiction in general – which has been classified under the genre of 
magical realism (see MacKenzie, Gaylard, Gray, Chapman, Wood) – introduces elements of 
the fantastic in order to oppose what Jean-Pierre Durix refers to as “realism’s typical 
limpidity” (79).  Magical realism opens up “possibilities of border-crossing or boundary 
skipping between domains [which have previously been] blocked [or] methodically 
delimited” (79) by realism. Both the fantastic and magical realism have been described as 
“the underside of realism” (Jackson 83), and as a means to counter the “closed, monological 
forms” imposed by the realist aesthetic with “open structures” (83). Where realism relies on a 
(contestable) definition of reality, the fantastic “reveals reason and reality to be arbitrary, 
shifting constructs, and thereby scrutinizes the category of the ‘real’”. Consequently, “reason 
is made to confront all that it traditionally refuses to encounter” (Durix 81) and, in the case of 
trauma representation, that for which it is unable to account.  
 Moreover, as an offshoot of the fantastic, magical realism dissolves “Cartesian 
dualities: antinomies between natural and supernatural, [and between the] explicable and 
[the] inexplicable” (Wilson 223) by interfusing distinct fictional and ontological worlds and 
collapsing the dialectic between them. The interpermeability of these worlds, both in “The 
Day Mabata-bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab,” causes a hesitation which 
“leads the reader to question the existence of an irreducible opposition between ‘real’ and 
‘unreal’” (Durix 80). In their representation of trauma, therefore, these texts also attempt to 
engage with its defining quality: the terrifying sublimity of both atrocity and psychological 
trauma. This engagement, foregrounded by the collapse of distinct fictional worlds, 
“recapitulates . . . a dialectic between ‘codes of recognition’” (Slemon 413) inherent in 
literary conventions. It may thus be argued that Couto innovatively endeavours to expand 
both the vocabulary of suffering and the fictional space of his texts in order to foreground the 
notion that, if empirical reality is mediated by language, then fictional representations of it 
are doubly so and, where trauma is involved, perhaps even triply so. In addition to 
incorporating silences and lacunae inherent in both traumatic experience and its 
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narrativisation, Couto, like Akpan and Bulawayo, also immerses the implied reader in a 
structural irony which complicates his/her interpretation of the narrated events.  
   
1.4  Irony in Child-Focused Trauma Fiction 
 
Akpan, Bulawayo and Couto’s deployment of the perspective of the traumatised child in their 
respective texts raises some interesting issues. For example, Vickroy argues that  
the embeddedness of the child with others is the overriding feature of 
early development, and the need for attachment, connection and 
integration with others is the preeminent motivational thrust of the 
human organism throughout life. (24) 
 
Traumatic experience, especially during early childhood, causes an irrevocable rift in the 
cluster of needs which Vickroy calls a “motivational thrust”. In literary terms, this process 
may be regarded as an interrupted or disrupted bildung, since the child, when confronted with 
that which “disrupts the individual’s frame of reference and other psychological needs and 
related schemas” (McCann 10), has to reconfigure the set of coordinates from which s/he once 
derived meaning, a process which necessarily includes an unmaking of the self in an attempt 
to survive the circumstances which threaten both his/her subjectivity and personal agency. 
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise when, having witnessed her Hutu father being forced to 
bludgeon her Tutsi mother to death, nine-year old Monique of Akpan’s “My Parents’ 
Bedroom” asserts: “no one can ever call me Shenge again” (286). Monique’s rejection of the 
pet name her father and his ethnic group ascribe to her signals her attempt to re-identify 
herself by renouncing her previous notion of self. This example suggests that the Rwandan 
genocide which results in her witnessing her mother’s murder directly affects her 
individuation and sense of integration.  
The situation described above outlines a disintegration on three levels: of the child’s 
sense of identification with a parental figure or figures; of the child’s sense of self/ego; and of 
his/her sense of “being-in-common” (Durrant 5) with members of his/ her community.  If, as 
Vickroy argues, “our conceptions of self are determined and interpreted within cultural 
histories and contexts,” then a breach of the nature described above constitutes a destruction 
both of the very notion of being a subject and of being a subject amongst other subjects 
(Durrant 5, emphasis added), and consequently affects existential notions of the self.  
As previously argued, trauma is “suffered in the psyche precisely . . . because it is not 
available to experience” (Caruth, Unclaimed 61), and therefore constitutes a challenge to 
representation, particularly in relation to the cognitive and perceptual limitations of child 
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subjects. As such, Akpan, Bulawayo, and Couto’s texts all draw attention to their respective 
representational difficulties by not only “mimicking [trauma’s] form and symptoms” 
(Whitehead 3), but also through the installation of the stylistic device of irony.  Structural 
irony is assured by the fact that each of the narratives is either told or focalised by a child, 
whose interpretive and perceptive capacities are, by virtue of their respective ages, necessarily 
limited. Consequently, the meanings which may be derived from the texts become heavily 
reliant on the dialogical interplays between perception and misperception, apprehension and 
misapprehension, knowing and not knowing, and, lastly, between language and silence. The 
use of children as vehicles to represent traumatic experience, particularly in the postcolonial 
setting, highlights the ambiguities inherent in such experience and constitutes an examination 
and critique of existing social and political structures.  
 By definition, structural irony is a narrative strategy which serves to sustain duplex 
meaning and evaluation by involving “a naïve hero or unreliable narrator whose view of the 
world differs from the circumstances recognised by the reader and implied author” 
(Ellenström 51).  The installation of an ingénu(e) – a naïve or immature narrator and/or 
focaliser – in each of the texts dealt with in this study therefore facilitates the opening up of 
fictional worlds more inclusive of subjective interiority and hence the immaterial aspects of 
being. The latter occurs because the text is characterised by a double utterance: that of the 
implied author and that of the narrator/focaliser, a double utterance which generates 
numerous meanings from a single event because the latter is depicted from multiple 
perspectives. Consequently, the implied reader is perpetually engaged in amending the lacuna 
inherent in the narrative voice’s perception and interpretation of events, and the irony implicit 
in this limited perspective.  
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Chapter 2 
Returning to Paradise: Noviolet Bulawayo’s “Hitting Budapest” 
Ever since the 1960s, critics . . . have faulted writers for assuming that 
literary representation gives direct access to social reality while in fact 
their realism, as Coetzee . . . says about Alex la Guma, bears “the 
fingerprints of Literature all over it.”                                                                         
− Stefan Helgesson (Transnationalism in Southern African Literature 101) 
 
The dominant mode of representation adopted by Southern African writers over the twentieth 
and early twenty-first century has been that of realism. This trend, Bethlehem states, arises as 
a consequence of “writers and readers assum[ing] that literature and life [maintain] a one-to-
one relationship and that mimetic writing [is] capable of providing unmediated access to the 
real” (1; see also Gaylard 45). However, this assumption has been challenged not only by 
poststructuralist theories of language and representation, but also by inquiries into African 
cosmology and oral culture, and by philosophical queries into the nature of reality itself. As a 
result, mimesis has come to be regarded as “a turn toward a world that is by no means 
identical with empirical reality” (Gebauer and Wulf 9). Given these alternative perceptions 
both of mimesis and of the non-instrumental use of language, what Bethlehem terms 
“representational literalism” (6) is undermined by the unfathomable nature of trauma. The 
attempt at mimesis is further destabilised in texts dealing with trauma, a subject which resists 
“intrusive literary conventions such as chronology, [coherent] characterisation, dialogue, and 
a directive narrative voice” (Langer Testimonies 41), conventions upon which realism 
depends.  
 Narrated by the ten-year-old Darling, set in what is undoubtedly a Southern African 
country (most likely Zimbabwe), NoViolet Bulawayo’s Caine Prize-winning short story, 
“Hitting Budapest” (2011), is a very recent example of an enigmatic realist text emerging 
from the African continent. Darling’s casual narration of how she and five of her friends 
(Bastard, Godknows, Chipo, Stina, and Sbho) embark on an expedition from what she terms 
their “shanty” (44) or informal settlement, ironically named “Paradise” (43), in pursuit of 
something to eat in the middle-class suburb of Budapest, is permeated with structural irony. 
The latter is achieved through the use of a child narrator whose perceptions of her reality are 
juxtaposed with the implied reader’s penetration into the traumas of neglect, sexual 
exploitation, socio-political marginalisation, and poverty to which she and her friends are 
exposed. In other words, Bulawayo’s text implicates the reader in the construction of the 
underlying significance of the social, political and economic dynamics of trauma and 
18 
 
suffering as unwittingly conveyed by the narrator. The persistent use of irony in the narrative 
is thus reflective of the fact that “using language is never completely innocent because the 
linguistic fabric and the organisation of the world it carries with it determine the way the 
experience is perceived” (Durix 156).  
 The story begins with Darling explaining that the reason the groups of friends are going 
to Budapest, in spite of their parents’ wishes, is in order to harvest guavas. Upon arriving in 
Budapest, the children encounter a barefoot woman with dreadlocks who comes out of her 
house to interact with and take a picture of them. This happenstance reveals the power 
differential which those who are extremely poor have to contend. As a result, the children run 
away from the woman who, from their perspective, taunts them with what she has. Thereafter, 
they gorge themselves on the guavas and have to take a break from their expedition in order to 
defecate. While defecating, Stina discovers that there is another woman hanging from a noose 
in a nearby tree. The rest of the group congregate around the hung woman’s body and throw 
stones at her corpse. They soon grow tired of the game and decide to go back home. However, 
as they are leaving Bastard suggests that they ‘harvest’ the dead woman’s shoes in order to 
sell them for a loaf-and-a-half of bread. The children then all rush back to the woman’s body 
and retrieve the shoes, after which they run away from the scene. 
 My reading of Bulawayo’s story begins by examining the themes of deprivation and 
hunger in relation to the socio-economic configurations of “Paradise” as opposed to 
“Budapest,” and the notion of belonging as evidenced by the children’s contrastive 
experiences of being in one or the other location. My focus in section 2.1 is on questions of 
language, with specific reference to food, and the manner in which the child narrator engages 
with the theme of lack. The episode in which the children encounter a barefoot woman in 
Budapest, who takes a photograph of them, is essentially pertinent in section 2.2, since it 
throws into relief the uncomfortable issues of voyeurism, belonging,and ethical responsibility 
towards children – issues which implicate the reader in a misplaced empathetic subjective 
position. In section 2.3, I explore the children’s social invisibility, as indicated by the fact that 
the adults they interact with, apart from Mother of Bones, either ignore them or exploit them 
for their own purposes. In this regard, the pregnancy of ten-year-old Chipo illustrates the 
abusive appropriation of children’s bodies by the adults in “Paradise.” Chipo’s pregnancy, 
examined in section 2.4, is especially significant – both in terms of the kind of language the 
child narrator employs to describe it, and in relation to discourses of the gendered body as a 
site of subjectivity and cultural inscription. Similarly, section 2.5 analyses the body of the 
woman who has hanged herself, a scene encountered by the children towards the end of the 
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story. This scene plays a crucial role in the narrative’s depiction of the (mis)treatment and 
abuse of female bodies in a setting characterised by poverty and disavowal. Above all, my 
reading will emphasise the lacunae instantiated by the use of structural irony, as it serves both 
to engage the reader’s empathetic imagination and to provide multiple lenses through which 
the narrative action may be perceived. 
 
2.1 Poverty and Alterity: Going Hungry in Paradise 
 
“Hitting Budapest” opens with Darling stating 
We are on our way to Budapest . . . We are going even though we are not 
allowed to cross Mzilikazi Road, even though Bastard is supposed to be 
watching his little sister Fraction, even though mother would kill me 
dead if she found out; we are going. There are guavas to steal in 
Budapest, and right now I’d die for guavas, or anything for that matter. 
My stomach feels like someone just took a shovel and dug everything 
out. (43) 
The persistent use of the plural pronoun “we” indicates the children’s affinity with one 
another, and their wilful disregard of parental authority (which cannot be enforced, since the 
parents are conspicuously absent). Implicit in the above passage is the reality that, behind 
what appears to be typical child-like truancy lies a need for food so severe that it outweighs 
any obligation to be obedient. Darling’s description of the extremity of her hunger (“I’d die 
for guavas”), and the simile evocative of digging or forceful excavation which she 
subsequently employs, suggest that the guavas the children are intent on stealing are not so 
much a luxury or extravagance, but rather a necessity given the urgent need to keep the 
sensation of hunger at bay. The narrator’s use of the plural pronoun here, and repeatedly 
throughout the narrative, functions as an index to the collectivity of the children’s experience 
of hunger and suffering, and their undernourishment is a function of the dire socio-economic 
conditions which characterise the shanty settlement in which they live. As the opening 
passage reveals, then, the narrator immediately draws attention to the central dichotomy 
between scarcity and abundance, a dichotomy which is most pronounced in relation to the 
emphasis on the theme of food. 
  Food, in turn, is closely linked to the notion of place: while Paradise is associated with 
hunger, deprivation, and the children’s social invisibility, for example, Budapest is connected 
to an abundance of food, affluence, and the invisibility of adults (with the significant 
exception of the barefoot woman). In addition to the irony that “Paradise” is hardly Edenic 
20 
 
and its supply of fruit is scant, Bastard’s insistence, towards the end of the story, that “God 
does not live here” (47) underlines the absence of a benign and nurturing presence or 
environment – and, perhaps, moral universe. The symbolic names of Darling’s troupe also 
reflects of this absence; Godknows’ name, for instance, suggests futility and hopelessness, 
while Bastard’s sister’s name, Fraction, connotes incompleteness and fragmentation, both of 
which are incompatible with the notion of a Paradise. The religious, Christian overtones of the 
story are thus distinctive, in that they enhance the pessimism which, although undetected by 
the children themselves, nonetheless lies at the very heart of the narrative from the outset.  
 Darling describes Budapest, with its plenitude and comfort, as “like a different country. 
A country where people who are not like us live” (44). She explains: 
The air is empty; no burning things, no smell of cooking or something 
rotting; just plain air with nothing in its hands. Budapest is big, big 
houses with gravelled yards and tall fences and durawalls and flowers 
and green trees, heavy with fruit that’s waiting for us since nobody here 
seems to know what fruit is for. It’s the fruit that gives us courage, 
otherwise we wouldn’t be here. I keep expecting the streets to spit and 
tell us to go back to the shanty. (44) 
Her comparison of Budapest to Paradise here foregrounds the ironic naming of the latter, 
because it suggests that Budapest, in being, amongst other things, laden with “flowers and 
green trees . . . heavy with fruit,” (44) is more deserving of the moniker ‘paradise’.  She also 
scornfully notes that the inhabitants of this Edenic locale do not seem to recognise how lucky 
they are, and she perceives their disregard of the fruit as a waste of the food which she and her 
friends are in dire need of. Darling’s personification of the streets of Budapest in the final 
sentence of the quote above signifies not only her feeling of not belonging or of being out of 
place, but also that she herself perceives herself and her friends as intruders who, if detected, 
will be treated with contempt and summarily evicted. This, then,  impresses upon the implied 
reader the extent to which her self-identification or identity is characterised by negation: 
precisely because she focuses on what she is not, what she lacks and the types of rejections 
she anticipates from those more privileged than herself. She is thus also unwittingly 
suggesting that poverty confers a state of alterity, and that those who are poor are viewed as 
repulsive and consequently altogether other to those who are not.  In a similar vein, her 
personification of the air in Budapest indicates that it is unburdened (“just plain air with 
nothing in its hands”) and contrasts with her description of the air in Paradise, which smells of 
squalor – “burning things, [the] smell of cooking or something rotting” (44).  The air in 
Budapest is neither invasive, nor imbued with the pervasive sense of diminished resources 
21 
 
and amenities that necessarily accompany acute poverty. Explicitly, then, the children’s visit 
to Budapest is motivated by a desire not only to relieve their hunger, but, implicitly, to escape 
their circumstances.  
 Before setting off for Budapest, it becomes apparent that this is not the first time that the 
children have resorted to stealing fruit in order to satiate their hunger. “We used to steal from 
Chipo’s uncle’s tree, but that wasn’t stealing stealing,” Darlings confesses, “Now we have 
finished all the guavas in his tree so we have moved to strangers’ houses. We have stolen 
from so many, I cannot even count” (44). Employing a childlike logic, Darling’s statement 
defines real stealing as taking something from a stranger’s house rather than from people you 
know. The repetitive focus on stealing in order to survive indicates not only the extent of the 
desperation which characterises the children’s daily lives, but also signals the scarcity of both 
trees and fruit in Paradise. Having grown accustomed to the necessity of stealing, the children, 
as per Godknows’ instructions, devise a system by which they can keep track of which trees 
and streets they have as yet not raided.  
 
2.2 Alterity and the Barefoot Woman 
 
On their way to the chosen location, the children walk past SADC street, “where [they] have 
harvested every guava tree” (44), and see a face peeking at them from a window in a house in 
the yard of which is “the statue of a urinating boy with wings” (44). Darling’s direct 
description of the manikin’s appearance reinforces the presentation of Budapest as idyllic, but 
also implies the superfluous extravagance of the locale’s inhabitants, and forms a direct 
contrast to the children’s reality, because it signifies a carefree existence in a pastoral setting 
characterised by abundance.  Similarly, the love, innocence, and angelic nature of the manikin 
highlight the extent to which the children, despite belonging to Paradise, are deprived of these 
characteristics. In addition to the glass of the window representing a barrier or obstacle 
between the woman observing and the children, in that it mediates the perception of the one 
peering through it, despite its claim to transparency, there is the further implication that the 
viewer’s perception is itself distorted – as is confirmed by the woman’s subsequent interaction 
with the children. This interaction underlines the children’s alterity and exploitation at the 
hands of adults in this setting.  
 Darling also describes how the voice of the person peering from inside the house calls 
out to the children, telling them to stop, and a “tall, thin woman . . . [with] clean pretty feet” 
emerges from the house, with “a nice, pink camera dangl[ing] from her neck” (44). The 
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children obey her instruction, “not because the voice [tells] them to . . . but because the voice 
does not sound dangerous” and, when they see the woman, they “can tell from [her] thinness 
that [they] are not going to run” (44). Contrary to the conventionally Western association of 
slenderness with beauty and well-being, this passage implies that the children perceive 
thinness as a sign of physical weakness, a perception which they derive from their own 
circumstances.  The narrator’s repetitive emphasis on the woman’s “not-dangerous voice” 
(44), together with her recognition that she is physically unintimidating, suggests that Darling 
is streetwise: she can ascertain whether someone is threatening or not from their physique and 
tone of voice.  
  Upon approaching the children, the woman first smiles and then proceeds to engage in a 
mostly one-sided dialogue with them from behind a “locked gate” (44), the keys to which she 
neglects to bring with her.  This again reflects the distance already established between her 
and the children: whether intentional or not, the fact that the woman does not open the gate 
indicates that she is keeping the children at bay and foregrounds the voyeurism which marks 
her interaction with them. For instance, none of the children ask the woman her name and she 
herself does not divulge it to them. The children’s alterity in relation to the woman is further 
signalled both by her manner of dressing and by the motif of food: while she is barefoot as a 
matter of stylistic choice, the children are barefoot because they presumably have no shoes. 
She is also eating something which looks both delicious and colourful. From behind the gate, 
Darling observes:  
I look up at the woman’s red, chewing mouth. I can tell from the vein on 
the side of her neck, and the way she smacks her big lips, that what she is 
eating tastes good. I look closely at her hand, at the thing she is eating. It 
is flat, and the outer part is crusty. The top looks creamy and soft, and 
there are coin-like things on it, a deep pink, the colour of burn wounds. I 
see sprinkles of red and green and yellow, and finally the brown bumps, 
like pimples. (44) 
 
The microscopic manner in which the woman’s consumption of the unnamed and unidentified 
‘thing’ is described and the speculation regarding the sensations this ‘thing’ elicits in her 
indicate a hunger so great that it forces the children to become voyeurs of others eating. 
Notably, the children are voyeurs of her, as she is of them. It is as if the social dynamic that 
defines their respective roles means that neither party can interact with the other without the 
distance implied by voyeurism. With regards to the voyeurism, the sensuous details of the 
woman’s veins and lips, together with the focus on the texture of the food item being 
consumed in the quoted passage, highlight Darling’s desire to experience what the woman is 
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experiencing and the extent of her longing for food. The narrator’s scorn for what she 
perceives as the wasteful inhabitants of Budapest again surfaces in her bewilderment when the 
woman carelessly discards the item she is eating, without finishing it or asking the children if 
they want it: “We have never seen anyone throw food away” (44). Ironically, however, 
Darling’s attribution of wasteful behaviour depends on who is doing the wasting and on what 
the object being squandered is. When Bastard throws guavas at the wall of the house Sbho 
says she wants to own one day, for example, Darling does not respond with the same 
contempt she shows the woman. Her judgement of what may be deemed wasteful, therefore, 
is contingent, firstly, upon whether or not you are part of the friendship group and, secondly, 
whether or not food is something you have or lack. Given the narrative voice’s whimsical or 
child-like character, it would seem that the former is the overriding determinant. Logically, 
then, just as Bastard is allowed to throw away guavas because they are a non-luxurious item 
for the children, the woman is not allowed to throw away the pizza or pie she eating because it 
is perceived as a treat.  
 After dispensing with the food item – from the children’s perspective, an 
incomprehensible action – the woman tries to speak to Chipo, who “is not even listening 
[because] she is busy looking at the thing lying there on the ground” (44).  Despite the 
poignancy of Chipo’s gaze, however, the woman carries on speaking to the children as though 
nothing has happened. The latter’s desperation at this point is cumulatively expressed by their 
fascination with the item of food, their astonishment at the woman’s actions and, ultimately, 
Darling’s admission: “we want to eat the thing she is eating . . . we want our hunger to go 
away” (45).  
In light of the above, the gate which literally and physically separates the woman from 
the children also figuratively represents the class distance which hinders her from engaging 
empathetically with them. “The woman looks at us,” Darling notes, “like maybe she wants us 
to laugh since she is laughing” (44), but they do not. This moment is fraught with 
significance: it encapsulates the woman’s questionable ethical position in relation to the 
children, because it reveals not only her obliviousness to their needs, but also suggests that 
she is imposing her own on them. Her unreciprocated smiles and laughter emphasise the 
falsity of a position which, like the implied reader’s, is characterised both by distance and by 
a misplaced sense of philanthropic identification. The reader’s empathic imagination, stirred 
by his/her recognition of the dire circumstances informing the children’s lived experience and 
enhanced by the narrator’s blasé tone, which suggests that the latter is desensitised to her 
adversity, is repeatedly called into question through the parallel the narrative draws between 
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the implied reader and the woman.  Just as the woman with the “big jewellery . . . [and] skin 
that doesn’t even have a scar to show she is a living person” (45) attempts to engage with the 
children, the reader is drawn into an empathetic relationship with the text which is as 
efficacious as the “Save Darfur” (45) T-shirt the woman is wearing. Inherent in Darling’s 
insistence that one needs scars to show one is alive is the suggestion that, in order to identify 
with the suffering of others, one has to have it physically imprinted on one’s body. As 
opposed to having such marks imprinted on her body, however, the woman wears a 
philanthropic slogan on her T-shirt, words which are revealed to be a luxury and empty of 
content for those in the circumstances described in this context. Like a soldier’s battle scars or 
a gang’s tattoos, the children bear the marks of their adversity on their bodies. Hence, 
contrary to the woman and the reader, who perceive these scars as signs of deprivation, the 
children display admirable resilience. In other words, while perceived as victims, the children 
are, in fact, survivors.  
 The woman’s blindness to the children’s experience and definition of themselves is 
especially highlighted by the episode in which, without waiting for their consent, she decides 
to take photographs of them. She makes them pose and utter the conventional cue for staged 
photographic smiles: 
“Come on, say cheese, say cheese, cheese, cheeeeeese,” the woman 
enthuses, and everyone says “cheese.” Myself I don’t really say, because 
I am trying to remember what cheese means exactly, and I cannot 
remember. (44) 
 
Although permeated by, to use Terry Eagleton’s terms, “the thick mud of cliché” (qtd in 
Bethlehem 7), this passage nonetheless reflects the experiencing self’s inability to link the 
referent “cheese” with something concrete – or vaguely recalled – in her experiential world. 
For the children, food is not a matter of naming and differentiation, but of availability. The 
fact that Darling hesitates to say the word “cheese” implies that, for her at least, the word has 
lost its meaning. In Darling’s reality, the object cheese does not exist except in the abstract; it 
is a word that, essentially, is meaningless. Despite this, however, Darling does eventually 
pose for the photograph, an action which enhances the falsity of the photograph  –  not only 
are the smiles fake and forced, but the word that has occasioned the ‘smiles’ is empty of 
content.  
In the midst of this episode, Darling also recalls a story told to her by Mother of 
Bones – the fable of Dudu the bird “who learned and sang a new song whose words she did 
not know the meaning of, and was caught, killed, and cooked for dinner because in the song 
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she was actually begging people to kill and cook her” (45). This cautionary tale indicates the 
deceptive nature of language and the instability of meaning and reception:  in addition to 
motivating Darling’s hesitation in repeating the word “cheese”, it draws attention to the meta-
textual qualities of Bulawayo’s own narrative.  The instability of the sign, as previously 
argued, is a problematic factor in the representation of trauma since it raises questions of 
language’s (in)ability to accurately represent reality. Thus, Mother of Bones’ fable may also 
be read as a code through which “Hitting Budapest” gestures towards problems of expression 
in the context it wishes to describe. A further interrogation of the adequacy of language, 
during the spectacle of the children “all singing the word [cheese] and the camera . . . clicking 
and clicking and clicking,”  arises when Stina, who is characterised as “never really 
speaking,” begins “walking away” (45) from the group. Taken aback, the woman stops taking 
pictures to ask if he is “ok” (45), but the only response she is met with is the boy continuing 
to walk away and the others beginning to follow suit. While it may be argued that Stina walks 
away because he is tired of posing and wants to get to the guavas, his wordlessness imbues 
the gesture with a greater significance because it suggests a rejection of the woman’s 
appropriation of the children for her own ends. Her astonishment at the gesture and her futile 
inquiry into Stina’s well-being only serve to amplify the sense that she is oblivious to the 
children’s reality and unaware that they might be resistant to being treated as photographic 
material.  
 Furthermore, the woman’s insistence that the children pose for photographs and that 
they smile at the camera suggests that she, too, is a voyeur – in this case, of poverty. In asking 
the children to produce inauthentic smiles for the camera, she is in fact drawing attention to 
art’s inability to replicate reality. In other words, the fact that the photos she takes will depict 
the children smiling, despite the reality that they are hungry, renders the moments captured 
fundamentally untrue. Hence, what the photos represent is a meta-textual critique of whether 
or not ‘real’ life can indeed be reflected in art, particularly when the former is characterised 
by suffering and deprivation. Indeed, it could be argued that the taking of photographs – 
ostensibly the most unmediated or ‘lifelike’ form of representation – by implication indicates 
the reflexive manner in which the text questions its own narrative mode and, perhaps, all art. 
Read in the light of Helgesson’s comments in the epigraph to this chapter, the “fingerprints of 
Literature” in Bulawayo’s ostensibly realist text are evidenced by its symbolism, irony and, 
ultimately, by moments of meta-textuality such as those discussed above. 
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2.3 Children’s Contact with Adults in “Hitting Budapest” 
 
The encounter with the barefoot woman also emphasises the contrast between the children’s 
intersubjective relations in Paradise, and those they experience in Budapest, a contrast 
especially evident in the manner with which the children respond to the woman smiling at 
them. As Darling reports, “we wait for her, so we can see what she is smiling for, or at: 
nobody really ever smiles at us in Paradise. Except Mother of Bones, who smiles at anything” 
(44).  Unaccustomed to being treated with at least the veneer of kindness, the children are not 
equipped to respond appropriately to the woman’s smile. At the very least, they find her 
behaviour puzzling, because she does not know them, and respond to it with confusion and 
suspicion. Implicit in Darling’s observation, then, is the suggestion that the extreme material 
deprivation which characterises their shanty settlement renders its inhabitants so preoccupied 
with the pursuit of basic human needs that they have very little to smile about.  The depiction 
of smiling as a luxury afforded only to those who are not starving therefore serves to amplify 
the dichotomy of scarcity and abundance, and the woman’s implicit location in the realm of 
privilege, despite her bohemian and humanitarian appearance – her “Save Darfur” T-shirt, 
bare feet, dreadlocks (45) – and well-meaning gestures. The discrepancy is further evidenced 
by the fact that she asks to take snapshots of them, rather than offers to feed them, and in her 
misinterpretation of the direction of Chipo’s gaze: 
“What’s that?” Chipo asks, pointing at the thing [the woman is eating] 
with one hand and rubbing her stomach with the other. 
“Oh, this? It’s a camera,” the woman says, which we know. (44) 
 
The woman’s misinterpretation of Chipo’s gesture signifying hunger and her unintentionally 
condescending response to Chipo’s question once again exemplifies the reality that, despite 
her philanthropic pretensions, she is merely an observer of the children’s misfortune.  
Moreover, the distance between herself and the children is characterised not only by the 
physical boundary of the gate and the fact that she has what they lack, but also by her trying 
to impress the children by revealing that she is from overseas: “I’m from London,” she says, 
“This is my first time visiting my dad’s country” (44). Her positioning of herself as an 
outsider is further emphasised when she comments, “I can’t stand the heat, and the hard earth” 
(44).  Implicitly, then, it is her father rather than she herself who belongs in the country, and 
her discomfort with the climate further illustrates her sense of being out of place.  
The notion that place is linked to privilege and mobility to escape from deprivation 
emerges when, upon arriving in Budapest, Sbho daydreams  aloud of one day living in a 
27 
 
house in Budapest, a dream which she insists will be realised because she is “going to marry a 
man from Budapest” (46). In response to this assertion, Bastard is quick to point out that 
“Budapest is not a toilet where anyone can just walk in” (46). Instead, to gain access to 
privilege, one has to “go out of the country . . . make a lot of money and come back and buy a 
house in . . . Budapest or Los Angeles, even Paris” (46). Bastard’s response here underlines 
the notion of exclusion in relation to place in the story, and suggests the impossibility of 
thriving in one’s own country: as Darling has earlier revealed, Godknows’ uncle went to 
London, but did not return and no longer writes or sends them sweets (44). The general sense, 
then, is that the socio-economic climate of the country the children inhabit is not conducive to 
the betterment of its citizens.   
 In this regard, the name of the woman in Paradise who smiles indiscriminately and 
tells the children traditional African fables at bedtime – “Mother of Bones” – is noteworthy. 
Firstly, her name might be taken literally to signify her emaciated, skeletal frame, or that she 
has produced a child who is severely malnourished. Secondly, her mothering of the children 
suggests that the latter are, metaphorically, ‘the bones,’ the hungry ones, frail and waif-like. 
Lastly, the fact that “she smiles at anything” (44) indicates either that she is senile or 
unhinged, and is oblivious to her own condition and the conditions surrounding her.  
 At various points throughout the story, the narrator draws attention to the fact that the 
adults in Paradise treat the children with indifference. For example, in responding to the 
questions posed by the barefoot woman in Budapest, Darling observes, “We do not answer 
because we are not used to adults asking us anything” (45). Read in isolation, this could be 
regarded as articulating the hierarchical principle that children are minors and therefore not to 
be accorded equivalent attention as adults. Alternatively, as Darling indicates earlier, the 
adults are distracted by gambling, gossiping, and attempting to survive in dire socio-economic 
conditions. 
Nevertheless, all of the children express the desire to escape their immediate 
environment, as is evident in the competitive one-upmanship of their respective dreams of 
getting out of Paradise. These ambitions, however, by their very improbability, are shrouded 
in a sense of unreality and futility. When Darling boasts about going to America to live with 
her aunt in the future, for example, Bastard quickly deflates her dream by retorting: “Well, 
go, go to that America and work in nursing homes and clean poop. You think we have never 
heard the stories!” (46). His response suggests the futility of attempting to escape suffering by 
changing one’s location. Implicit in his reference to the stories of others who have left 
Paradise in pursuit of what they thought would be a better life – only to be degraded by 
28 
 
having to take on humiliating, menial work – is the suggestion that poverty is a 
predetermined, ubiquitous and unalterable condition. In response to Bastard’s cutting but 
insightful rebuttal, which the reader identifies as grounded in realities of which Darling is 
naïvely unaware or cannot fathom and therefore dismisses, Darling confides: 
I think about turning right around and beating Bastard for saying that 
about my America . . . But I shut up and walk away. I know he is just 
jealous. Because he has nobody in America. Because Aunt Fostalina is 
not his aunt. Because he is Bastard and I am Darling. (46, emphasis 
added)  
 
While indicative of an internal hierarchy within the group of the children, the above passage 
also reveals the author’s intentionally symbolic use of names. As Darling implicitly (but 
ironically) asserts, her name ostensibly signifies she is wanted, loved, treasured and lucky: it 
is a term of endearment. By contrast, Bastard’s name conveys the sense that he is unwanted, 
unloved and unlucky. The opposition between the two children’s names, as interpreted by the 
narrator, is, however, undermined by the fact that both of them in reality inhabit a community 
characterised by lack, and are deprived of nurturing. Irrespective of their names, therefore, 
both children’s experience is one of socio-economic hardship, marginality and invisibility.  
The impossibility of escape is further evidenced by Chipo’s already thwarted dream of 
receiving an education: 
“When we were going to school, my teacher Mr. Gono said you need an 
education to make money, that’s what he said, my own teacher.” Chipo 
rubs her stomach and says Mr Gono’s name so proudly like he is her 
own father, like he is something special, like maybe it’s him inside her 
stomach. (46, emphasis added) 
 
Chipo’s comment here reveals that the children no longer go to school, though the reasons are 
not divulged. Moreover, Darling’s observations regarding the manner in which Chipo proudly 
speaks about her former teacher suggest that Mr Gono’s treatment of Chipo has meant that 
she has come to regard him as a father figure – perhaps as a substitute for a father who is 
absent. The fact that Chipo no longer goes to school therefore means that not only has she lost 
a mentor, but also a man from whom she received support, encouragement and sympathetic 
attention. The loss of Mr Gono possibly has further implications, in that the constructive 
interaction Chipo had with him has been replaced by an abusive interaction with a 
grandfather who has sexually exploited and impregnated her. Given her pregnancy and the 
impending responsibility of having to look after a child whilst herself still a child, Chipo’s 
earlier dream of achieving the education that, she insists, would confer upward social 
mobility, has been rendered highly improbable by her present and future circumstances. The 
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earlier description of her rubbing her stomach while she is speaking may thus be read as 
unintentionally reflective of the inescapable reality that her pregnancy delimits the possibility 
of a more prosperous future. Notably, the ways in which the children assert a proprietorial 
pride in certain places and people (“your home” “my own teacher” “her own father” “my 
America”) is deeply ironic, since that they do not, in reality, possess any of these – and are 
unlikely to do so in the future.   
 Additionally, the degree of familiarity and identification with which the children 
speak about foreign places implies the insignificance of the place they inhabit, and suggests 
that being in Paradise is like being nowhere. It is also reflective of the effects of globalisation, 
which means that, in a sense, these foreign places have already been incorporated into the 
children’s world – at least as desirable destinations, though in reality they have as little 
purchase as “cheese”. This is reflected in the children’s insistence that they must be able to 
return to Paradise.  Another effect of globalisation, however, is the perpetual poverty of some 
communities. Thus, implicit in Bastard’s retort to Darling’s wish to go to America is the idea 
that she will essentially carry poverty with her wherever she goes. These other places are also 
interpreted by the children as only a means through which they can procure the financial 
security they need in order to survive in their context. Indeed, the game in which the children 
are engaging to determine who has the best dream of escaping Paradise, although comical, is 
ironised by the excruciatingly dire circumstances of their lived reality.  Ultimately, it is clear 
to the implied reader that the children will not be going anywhere – either way. 
 The dichotomy between scarcity/poverty and abundance/material wealth, read in 
relation to the improbability of escape, is integral to the narrative’s depiction of the children’s 
suffering. Indeed, the manner in which these themes emerge from the limited interpretive 
capacity of the child narrator attests to the effectiveness of the author’s installation of 
structural irony: the gap between the children’s illusions, claims to a brighter future, and 
defiant bravado/one-upmanship, and the reality of their abject poverty, static and deterministic 
social context, and bleak future illustrates the complexity of meaning this stylistic feature 
generates. 
  
2.4 Chipo’s Pregnancy  
 
 Within the context of Bulawayo’s narrative as a whole, the inattention to or social invisibility 
of children manifests itself in their neglect and exploitation, realities which initially emerge in 
Bastard having to look after his little sister and the children being unsupervised, but which are 
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more horrifically evoked by Chipo’s pregnancy at the age of ten. Chipo’s pregnancy signals 
not only the sexualised abuse of a child’s body, but also connotes the gender politics which 
underpin the impoverished setting of Paradise: it is the site onto which the abuse of male 
power and the instrumental use of the female body for male sexual gratification are inscribed. 
The gravity of the offense here is exacerbated by the fact that her own grandfather is the 
father of her child; thus, not only is she a victim of masculine oppression, she has also been 
violated by a close family member. Chipo’s pregnancy also suggests that her grandfather 
gives her attention when he is abusing her, and that therefore she can only receive this 
attention when she is used as an object of sexual desire. 
The sexual violation of a child’s body interferes with the child’s identity and psychic 
well-being, particularly if the latter is primarily located in the body: “the body and 
embodiment are central – not peripheral to the development and construction of the self” 
(Cahill 131). Chipo’s body thus represents a contradiction, since the depiction of a child about 
to give birth to another child sends mixed messages or is fundamentally ambiguous: it 
destabilises the conventional definition of what it means to have a child’s body by not only 
attributing sexuality, but also fertility to it. Thus, while inhabiting a body on the cusp between 
childhood and puberty herself, Chipo will also be forced to perform the adult task of being the 
custodian of a life, a responsibility which far exceeds her cognitive and emotional framework. 
The life she is carrying is literally a burden which she is ill-equipped to shoulder, though 
Darling describes her stomach as “the size of a soccer ball, not too big” (44). Darling’s 
comparison of Chipo’s stomach with a soccer ball reveals the narrator’s frame of reference, 
which entails using childlike comparisons to describe the supposedly adult phenomenon of 
pregnancy.  
The manner in which Darling deals with the question of Chipo’s pregnancy is 
noteworthy, since she exhibits no sign of being shocked or scandalised, but rather a childlike 
curiosity, and an offhand, noncommittal acceptance which suggests that this occurrence is 
anything but remarkable or out of the ordinary. Apart from the barefoot woman, who inquires 
as to how old Chipo is, and whom the savvy Darling describes as “looking at [Chipo’s] 
stomach like she has never seen anybody pregnant” (44) while Chipo is eyeing the discarded 
item of food, for instance, there is no indication that any of the adults or children in Paradise 
either show concern about or question the propriety of the child’s pregnancy. This speaks 
volumes about the apathy and hopelessness in that locale. The narrator’s blasé depiction of 
Chipo’s pregnancy demonstrates the narrative’s installation of structural irony, since the 
implied reader will no doubt conclude that the child focaliser’s perspective is characterised by 
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lacuna in both her socio-political and psychological awareness.  Given this alignment, the 
implications surrounding the enormity of Chipo’s violation and questions of social and ethical 
responsibilities towards children extend beyond the confines of the story to include the 
(mis)treatment of children in settings – fictional or otherwise – characterised by deprivation in 
general.  
  Darling’s deadpan depiction of Chipo’s pregnancy may also be read as a narrative 
device which ironically emphasises the latter’s subjective unsettlement and the collapse of 
coherence in her experience of self, an unsettlement which is first expressed when the 
children stop on AU street so that Chipo can vomit (45). Obviously this can be interpreted 
literally as symptomatic of her morning sickness. However, given that the names of all the 
children, places and streets in the story are significant, the fact that Chipo vomits in the street 
named after the acronym of the African Union is especially telling, since this episode 
highlights the manner in which the narrative critiques political organisations and alliances 
which, although they proclaim that they assist communities plagued by poverty, 
unemployment and the like, exist only as words, disembodied signposts that have no material 
impact on these conditions. Thus, Chipo’s vomiting figuratively signals a rejection of political 
structures which fail to protect the most vulnerable members of any society, especially 
children. In other words, the gap in awareness implicit here is, in fact, an adult failure. The 
narrative’s critique of such organisations is further evidenced by the fact that a number of 
streets the hungry children walk along (SADC, IMF) are named after these putatively well-
meaning, but evidently absent and ineffectual, political and financial organisations. 
When Bastard becomes irritated at having to wait for Chipo, who is lagging behind on 
the road to Budapest, he interrogates then argues with Darling: 
“Where exactly does a baby come out of?” 
“From the same way it gets into the stomach.” 
“How exactly does it get into the stomach?” 
“First, God has to put it there.” 
“No, not God. A man has to put it there, my cousin Musa told me. Didn’t 
your grandfather put it there Chipo?” 
She nods. (43) 
 
Bastard’s curiosity and mixture of ignorance and half-assimilated knowledge regarding 
conception and childbirth, in this passage, is juxtaposed with his (and Darling’s) non-
committal attitude to the very fact of their friend’s pregnancy, and apparent lack of any sense 
of indignation, shock or impropriety in relation to its origins, as is particularly evident in 
Bastard’s dispassionate question: “Didn’t your grandfather put it there Chipo?” Implicit in the 
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seemingly nonchalant manner in which Bastard asks this question is the normalisation – or, at 
least, unexceptionality – of incest and child abuse in “Paradise.” Additionally, the fact that it 
is Chipo’s grandfather who is responsible for her impregnation points to the marked absence 
of any reference to Chipo’s parents, both in her own and her friends’ speech, and in the 
narration of the text itself. Thus, her pregnancy foregrounds questions of ethical relations 
between adults and children – for the implied reader, if not for the characters themselves.  The 
absence of allusions to Chipo’s parents and, indeed, reference to any parental presence or 
supervision in the story, implies a localised or domestic malfunction. This, in turn, forms an 
index to the social coordinates of a fractured and disregarding community which, by virtue of 
being unable to protect and provide for its youngest members, is rendered dysfunctional.  
 Furthermore, it is significant that Chipo does not engage much in her friends’ 
discussion of her pregnancy, a discussion in which there is a contest between the offhand and 
(somewhat) more informed Darling and the ignorant and curious Bastard (whose name 
suggests that he should know more). For example, Bastard and Darling argue about how 
Chipo will feed the baby, the former commenting, “But Chipo’s breasts are small. Like 
stones.” And the latter retorting, “They will grow when the baby comes. Isn’t it Chipo?”  
Chipo herself responds: “I don’t want my breasts to grow. I don’t want a baby. I don’t want 
anything, just guavas.”  Darling then relates that Chipo “takes off. We run after her” (44). 
Chipo’s resistance to the biological changes her body is undergoing and her psychological 
distress are evident in the desperate, but feeble and futile, way in which she attempts to negate 
the physical reality of her pregnancy, the fact that her breasts will indeed enlarge, and the 
inevitability that she will give birth to the child. Her dismissal here explicitly indicates she is 
not ready for the changes which are nonetheless occurring in her body. 
In his essay on children’s psychological responses to trauma and their narrative 
reconstructions of traumatic experience in therapy, “Children, Trauma and Subordinate 
Storyline Development,” Michael White observes: 
No child is a passive recipient of trauma, regardless of the nature of this 
trauma . . . children take action to minimise their exposure to trauma and 
to decrease their vulnerability to it by modifying the traumatic episodes 
they are subject to, or by finding ways of modifying the effects of this 
trauma on their lives. However, it is more common for these responses to 
go unnoticed, or to be punished, or to be disqualified through ridicule 
and diminishment within the trauma context. (148) 
 
Read alongside White’s claim, Chipo’s attempt to reject the changes occurring in her body 
and escape the probing questions of her friends, together with the narrator’s inability to 
33 
 
penetrate the significance of her friend’s behaviour, are symptomatic of both children’s 
responses to traumatic experience. The meaning behind Chipo’s outburst, for example, is 
contained in her assertion “I don’t want anything,” and in her flight, both of which indicate 
denial and an inability to cope with reality.  The continuation “but guavas” clearly expresses 
her immediate priorities. 
  Chipo’s loss both of her physical and psychic innocence necessarily undermines the 
potential for a change in her circumstances and, by extension, foregrounds the bleak 
circumstances with which her unborn child will have to contend.  Thus, the fact that she is 
acted upon, that her innocence is both literally and figuratively ‘killed’ by her grandfather, 
further suggests that the kinds of violations she has endured and will continue to endure will, 
ultimately, rob her of personal agency.    
 
2.5 The Female Body: Politics, Ambiguity and Self-annihilation 
 
In her argument regarding the manner in which fictional representations of historical traumas 
inscribe such traumas on the bodies of characters, Vickroy claims that 
Social conflicts are enacted in character’s personal conflicts, where 
historical trauma is personalized by exploring its effects in bodily 
violations and wounds, in sexuality, or in the struggle to achieve 
emotional intimacy. (168) 
 
The violation of the body is thus symbolic of disturbances in interpersonal relations and, by 
extension, ruptures in entire communities. Implicit here is the suggestion that one of the ways 
in which trauma is conventionally represented in fiction is via the effects of physical 
violation, particularly when grounded in sexuality. Bulawayo’s treatment of the female body 
in “Hitting Budapest” is thus pivotal, because the social dysfunctionality which characterises 
the impoverished setting from which the children derive is illustrated with reference, firstly, to 
the figure of the pregnant Chipo and, secondly, through the corpse of a woman who has 
committed suicide.  
Like Chipo’s body, the body of the hanged woman the children encounter on their way 
back to Paradise, towards the end of the story, foregrounds a persistent pessimism and 
bleakness in the narrative, though perhaps the shock and horror the reader experiences at this 
climax to the events related is only momentarily shared by the children themselves. 
Overlapping with the moment in which the narrator provides a detailed account of herself and 
her friends defecating in the bush, the discovery of the body represents a moment of crisis 
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which is profoundly linked to the experience of abjection. The children are literally suffering 
from constipation and bloatedness, as Darling explains, having gorged themselves on the 
“bull guavas” in Budapest. “When it comes to defecating,” Darling disarmingly reveals, “we 
get in so much pain, like giving birth to a country” (46). Read in relation to her earlier 
description of Bastard running at the forefront of the group because “he won country-game 
[sic] . . . and thinks he rules” (43), the simile evoking a parallel between the painful process of 
defecation – “giving birth to a country” (46) – and the equally agonising process of achieving 
national independence implies that the country the children have inherited and inhabit is 
tantamount to faeces, and that the people who rule it are all ‘bastards’. Implicit, too, in the 
image of the guava seeds that “get you constipated when you eat too much” and which cause 
“so much pain”(46) when defecating is the suggestion that the scars of adversity the children 
bear are a result of being debased – in this case,  even the food they eat violates them.  
While the act of defecating entails the expulsion of waste, and hence the purification 
of the body, being in the presence of a corpse constitutes a destabilisation of the very notion 
of a ‘pure body,’ in that it represents the ultimate state of decay: death. Darling describes the 
disruption of the defecating episode by Godknows’ discovery of the woman’s body in terms 
which draw attention to the magnitude of her simultaneous disquiet and fascination at the 
scene:  
The woman’s thin arms hang limp at the sides, and her hands and feet 
point to the ground, like somebody drew her there, a straight line hanging 
in the air. Her eyes are the scariest part, they look too white, and her 
mouth is open wide. The woman is wearing a yellow dress, and the grass 
licks the tip of her shoes. (47) 
 
The woman’s thin arms and stick-like figure, silhouetted against the sky, suggest that she is 
thin or malnourished and thus more likely a resident of Paradise than of Budapest. Notably, 
while the woman’s gaping mouth is a result of rigor mortis, it is also evocative of a 
suppressed scream, a scream which symbolically connotes her vulnerability and marginality 
and, by extension, signifies that of all females in the context. This gendered experience, is 
primarily illustrated by the appropriation of Chipo’s body for male sexual gratification, and is 
also a function of women’s double othering/alterity as inhabitants of a dysfunctional 
community characterised by extreme deprivation. Similarly, the lifelessness evoked by the 
image of the dead woman’s empty, pale upturned eyeballs, and the sickliness symbolised by 
the colour of her dress, conveys a sense of degeneration and decay.  The futility, finality and 
morbidity in this passage therefore correspond with the wider context of a setting 
characterised by hunger, poverty, hopelessness, neglect and exploitation.  
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Furthermore, the body of the hanged woman, juxtaposed with that of the pregnant 
Chipo, elucidates the failure of social, economic, familial and political structures to secure 
human dignity in this environment. This juxtaposition points to the irony inherent in the 
narrative’s depiction of death. While the woman’s presumed suicide, for example, signals a 
desire to return to the womb (to be buried or to return to a sublimated state prior to birth and 
after death), Chipo clings to the hope of a better life which the knowing reader perceives as a 
kind of death.  
The fact that the woman does not have a name or an identity, apart from that ascribed 
to her by her sex, suggests, in a sense, that her self-annihilating body foregrounds the 
vulnerability of all female bodies in “Paradise”. Hence, while the new life that Chipo’s body 
is carrying represents the burden rather than the joys of motherhood, the hanged woman’s 
body represents the death of hope. The latter may be inferred from the fact that, in a literal 
sense, the female body is the physical custodian of future generations; its annihilation 
therefore, in addition to presaging Chipo’s fate, foregrounds the futility of the children’s 
dreams of a different future. This pessimistic reading is first prompted by the episode in 
which the children “gallop along Hope Street past the big stadium with the glimmering 
benches [they will] never sit on” (43) on their way to Budapest, a seemingly minor detail 
which, together with the fact that Chipo has been robbed of her subjective integrity, prefigures 
the hopelessness evoked by the body of the hanged woman. Darling’s recognition that she and 
her friends will never be granted access to the “glimmering benches” of the stadium, erected 
post-independence, thus impresses upon the implied reader the futility of hope itself in the 
story’s context. 
In writing about the role the body plays in histories of trauma, Vickroy argues that 
“the body becomes the testing ground for human endurance” (168). In similar vein, in her 
book on the physical violence of rape, Roberta Culbertson maintains: 
No experience is more one’s own than harm to one’s own skin. None is 
more locked within that skin, played out within it in actions other than 
words, in patterns of consciousness below the everyday and the 
construction of language. (170) 
 
Implicit in both Vickroy and Culbertson’s claims is the notion that the body in pain or the 
suffering body constitutes an inexpressible reality, and that the endurance or survival of the 
body takes precedence over the ability to articulate one’s lived experience in words. In this 
sense, the body speaks for itself.  In light of the concerns raised by such observations, it could 
be argued that Chipo embodies an inarticulable violation which ensues from the socio-
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political realities of her community, and that the hanged woman is the ultimate, mute 
expression of the damage wrought by a community torn asunder by pervasive and extreme 
poverty. As such, the representation of both female bodies in “Hitting Budapest” raises 
questions of responsibility and evokes an ethical response in the implied reader. 
The desperation which characterises the community depicted in Bulawayo’s story is 
most shockingly displayed when the children steal the dead woman’s shoes in order to sell 
them and buy bread, implicitly a luxury rather than commonplace in this context. Bastard 
observes that “the woman’s shoes look almost new” and that if they sell them they can “buy a 
loaf, or maybe one-and-a-half” (47). What might appear to be a desecration of the lifeless and 
abandoned female body at this point is juxtaposed with the survival instinct of the children, 
and their determination to use whatever means are at their disposal to procure something, 
however meagre, to eat. Inherent in this juxtaposition is an ethical conundrum for the implied 
reader: the preservation of the dignity of the dead versus the necessity for survival. It is 
significant that this dilemma does not present itself to Darling and her friends for, 
immediately Bastard has proposed this plan of action, they “all turn around . . . rushing . . . 
running . . . running and laughing and laughing and laughing” (47), and head towards the 
woman’s hanging body to remove her shoes. Driven by bravado (perhaps even hysteria) and 
the overwhelming desire to escape hunger, the children’s actions are premised on the 
resourcefulness of necessity and the overriding need to improvise ways to feed themselves. 
The reader’s possible sense of abhorrence at the children’s proposed violation of the dead 
woman’s body emphasises his/her positioning as parallel to that of the barefoot woman in 
Budapest, since this emotional response is premised on the assumption that the dead are 
entitled to dignity and that the living are ethically charged to treat them with such. In the 
children’s lived reality, however, abstract concepts such as ‘the dignity of the dead’ are as 
effectual and as meaningful as “cheese,” since even the living, in this case, are deprived of 
basic human needs. This episode illustrates that the material possibility of food wins over 
abstract notions such as dignity. It may thus be deduced that the parallel the narrative 
establishes between the woman’s body and that of Chipo suggests that the ethical questions 
posed by the children’s violation of the woman’s corpse correspond with those posed by 
Chipo’s grandfather abusing his granddaughter. In other words, given the parallel, it could be 
argued that Chipo’s grandfather’s violation of his granddaughter’s body is similar to that of 
the children violating the corpse, precisely because both actions undermine what, in both 
cases, the reader perceives to be the sanctity of the body.  
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It may be inferred from the narrator’s conversational tone in “Hitting Budapest” that 
she does not seem to take cognisance of the extremely disconcerting events she narrates. It is 
the reader’s perception of the broader implications of these events which creates a sense of 
unease. Darling relates the story in a factual manner, with muted emotional content, which is 
unnerving to the reader as it is indicative of a psychic distancing or detachment. The reader’s 
unsettlement is however premised on his/her own emotive response to the story.  The 
narrative gestures towards the characters’ internal emotional states through the use of 
metaphor, irony and symbolism, and the narrator’s diction is symptomatic of the manner in 
which the subject matter, namely trauma, resists representation. Consequently, the narrative 
voice reflects not only of the limitations of the child focaliser’s perceptive abilities, but also of 
the difficulty of attempting to inscribe meaning onto that which ineluctably resists such an 
attempt.  The narrative voice’s distance from the events she narrates is suggestive of an 
unresolved, or perhaps irresolvable, psychological distress. This reading is, however, 
contingent on whether or not the reader perceives the children more as victims than survivors, 
and responds emotively to their plight or perceives the narrative as a self-reflexive 
interrogation of children’s suffering in locations characterised by acute poverty. 
 It is also highly significant that the story’s closing episode constitutes the first 
occasion on which the children are described as laughing, the implication being that their 
laughter will be as fleeting as the satisfaction they will derive from eating bread they obtain 
by selling the dead woman’s shoes. The children’s laughter is simultaneously emblematic of 
their survival instinct and of the momentary relief afforded by what to the implied reader 
might seem a macabre windfall. The demanding activity of running and laughing at the same 
time connotes the expulsion of an anxious or hysterical energy symptomatic of resilience. Put 
simply, the children’s response here suggests that their childlike actions are informed by what 
the reader, having experienced the structural irony of the narrative, perceives as a tragic 
optimism, but for them constitutes a temporary relief.  Ultimately, the light-hearted delivery 
of Bulawayo’s story not only complicates the reader’s interpretation of  what the child 
characters endure, but also implicates the reader in the need for the revision of human rights at 
a practical level.   
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Chapter 3 
Fictionalising a Traumatic History: Uwem Akpan’s “My Parents’ Bedroom” 
No matter how prepared we are to make sense of evil we are never    
prepared enough.   
 
– Richard Kearney (“Evil, Monstrosity and the Sublime” 501) 
 
There is an undeniable violence in [the] act of naming, because it effectively 
reduces the unspeakable terror and the singularity of the event to “one among 
many”. The moment we call an event (or series of events) “genocide” it 
becomes, by unavoidable implication, “just another genocide”.    
 
– Leonhard Praeg (The Geometry of Violence 3) 
 
 
Say You’re One of Them derives its title from the penultimate story of Akpan’s collection, 
“My Parents’ Bedroom”, a story which recounts traumatic occurrences in the child focaliser’s 
life during the onset of the Rwandan genocide. Narrating against the backdrop of this social 
trauma, nine-year old Monique provides an account of the trail of events that lead, over two 
days, to her being attacked by armed men in her family home and witnessing her Hutu father 
bludgeon her Tutsi mother to death in their marital bedroom. The story begins at sunset with 
Monique noting that she and her baby brother, Jean, have been forbidden to go outdoors since 
the previous day. Their mother pretends to be leaving the house for the night, while warning 
the children to pretend no-one is at home if anybody should ask. During that night, however, 
Monique is tricked by her uncle André into letting him and a mob of Hutu people into the 
house. This mob, lead by Monique’s great uncle, “the Wizard,” ransacks the house and a few 
of the men assault and attempt to rape Monique. The children’s parents return the following 
morning, but they do not want to listen to Monique’s account of the previous night’s events, 
opting rather to soothe her. On the second evening, the mob comes to the house again and this 
time Papa leaves with them after having been forced to kill his wife in front of his children. 
Ultimately, the family home, which forms the dominant setting of the narrative and which 
both restricts and determines the movements of the characters as well as the plot, is destroyed. 
The story ends with Monique and Jean, stranded amongst a colossal mass of abandoned 
corpses. Despite the implication that the father will inevitably be hunted down and killed, the 
ending also suggests that the children have been rescued from death through Maman having 
sacrificed her life to ensure their safety. 
 From the outset, Monique registers a tension in her parents’ relationship, as the 
domestic setting is threatened by internecine conflict instigated by the public, or political, 
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sphere. The increasing proximity of this threat, evident in her surroundings and emphasised 
by the exponential rise of the tension between her parents, culminates in the ultimate of 
violent acts, that of Papa being forced to murder his spouse in front of his children.  It 
gradually becomes apparent that the tension between the parents stems from their desire to 
protect the entire family unit; the safety of the family unit as a whole, however, must be 
sacrificed in order to ensure the safety of Monique and her younger brother.  The phrase “say 
you’re one of them” (266) is uttered by her mother and constitutes a warning to Monique that 
if anyone should come to the house, she must tell them she is a Hutu. In constituting the title 
of the entire collection, the phrase implies that each of the narratives’ contexts constitutes an 
unfavourable environment in which the characters’ primary goal and motivation is survival. 
The phrase also signifies notions of identity, belonging and entitlement – all of which are 
undermined in “My Parents’ Bedroom” because they are constantly depicted as selective and 
exclusionary. Indeed, it is exclusionary manoeuvres which are at the murderous heart of the 
genocide itself.  
 Section 3.1 of this chapter provides a brief historical background to the Rwandan 
genocide and the complex relationship between language and atrocity in narrative. This is 
followed, in section 3.2, by a close reading of the depiction of the two central crises of the 
story in relation to notions of the body, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity.  Section 3.3 
examines the theme of sacrifice in relation to the Christian symbolism in the text, while 
section 3.4 comprises a discussion of the relationship between the motif of silence as a 
narrative tool in representing trauma. In all of the sections, the main emphasis is on the child 
narrator/ focaliser’s (mis)perceptions and reactions to the atrocity she witnesses.  
 
3.1 Social Trauma and the Embodied Subject 
 
In attempting to document his experience of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the British 
journalist Fergal Keane confides:  
In writing about Rwanda, I am conscious that my words will always be 
unequal to the task of conveying the full horror of the crime of genocide. 
For what I encountered was evil in a form that frequently rendered me 
inarticulate . . . Although I had seen war before, had seen the face of 
cruelty, Rwanda belonged in a nightmare zone where my capacity to 
understand, much less rationalize, was overwhelmed. (4) 
 
In drawing attention to his inability to articulate the atrocities he witnessed, Keane’s statement 
may be read as a testament to what Steiner terms “the failure of the written word in the face of 
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the inhuman” (71). Keane underlines language’s inability to “be the equivalent of a reality” 
(Coward 47), particularly when the reality it seeks to represent is characterised by 
fragmentation and incoherence.  As a result, he arrives at the conclusion that, faced with the 
incomprehensibility of the social trauma of genocide, the subject, whether as witness or 
victim, is violently acted upon and invaded by a phenomenon that destabilises notions of a 
stable, unitary subjectivity and defies understanding. In this regard, Chesca Long-Innes 
diagnoses the collapse of the realist assumption of verisimilitude in Couto’s early narratives 
as a reaction to “scenes and images of mass destruction” that, like the Rwandan genocide, 
have the power to damage “systems of perception and representation” (178). It therefore 
follows that, due to the sense of unreality social traumas present, textual representations of 
such atrocities pose particular challenges.  Steiner’s insistence that language is unequal to the 
task of imitating reality, particularly when faced with a reality as ‘inhuman’ as the Holocaust,  
raises the further issue of what atrocity means in relation to notions of being/subjectivity and, 
consequently, inter-subjectivity or “being-in-common” (Durrant 5, emphasis added) .   
 For Cahill, “intersubjectivity is rooted in the primacy of embodiment” (128), and she 
underlines the perception that “the body and embodiment are central – not peripheral, to the 
development and construction of the self” (131). It may be inferred from this that the body, in 
constituting the primary means by which subjectivity is constructed, is also the site upon 
which social and political ideologies are enacted. Thus, the discourses of race and gender are 
also inscribed on the body, which is “regulated [and constrained] by the norms of cultural life 
[and is thus rendered] docile” (Bordo 165).  According to Susan Bordo, “[t]he body is not 
only a text of culture. It is also . . . a practical, direct locus of social control” (165). 
 The Rwandan genocide, which lies at the heart of Akpan’s story, “My Parents’ 
Bedroom,” initially arose from the social disruption caused by the “racially obsessed” 
(Prunier 6) first European explorers to ‘discover’ Rwanda and Burundi. These explorers 
immediately noticed differences in the physiognomy of a “population  . . . [that was] 
linguistically and culturally homogenous” (Prunier 5).  According to Gérard Prunier, “much 
was made of the physical features of the three groups – the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa – in 
heavy pseudo-scientific terms” conjured up by both European anthropologists and laymen (6). 
The full effect of this emphasis on racial classification arose when the colonialists 
“reorganised the social structure of Rwandan society by exaggerating [racial] . . . stereotypes 
and supporting the [Tutsi over the Hutu]” (36). German colonisers, who occupied the country 
between 1894 and 1919, considered what they viewed as the fine features of the Tutsi to mean 
that they were “Europeans under black skins” (Destexhe 38). And the Belgians, who assumed 
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colonial control of the country in 1919 after Germany’s defeat in the First World War, 
exacerbated ethnic distinctions by actively favouring the Tutsi, allowing them greater access 
to education and indoctrinating them into Catholicism with the intention of ‘civilising’ them 
(Destexhe 36).  
  While the seeds of racial discrimination were laid by the colonialists upon their arrival, 
the first effects of such perceptions were not felt until the dawn of the 1950s, when Rwanda 
saw the establishment of political parties which were primarily aimed at fighting for the 
country’s independence. Earlier, in 1926, the Belgians had begun issuing identity books 
which operated in a similar manner to the Pass system in Apartheid South Africa. These 
identity documents classified people according to the ethnic identity of either the majority 
population group – the Hutu – which comprised more than 80%, or the Tutsi minority, which 
constituted approximately 14%. The Twa people, who only formed about 1% of the 
population, were excluded.  Ironically, these pass books, which were established in order to 
ascribe privilege to the Tutsi, later became the very means by which the Hutu identified and 
targeted them. Disgruntled with the Belgian colonisers and the Tutsi elite, who rose to 
privilege only because of their physiognomy, which was taken to be an index of their 
superiority, the Hutu began to rebel as early as 1951 and, with the formation of political 
parties, this rebellion culminated in Rwanda’s first recorded massacre of the Tutsi by the Hutu 
in 1959, and the exile of more than 150, 000 Tutsi to neighbouring Burundi (Prunier 45). This 
conflict was further exacerbated by the republican democracy of Rwanda’s first president, 
Grégoire Kiyabanda, a Hutu who replaced the Tutsi monarchy in 1962 (Prunier 54). 
 According to Alain Destexhe, the Tutsi, because they were favoured by the colonisers, 
became an easy target for genocide by the Hutus, since “anti-Tutsi propaganda presented 
them as a minority, well-off and foreign” (28).  The racially-charged situation under 
democracy, together with the gradual withdrawal of the colonial authority, and the ultimate 
severance of this authority when the country gained its independence on 1 July 1965, left 
Rwanda in a state of crisis. The withdrawal of colonial authority, while politically motivated, 
also meant that the Europeans did not take responsibility for the seeds of racial tension they 
had planted in the country. While the second conflict occurred in 1979, it was not until 1990 
that Rwanda saw the outbreak of its third and most devastating conflict between the Hutu and 
the Tutsi, a conflict which almost resulted in the near-extinction of the Tutsi by 1994.  
 In “My Parents’ Bedroom,” a heightened sensitivity to racial classifications – a remnant 
of colonial intrusion and disruption – is evident in Monique’s narrative from the outset.  Her 
father, she observes, “has a round face, a wide nose and . . . [his] lips are as full as a banana,” 
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while her mother “has high cheekbones, a narrow nose, a sweet mouth . . . [and] skin so light 
that you can see the blue veins on the back of her hands, as you can on the hands of Le Père 
Mertens, [their] parish priest, who’s from Belgium” (266). Monique’s contrast of her parents’ 
physical features implies that she has inherited a discourse of racial discrimination and 
sensitivity from her community.  This contrast is also informed by an inherited notion of what 
kind of bodies belong to which racial group and, consequently, which bodies belong together 
and which do not.  By extension, too, Monique’s comparison of Maman’s physical features 
with those of the Belgian priest is also suggestive of Rwanda’s colonial history – specifically 
of discriminatory practices which, as previously indicated, initially entailed drawing racially-
defined categories between the European and the ‘native’, and then proceeded to classify the 
indigenous people into hierarchical groups. The narrative’s immediate emphasis on the 
racialised body thus foregrounds the manner in which the inscription of political discourses on 
the various bodies depicted in the story determines these bodies’ respective fates. In other 
words, “My Parents’ Bedroom” presents characters whose colour and physiognomy become 
the means by which they either assert a notion of belonging or, alternatively, are excluded and 
persecuted.  
  Destexhe maintains that the core characteristics of any genocidal persecution follow 
three steps: the enemy has to be “identified, targeted and ultimately slaughtered” (9).  In 
relation to the first of these steps, “My Parents’ Bedroom” highlights the absurdity of the 
process of identifying one’s self and others in terms of race. This process is especially 
perceptible in the figure of Monique’s paternal great-uncle, Nzeyimana, whom she refers to as 
“the Wizard” (267).  She introduces the Wizard by describing his physical features, the most 
distinctive of which is that his skin looks like “milk with a little coffee” (267).   The Wizard 
adopts a self-imposed bachelorhood and justifies his decision by announcing that “he hates his 
skin and doesn’t want to pass it on” (267).  On occasion, Monique observes, he also “paints 
himself with charcoal, until the rain comes to wash away his blackness” (267). Her 
fascination with the Wizard’s complexion, which she explains is the result of “a complicated 
story of intermarriage” (267), and the self-hatred evoked by her image of him attempting to 
camouflage himself under a layer of soot, suggest that he is of mixed racial heritage.  It may 
further be deduced from this image that the Wizard perceives himself to be contained inside a 
body that defies racial inscription; in other words, his body is an anomaly which renders racial 
classification as either Hutu or Tutsi impossible.  
 Notably, the manner in which various members of the community interpret and interact 
with the Wizard’s physicality place him on the fringes of his community.  He consequently 
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behaves in a manner that seeks to overcompensate for what other Hutus view as his 
ambiguous physical features by becoming an agent of extreme violence against the perceived 
‘enemy’ – the Tutsi. It thus becomes apparent that actively implicating himself in the violence 
perpetrated against the Tutsis reinforces his place in the ‘them’/Hutu camp, particularly when 
these actions draw attention away from what may be construed as his own compromised 
claim to belonging.  For the Tutsi, however, the desperate survival tactics they adopt in this 
genocidal environment rely not so much on “say[ing] you’re one of them  [a Hutu]” (266), but 
on looking – or attempting to look – like “one of them”, the former being the more effective 
strategy. Ironically, given that the difference between a Hutu and a Tutsi physiognomy is 
itself a colonial construct, looking like “one of them” is revealed to be both as contestable and 
as futile as “say[ing] you’re one of them” (266). 
 A further illustration of the absurdity of identifying the ‘enemy’ purely in terms of the 
racialised body as an indicator of ethnic belonging lies in the fact that the perpetrators of the 
Rwandan genocide assigned the children of mixed marriages the ethnic identity of their 
fathers (Destexhe 31).  Of her own physical appearance, for instance, Monique observes: 
I look like Maman, and when I grow up I’ll be as tall as she is. This is 
why Papa and all his Hutu people call me Shenge, which means ‘my 
little one’ in Kinyarwanda.  (266) 
 
In contrast to Papa’s confidence in Monique’s safety, based on the knowledge that she is 
ethnically classified as Hutu, Monique’s physical appearance is the cause of much anxiety for 
Maman. While Papa “scolds his relatives when they say that it’s risky that [Monique] looks so 
much like Maman,”  Maman “does not like going out in public with [her daughter]. . . She is 
always tense, as if a lion will leap out and eat [them both]” (267). Maman’s insistence that 
Monique “say [she’s] one of them” (266), in the opening passages of the story, is therefore 
not only a security measure, but also emerges out of this anxiety. Despite her mother’s 
insistence, however, Monique nonetheless forgets to tell the men who break into the house on 
the first evening that she is “one of them,” and it is the Wizard who later intervenes in the 
attempted rape of Monique by protesting, “Oya! No! Shenge is one of us!” (271).  
 By the time of the third massacre of the Tutsis by the Hutu in 1990, the Hutu forces had 
concluded that they would not spare children, as they had during the 1959 conflict; under this 
new regime, children thus also became targets for murder and abuse (Destexhe 21), 
particularly because they represented the next generation of Tutsis. As indicated above, 
however, children of mixed marriages presented an exception, since they were ascribed the 
racial category of their fathers. Nevertheless, the physical appearance of these children was 
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still read as an index of ethnic identity, as is demonstrated by the fact that the men who 
attempt to rape Monique initially assume that she is a Tutsi and therefore a target for their 
abuse, until the Wizard confirms otherwise.  
 Ironically, this is the same Wizard who, addressing Papa during the build-up to 
Maman’s murder, later insists: “we must remain pure. Nothing shall dilute our blood. Not 
God. Not marriage” (285).  The irony here lies in the fact that he, too, is a product of 
intermarriage, yet he condones a doctrine that condemns those of mixed race. In effect, what 
he is calling for in this exclamation is a pledge from Papa to uphold the ‘purity’ of their Hutu 
ethnic group by annihilating any individual who opposes or threatens that group’s 
homogeneity, even when that individual is one’s own spouse.  
  In dismissing ethnically mixed marriages as a ‘dilution of blood’, the Wizard is 
essentially reducing the institution of marriage to an expression of ethnic conformity intended 
to reinforce the notion that there are certain bodies that belong together. This dismissal is 
further reflective of the extent to which genocide “breaks the attachments of social life”  
(Erikson 460), a fracture that is starkly realised when Papa butchers his wife in the marital 
bedroom in front of his children. The privacy of one’s body in this context is rendered public, 
precisely because, in being racially marked, it becomes the manner through which one’s mode 
of being is determined. In this regard, in being one of the primary sites upon which ethnic 
conflict is played out in the story, the children of Maman and Papa’s mixed marriage are 
themselves both the victims and survivors of the “degraded sense of community” (Erikson 
460) arising from the disruption or rupture of social attachments.  
Destexhe contends that any genocide “has to be a collective act . . . [that] foster[s] a 
feeling of belonging to [a particular] group and diminishes any feelings of guilt” (34).  This 
assertion highlights the binaries that give rise to genocidal thinking and that prescribe notions 
of identity and belonging. It also suggests that the systematic violence enacted during 
genocide relies on the sense of anonymity provided by the perpetrators acting as a collective. 
Indeed, Leonard Praeg argues that the collective nature of the genocidal violence perpetrated 
against the Tutsi primarily arose from “people’s willingness to imitate others” (42), a 
principle which served to disguise individual motives and responsibility. Notably, because 
binaries underpin language, it follows that language, too, was implicated in the exclusionary 
rhetoric of the Rwandan genocide. Hence, since language is, as previously intimated, 
implicated in literature’s inability to recuperate trauma, the very means through which 
exclusion was fostered is itself questionable – to the extent of being absurd.   
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 Operating within the ‘logic’ of the mob, both the Wizard and Monique’s paternal 
uncle, André, can exonerate themselves from individual ethical culpability.  André, for 
example, does not react to Monique’s imploring screams during the sexual assault that takes 
place in her home on the first evening. His refusal to act, which illustrates the disruption of 
moral structures and the diminished sense of ethical responsibility in this context, is highly 
significant because it signals a change in his relationship with his brother’s family. Under 
ideal circumstances, which presuppose the existence of a contractual obligation to one’s close 
relatives, Monique’s uncle would be called upon to act in order to ensure her protection. 
However, because the genocide suspends such obligations, André is relieved of responsibility 
for his brother’s children. He is also besides himself with rage and a lust for vengeance 
because of the deaths of his own wife, Annette, who was a Tutsi, and their unborn child.  
Subsequently, his inaction causes a rift in Monique’s own conception of familial relations: she 
intimates her anger towards him “because he lied to get in” (271) and participated in the 
violation of her family home by attempting to remove his face from a family photograph 
(277). When the irate André lashes out at the children, having not found Papa at home, he 
ominously claims, “My bastard brother and his wife are not home? [. . .] He owes me this one.  
And I’m killing these children if I don’t see him” (272). Monique responds to this outburst in 
an innocent manner: “Whatever it is, I’m sure [Papa] will repay him tomorrow” (272), a 
response which reveals the extent to which she has not yet realised that familiar familial 
relations have been suspended.  
 At this point, Monique does not know that her father was present at, if not participated 
directly in, André’s murder of his pregnant Tutsi wife, Annette, and that what is ‘owed’ is, in 
fact, the  revenge murder of Maman in return. Although the incident of Annette’s murder 
occurs outside the narrative, it forms a crucial motivation for André’s behaviour. The 
circumstances behind André’s murder of his wife constitute a precedent for what Papa is now 
expected to do – that is, kill his own wife. This correlation is made explicit in the later episode 
in which André strongly and derisively objects to Papa’s plea that someone else kill Maman 
by asking, “You love your family more than I loved mine?” (285). Papa’s imploration is met 
with similar disdain by the Wizard, who insists, “if we kill your wife for you . . . we must kill 
you. And your children too” (285). The Wizard’s response implies that the brothers’ killing of 
their respective Tutsi wives is sacrificial, because it is inevitable that other members of the 
Hutu tribe will murder those whom they perceive as being traitors to the cause of racial 
cleansing, and their families. Both André and Papa’s murderous actions may thus be read as 
an illustration of the disintegration of their personal agency and choice, their inability to 
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maintain their unwritten contractual and ethical obligations to their family units and, 
consequently, the inexorable corruption of interpersonal interactions during the genocide.  
Within a broadly humanist framework, “all peoples are citizens of the universe . . . 
[therefore] killing someone simply because he or she exists is a crime against humanity; it is a 
crime against the very essence of what it is to be human” (Destexhe 4). The genocidal setting 
of “My Parents’ Bedroom,” however, represents the anomaly described by Durrant:  
At the heart of histories of racism is the negation of the humanity of the 
other, an act of exclusion that has “pathological” consequences precisely 
because it introduces an external exception to the category of the human.                    
                                                                                                                 (4)         
 
Both of these observations suggest that, between the second and third steps of the genocidal 
impulse, targeting and slaughtering respectively, the perpetrator has to alter his perception of 
the perceived ‘enemy’ as human and thereby negate it.  Indeed, one of the primary means by 
which this was achieved during the Rwandan genocide was through the dehumanisation of the 
Tutsi, who were referred to as inyezi or “cockroach” (Praeg 43). This use of language to 
negate the humanity of the Tutsi directly correlates with the Nazi perception of the Jews as 
‘vermin’ during the Holocaust, and has the same functional significance. Both terms suggest 
that members of a particular group are firstly, pestilential, and secondly, that their elimination 
is a matter of disinfecting the society.  
 Monique’s perception of André, for example, is transformed from a view of him as her 
father’s loving brother and her uncle, to brutish, bloodthirsty fiend. As she observes, the man 
who once stood smiling in a family portrait now has the look of a “madman” (269) about him.  
He is altered to such an extent that he is suddenly consorting with the Wizard, a relative he 
previously detested so much that he would not even “greet [him]. . . on the road” (267).  This 
newfound affinity between people who would otherwise not choose to be associated with each 
other suggests that the hysteria of genocide elevates collective murderous purpose above 
personal antipathies, and is further indicative of the elimination of personal agency.   
Similarly, from Monique’s perspective, Papa is transformed from victim and 
distraught parent to murderer. The present-tense narration of the build-up to the scene in 
which he kills Maman presents a Papa who “looks guilty, like a child who can’t keep a secret” 
(277). Like Maman, Papa becomes increasingly silent as the moment of the former’s death 
draws nearer. His anguish may be read both in his silence and in the fact that he sweats 
profusely and experiences tremors. His internal conflict is contrasted with Maman’s level-
headed insistence that he carry out the only act that will ensure the safety of the children – 
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that is, kill her. When he protests that he cannot do this, she responds: “you can . . . 
Yesterday, you did it to Annette” (278), a statement which implies that she believes he must, 
of necessity, suspend what has hitherto been his ethical position in relation to his kin. The 
murders of both Annette and Maman are, however, somewhat ambiguous, because they could 
also be perceived as assisted suicides. Read this way, Papa’s complicity in the murder of his 
brother’s wife becomes a complex matter, since it entails killing her unborn child too; his 
involvement thus underscores the irony of his attempting to protect his own children from a 
similar fate.  André’s anguish and rage may thus be located in the inescapable fact that he has 
killed both his wife and his family: he cannot save the latter by murdering the former.  
 
3.2 Bodies in Crisis: Rape and Murder in “My Parents’ Bedroom” 
 
Although the general setting of “My Parents’ Bedroom” may be interpreted as constituting the 
sustained social crisis of the Rwandan genocide, the story itself contains two central crises 
which occur on two consecutive nights in the story: the assault on and attempted rape of 
Monique, and the murder of Maman. It is highly significant that both scenes occur in the 
parents’ bedroom, because this location conventionally signifies the most private of domestic 
spaces. During the raid on the house on the first evening, Monique reports: “When I hear 
noises in my parents’ bedroom, I run there with Jean, because my parents never allow visitors 
in their bedroom” (271). Upon entering the bedroom she finds “two men rummaging through 
[her parents’] closet” (271). This passage highlights both the sanctity of the parents’ bedroom 
and the symbolic significance of the invasion as a whole, since the perpetrators violate the 
sanctity of the domestic setting by forcibly entering the house. The invasion also highlights 
the intrusion of public discourse into private spaces. It may thus be argued that Akpan here 
presents what Vickroy describes as a “postcolonial domestic space [which is] . . .  a place of 
historical invasion – where home and world meet, conflict and become confused” (37). 
Moreover, the fact that the invasion culminates in violent acts against the most vulnerable 
members of the household – the children – in a quintessential domestic space, the marital 
bedroom, amplifies the significance of this violation. The bedroom thus represents the locale 
in which the full horror of the extreme public disharmony at large is enacted upon the bodies 
– specifically, the female bodies – of individual members of the community.  
That both of the central crises in the story occur in the bedroom renders these incidents 
integral to the narrative’s focus on an intersubjectivity based on interactions between 
individuals whose subjectivity is principally defined by their bodies. Cahill argues that all 
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intersubjectivity, beginning with the maternal bond between mother and child, is primarily 
rooted in the reality of embodiment (128); moreover, she insists that “the shapes and habits of 
individual bodies are directly related to their political and social environments” (129).  The 
assault on Monique and the sacrificial murders of both Annette and Maman illustrate the 
extent to which the intersubjective relations of the bodies in “My Parents’ Bedroom” are 
predetermined – indeed, overdetermined – and constrained by the socio-political environment 
that has resulted in genocide.  
The traumatic effects of these crises evoke a sense of unreality in Monique, whose 
profoundly horrific experiences cause her to view both herself and others as disembodied. 
When the mob invades the house on the first evening of the narrative, for instance, Monique 
claims that she hears her uncle André calling out to her “in a dream” (268), and again, when 
Papa lands the machete on Maman’s head, she comments, “It’s like a dream” (285). The most 
distinctive of these episodes, however, occurs during Monique’s hallucinations towards the 
end of the narrative, when she imagines her dead mother is still alive and talking to her from 
the ceiling. All of these episodes suggest that Monique manifests dissociative symptoms in 
response to the corporeal abjection she experiences and witnesses.  According to Vickroy, 
“splitting off from one’s awareness can reduce the victim’s immediate sense of violation and 
help them endure and survive the situation” (13), and Bruce Bradfield argues that 
“dissociation . . . represents the banishment of an experience from narrative and the 
subsequent disconnection of that experience from any potential interpersonal space” (9).  The 
narrating I’s repeated comparison of these events to a dream sequence therefore highlights the 
incommensurability of the experiencing eye’s immediate reality, and reinforces the 
disproportionate extent to which the violent interaction of the bodies concerned is outside of 
Monique’s frame of reference.   
 The initial crisis and subsequent collapse of Monique’s cognitive framework occurs on 
the first evening, in which, as previously mentioned, the house is raided by a gang of men. 
These men not only vandalise the house, but one of them also physically assaults and attempts 
to rape Monique. The manner in which Monique presents this experience serves to 
demonstrate the extent to which her observations are coloured by her ignorance of sexual 
realities. In her description of the nameless, faceless man who attacks her, for example, she 
reports: 
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Pressing me down on the floor, the naked man grabs my two wrists with 
his left hand. He pushes up my nightie . . . and tears my underpants . . . 
I’m twisting and holding my knees together . . . he hits my face, this way 
and that, until my saliva is salted with blood. I spit in his face. Twice. He 
bangs my head on the floor, pinning down my neck, punching my left 
thigh. (271)   
 
This harrowing description, which forms part of the first dream-like sequence in the narrative, 
is rendered particularly shocking in that it is narrated by a prepubescent child: Monique 
conveys the experience in a manner which indicates that she is aware of the physical impact 
of this brutalisation, but unaware of the gravity of the effect of this violation on her psyche.   
 The unrelenting force with which the perpetrator inflicts bodily harm on the nine-year old 
suggests that he either fails to recognise her fragility, or that he is only too aware of it and is 
unmoved. This episode highlights a consequence of the dehumanisation of the Tutsi, because 
it suggests that, for the perpetrator, Monique’s body is positioned and read within a socio-
political discourse of race hatred, rather than viewed in its singularity as belonging to a child. 
The assault therefore signals a moment of non-recognition for Monique, who conceives of 
herself as human when, in fact, she is not being treated as such. Rapists, after all, strip their 
victims of their humanity. Thus, the perpetrator’s non-recognition of Monique’s personhood 
causes her to question her own notion of self. If, as Cahill argues, “as a particularly sexual 
bodily attack on an embodied subject, rape constitutes a fundamental and sexually specific 
undermining of that person’s subjective integrity” (115), then Monique’s resistance to her 
attacker suggests a struggle not only to protect herself from physical harm, but also to assert 
her “subjective integrity” or personhood.  
 Although the episode does not culminate in actual penetration, the degree of the injury 
to Monique’s psyche is implied in her subsequent confusion and her incessant return to the 
experience in memory, although she lacks the vocabulary with which to speak about it. 
According to Catherine Mackinnon:  
genocidal rape is . . . an official policy of war in a genocidal campaign 
for political control. That means not only a policy of the pleasure of male 
power unleashed, which happens all the time in so-called peace; not only 
a policy to defile, torture, humiliate, degrade, and demoralise the other 
side, which happens all the time in war . . .  It is a rape to be seen and 
heard and watched and told to others : rape as spectacle. It is rape to 
drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy its 
people. (531)       
 
In other words, genocidal rape represents a systematic violence which, although perpetrated 
against specific individuals, comes to denote the destruction of an entire community. Read 
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alongside MacKinnon’s claim, the assault on Monique’s subjective integrity demonstrates the 
ways in which violence in the story’s setting – and rape, in particular – consists in one group 
negating and destroying the coherence of the other and, specifically, the latter’s female 
members. The inscription of socio-political discourse on the bodies depicted in Akpan’s story 
means that forcibly assuming control of someone’s body, as the perpetrator does of 
Monique’s, may be read as an attempt to destroy her sense of coherence. Hence, because the 
body is the primary locus of a person’s psychic existence (Mitchell 125), an assault on the 
body constitutes an attack on the very entity that makes one a self and, by extension, 
adversely affects that self’s relation to other selves.   
  Given that “the prepubertal child [is] not equipped with a full repertoire of defences at 
that developmental phase” (Neal 51), Monique’s experience is traumatic partly because it 
“involves a radical sense of disconnection and isolation . . .  [brought about by the fact that 
her] personal safety is put into question” (Vickroy 23). Furthermore, because trauma 
“destroys beliefs  . . . in one’s own safety” and one’s “perception of the world as meaningful 
and orderly” (Vickroy 23), the incident and its positioning as the first major crisis of the 
narrative suggest that in this context an absolute breakdown of an orderly environment 
governed by a set of rules has occurred. Both the notions of community and of personal 
agency have been destroyed. The attack on Monique’s body thus illustrates the collapse of a 
society characterised by a sense of coherence and stability. Here, as in “Hitting Budapest,” the 
body is the primary source of symbolism; it is the interface between the exteriority of social 
norms and the interiority of personal experience. The violent effects of this correlation 
between the private and public body, in “My Parents’ Bedroom,” are illustrated in the 
fragmentation of the society’s embodied subjects, and the diminished sense of self individuals 
undergo as a result. This is evidenced in the fact that Monique’s attacker and the other people 
involved in the raid, apart from Tonton André and the Wizard, are nameless and faceless. The 
perpetrators are undifferentiated individuals whose identities have dissolved into a featureless 
collective, which is significant in that the lack of differentiation signals Monique’s failure to 
identify or define one subject in relation to another. As a result, her own sense of self is called 
into question. 
  Mitchell maintains that the notion of self in childhood is related to the kinds of 
interactions the child has with others: 
  The primal question would be: who am I for this person/world I see? 
And later: that man is the friend of that woman, that child is the 
son/daughter of that woman – but who am I? This “who am I?” is not a 
question of a self-sufficient identity, but rather a positioning. (124) 
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In terms of this logic, the child learns to define him/herself relationally. The child’s being 
therefore relies on him/her being able to position him/herself in relation to someone else or 
some other body. Notably, Monique initially introduces herself by referring to her position 
within the (extended) family and the reader comes to know her through these references. The 
fact that the perpetrators are rendered almost anonymous therefore signals her failure to define 
herself in relation to them. This experience of alienation and of a collapse of self is captured 
in the moment before Monique loses consciousness after the assault, when she says: “My eyes 
show me many men in yellow trousers and overalls, many Wizards” (272).   
 It is also significant that, on the first evening, the Wizard “swings his stick at the 
crucifix . . . [until] Christ’s body breaks from the cross, crashing on the floor. Limbless . . . 
[with] only bits of his hands and legs . . . still hanging on the cross, hollow and jagged” (270), 
since this serves as a premonition of Maman’s body in an abject state. Moreover, because 
Monique associates the Wizard with paganism, and believes that he is an ogre or villainous 
figure with magical powers, his stick transforms, in her imagination, into a wand. Her 
interpretation of him thus fuses the mystical realm of childhood fancy with the lawlessness of 
a society in shambles. Hence, his destruction of the crucifix symbolically enacts the state of 
affairs already prevalent in the external environment, an environment in which all sense of 
order and ethics has been suspended. When he advises Monique: “If you want to live, don’t 
leave this house for anything. Ghosts are all over our land. Bad ghosts” (273), the force of this 
admonition instils fear in Monique, who immediately interprets his words in a highly 
imaginative manner: “He whisks his cane and tosses his head as if he were commanding the 
ghosts into existence” (273).  In her childish imagination, it is as though the Wizard conjures 
up the ghosts himself in order to frighten her. Her interpretations and responses here reflect 
both her misinterpretation of the urgency of his advice, and her childlike fear of his 
appearance. The Wizard is thus transformed from a mildly mystifying to a terrifying figure in 
Monique’s eyes. 
 If, as Mitchell argues, humans come to recognise themselves in relation to others – 
“someone or something gives one a place in the world. They see me, therefore I exist” (123) – 
then Monique’s experience implies that the manner in which she is perceived by others also 
determines the nature of her existence. Although she tries to identify the perpetrators with a 
known quantity – “wizard” – Monique does not recognise them as singular human beings, but 
rather as anonymous bodies. This lack of recognition, in turn, implies a shift in her definition 
of herself. The disruption of her ability to position herself in relation to these male bodies may 
also be read as a dissociative symptom of trauma, because dissociation is “a primary psychic 
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defence against the awareness of pain” (Bradfield 4). Hence, both the physical and psychic 
pain Monique experiences during the assault causes her to become disorientated and unable to 
position herself within her current reality.    
  The full manifestations of Monique’s sense of unreality reach their peak in the second 
incident of a body in crisis in the narrative, an incident which occurs on the second evening of 
the narrative. The episode begins with Maman finally giving up hope of evading the 
inevitable and opening the front door to let the mob in. Soon afterwards, she “runs into her 
bedroom” (284), followed by a frightened Monique and her younger brother, Jean.  Papa is 
later led into the room by the mob and “give[n] . . .  a big machete” (285). After confronting 
the terrible reality that he cannot avoid being forced to kill his wife if he is to attempt to save 
the children, “Papa lands the machete on Maman’s head” (285). Monique then remarks that 
“It’s like a dream . . . Maman straightens out on the floor as if she were yawning. Her feet 
kick and her chest rises and locks as if she were holding her breath” (285). With reference to 
Julia Kristeva’s conception of the abject, Nöelle McAfee asserts that, in the presence of a 
dead body, “the very border between life and death has been broken, with death seeming to 
‘infect’ the body. And we who are faced with a corpse experience the fragility of our own 
life” (47). The details of Maman’s death-throes and convulsing body are indicative of the 
extent to which Monique’s sudden encounter with the fragility of life causes a rupture in her 
sense of cohesion and meaning, primarily because death presents itself as sublime. The horror 
the experiencing self feels at this point is captured in her descriptions of both her own and 
Jean’s responses to Maman’s corpse: 
There’s blood everywhere – on everybody around her. It flows into 
Maman’s eyes. She looks at us through the blood. She sees Papa become 
a wizard ... the blood overflows her eyelids, and Maman is weeping red 
tears. My bladder softens and pee flows down my legs toward the blood. 
The blood overpowers it, bathing my feet. (285, emphasis added)   
 
Monique’s involuntary urination here indicates the extent to which she is traumatised, because 
her reaction illustrates a reversion to the preverbal and signals a spontaneous corporeal 
response to an experience that is too overwhelming to be articulated in words. Her 
psychological and emotional trauma thus expresses itself in a state of abjection – literally, a 
loss of control of her body or, more specifically, her bladder – because it is incomprehensible. 
The quoted passage reflects Monique’s inability to assimilate the reality of her mother’s 
death, as evidenced in her attribution of agency to the corpse or to a Maman who still “looks” 
at them, “sees” the transformation of Papa into a murderous monster, and “weeps” tears of 
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blood as result of the atrocity she witnesses. The grotesque image of Maman’s blood-filled 
eyes looking on from beyond the void of death is evocative, in that it underscores the meeting 
of life and death – both of which are sublime – during a traumatic event. This image is also 
uncanny, since death seems to infiltrate life and the living Monique is, evidently, invaded by 
the death of her mother. Monique’s incomprehension is echoed in the disturbing image of 
Jean trying to wake the corpse of his dead mother: 
He straightens her finger but it bends back slowly, as if she were teasing 
him. He tries to bring together the two halves of [her] head, without 
success. He sticks his fingers into Maman’s hair and kneads, the blood is 
thick, like red shampoo. As the ceiling people weep, he wipes his hands 
on her clothes and walks outside, giggling. (286) 
 
This quotation marks a moment of non-recognition in Jean, who is presented as being quite 
oblivious to the meaning of his mother’s dead body. His persistence in treating the body as 
though it were alive, whilst simultaneously attempting to reassemble his mother’s severed 
head, demonstrates his total unfamiliarity with death. Monique’s subsequent reaction to her 
dead mother’s body further mimics that of Jean. In her hallucinatory state, for instance, she 
confides:  
My mind is no longer mine; it’s doing things on its own. It begins to run 
backward, and I see the blood flowing back into Maman. I see her rising 
suddenly, as suddenly as she fell. I see Papa’s knife lifting from her hair. 
She is saying, “Me promised you.” (286) 
 
This highlights a distinctive symptomatic response to trauma, because the feeling of losing 
control of one’s mind is, by definition, dissociation: a psychological defence mechanism 
which allows the subject to be elsewhere at the time of the trauma so as not to represent it to 
him/herself. Similarly, the disruption of the temporal sequence of what has hitherto been a 
coherent narrative also mimics the fragmentation of Monique’s psyche. Hence, the reversal 
above of Maman’s final words to Papa – “My husband, you promised me” (285) – reflects a 
psychic fragmentation which is expressed through a verbal disjunction. The reversal also 
implies that Monique is attempting to undo her mother’s death by eliminating its very cause – 
the promise Papa made to Maman to sacrifice her to ensure the safety of the children. 
Language, in this passage, is marked by dissonance, a dissonance which serves to convey 
Monique’s state of mind and the dislocation of temporality brought about by the simultaneous 
presence of Maman’s body and her absence as a living person.  
 Ultimately, the scenes during and after Maman’s death are crucial in the narrative’s 
representation of Monique’s psychic degeneration. The abjection of Maman’s body, death’s 
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violation of Monique’s psyche, and Papa’s involvement in Maman’s murder culminate in 
Monique hallucinating that she can hear her mother’s voice calling to her from the ceiling. In 
Monique’s projection, she imagines her mother is hiding because “it’s not safe for her to 
come down yet,” and “Tonton André is hiding Tantine Annette in his ceiling and fooling 
everyone into believing that he killed her” (286). Monique’s denial both of Annette and 
Maman’s death may thus be read as an attempt to rewrite the incomprehensible event she has 
witnessed. The alternative present she imagines and her projection of a different future are 
symptomatic of her failure to assimilate a reality which has nonetheless transpired. 
 
3.3 Landscape, Genocide and Sacrifice  
 
Many of the tensions in “My Parents’ Bedroom” are expressed in the parallels the narrative 
establishes between the killing of Maman and the Christian doctrine of sacrifice. This 
emerges in the persistent images of blood in the story, and the presence of Christian icons, 
such as the crucifix on the family altar. The destruction or vandalisation of both of the latter 
sacred objects becomes symbolic of the annihilation of the household and of its individual 
members.  
 The altar, which, like the marital bedroom, is a central feature of Monique’s family 
home, represents order and connotes the existence of an ethical or religious framework which 
governs the domestic setting. The first reference to the altar occurs in the opening scene, when 
Maman lights a candle before she goes out for the evening. Shortly thereafter, Monique, too, 
lights a candle. While primarily associated with the ritual of prayer in the Catholic church, 
candles in the story also signifies the dichotomy of light and darkness. The darkness of night 
represents a cover for violence and chaos and the light of day enables recovery and an attempt 
to make sense of the events which take place during the night. The lighting of the candles may 
therefore be read as a symbolic deferral of darkness:  it is an act of faith which nevertheless 
seems impotent in the context of atrocity.  
 Similarly, the luminous crucifix, which is the central feature on the family altar, is not 
only an emblem of unconditional love and sacrifice, but also suggests a defiance of the 
connotations of darkness in the story. The main focus of the crucifix, the dead Christ, may be 
read in parallel to Maman, because both figures sacrifice their bodies and lives in exchange 
for the security or safety of others. In this respect, the passage depicting Maman’s blood 
bathing Monique’s feet, discussed in the previous section, recalls Christ washing his 
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disciples’ feet in a lesson in love and humility prior to the last supper and the crucifixion. The 
Gospel according to Luke documents Christ’s words on this occasion:  
I tell you now, where I am going you cannot come. I give you a new 
commandment: love one another; as I have loved you, so you are to love 
one another. (13:33-35) 
 
This biblical allusion is echoed in Maman’s words just before Papa kills her, when she tells 
Monique, “Your papa is a good man” (283), and in the ‘tears’ of blood Maman’s dead body 
weeps. Maman’s insistence that Monique not judge her father too harshly for what she has 
made him promise to do suggests that Maman has resigned herself to the reality that the only 
way to save her children is to sacrifice her own life. Her tears of blood, therefore, literally and 
symbolically signify her undying love for her children, and her absolution of her husband.  
 Following her mother’s death, Monique’s overriding impression of her is expressed as 
follows: 
All the things Maman used to tell me come at me at once and yet 
separately . . . Perhaps she is still trying to protect me . . . just as she 
stopped Papa from telling me that he was going to smash her head. (287)  
 
Monique’s hallucinations and her memories of Maman’s words simultaneously intermingle in 
this passage, thereby reflecting the collapse of her perceptive framework. Although she 
intimates that her mother was, and is still, attempting to protect her, Monique is, however, 
oblivious to the reasons behind her mother’s empathy towards her father, the man who kills 
her by “smash[ing] her head”. From Monique’s perspective, Papa’s lack of options and 
agency in this situation have not registered: shortly after her mother’s death, she immediately 
casts her father as one of those who are against her – that is, a “wizard.”  
 In another instance of religious significance, Papa takes on the symbolic role of a 
masculine Madonna. Upon Mama’s return to the house after the first evening, she is almost 
incapacitated with fear. Papa then assumes the ‘feminine’ roles of feeding Jean and bathing 
Monique. The significance of this reversal of the ‘traditional’ roles within the household 
foreshadows the reality that the maternal presence will soon be obliterated.  The images of 
Papa holding and comforting Jean and weeping over Monique, in particular, are resonant of 
Catholic representations of the Virgin Mary as mother of the new-born Christ and pietà. 
Significantly, in this regard, Monique initially identifies Maman with the figure of “Marie, 
Mére de Douleurs, looking down” (273), and it is implicit that, upon Maman’s demise, Papa 
will have to assume her maternal role, as well as his own. The uselessness of the Christian 
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iconography and Papa’s inability to take care of the children after Maman’s death both 
suggest the failure of redemption which attends sacrifice in the story.  
 After killing Maman, Monique classifies Papa as a wizard, a term which has come to 
connote a fearsome presence. He is now placed firmly in the category of ‘one of them,’ 
outside Monique’s circle of trust.  This radical shift in Monique’s perception of her father is 
contrasted with her earlier memory of the Papa who carried her on his shoulders to the hills, 
with the winds transmitting his “jolly-jolly laugh” (278) into the distance – a world far 
removed from that of the haunted man who “goes to the window and holds on to the iron bars 
so that his hands are steady” (274).  Likewise, the father who “scolds his relatives when they 
say that it’s risky that [Monique] looks so much like Maman” (276) is very different to the 
one who looks at his daughter as if she is “no longer [his] sweet Shenge” (275), and who 
screams “you children are a burden to us!” (281). The latter Papa, robbed of personal agency 
and threatened with the loss of both his wife and children, can no longer dismiss the 
vulnerability of his wife and daughter’s racially-marked bodies or ignore the fact that his 
responsibility to protect them is rendered impotent.  
 Above all, the secure world of the past is very different from that presented at the end of 
the story, a world in which: 
There are corpses everywhere. Their clothes are dancing in the wind. 
Where the blood has soaked the earth, the grass doesn’t move. Vultures 
are poking the dead with their long beaks. (288) 
 
 The desolation of an entire community, reflected in a landscape strewn with numerous 
corpses whose blood has disrupted even the movements of the natural environment, such as 
swaying off savannah grass, implies that the wholesale slaughter of people is a phenomenon 
of unnatural proportions.  This image of discarded corpses also evokes the utter wretchedness 
of bodies which have been stripped of their humanity to the extent that they are not even 
given a proper burial. Implicit, here, is the notion that these other bodies also had lives, 
families and stories like Papa and Maman’s. Just as the latter’s dead body is left lying on the 
floor of the marital bedroom prior to being dragged out by her Tutsi people, there is no one to 
ritualistically mourn the deaths of the corpses. The implication, then, is that there are so many 
dead that there are hardly any people living to perform the rituals, like burials, around which 
communal ties are forged and acknowledged. This, in turn, highlights that the bonds of people 
in this context have essentially collapsed to the point where there is no community.  
The narrative explores the disruption of both individual and collective lives in the 
genocidal context of Rwanda on multiple levels – psychological, emotional, corporeal, 
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environmental and supernatural – such that the discarded bodies demonstrate the bleak fact 
that the living may as well be dead. In addition, the image of vultures scavenging on the 
remains of the victims of the genocide adds to the devastation and carnage of the scene: since 
gathering vultures are archetypal symbols of impending death, the fact that they have settled 
means that death has already occurred – in this instance, on an unimaginable scale. Above all, 
this destruction culminates in utter isolation and disillusionment in Monique, who realises 
now that “no one can ever call [her] Shenge again” (286), since this is synonymous with her 
saying she will never want to be called ‘one of us’ – a Hutu – again. Given that the nickname 
signals that she has been accorded honorary status and included in the exclusive Hutu 
fraternity, despite her Tutsi appearance, her rejection of the name amounts to a denial of this 
‘privilege’. Unwittingly, too, it speaks her desire to survive and to escape the racialised 
nomenclature that has precipitated the genocide. Thus, Monique’s words indicate her dawning 
realisation that she, indeed, can no longer be part of a family or a community, a realisation 
which foregrounds the moment at which her childhood comes to an end.  
3.4 Trauma, (Mis)Perception and Silence 
 
Silence itself is defined in relationship to words, as the pause in music receives 
its meaning from the group of notes round it. This silence is a moment of 
language; being silent is not being dumb; it is to refuse to speak, and therefore 
to keep on speaking.  
– Jean-Paul Sartre (What is Literature? 38) 
The incomprehensibility of the genocidal setting in “My Parents’ Bedroom” is predominantly 
conveyed through the disjunction between Monique’s perceptions and the reality perceived 
by the implied reader. Monique’s present circumstances are summarised by the Wizard who, 
following the scene in which she is sexually assaulted, tells her that they are living in “Bad 
days, girl, bad days. Be strong” (272). Although beyond Monique’s cognitive abilities, for the 
implied reader this explanation implies that her current circumstances are characterised by a 
state of anarchy in which men feel they have licence to sexually assault young girls, and that 
the latter are expected to respond with stoicism. Monique is nevertheless protected from her 
would-be rapist by the Wizard’s intervention.  
The precariousness and volatility of the times the Wizard’s explanation evokes are 
further indicated when Papa, forcibly putting Monique to bed on the second evening, “kicks 
the teddy bear against the wall and stamps on Tweety and Mickey Mouse” (275).  Both the 
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Wizard’s words and Papa’s uncharacteristic actions reinforce the idea that Monique needs to 
abandon her child-like and perhaps idealistic perceptions of what she has hitherto regarded as 
normal in her family and community life. Her struggle to accept these altered conditions is 
illustrated by the fact that the majority of the interchanges she has with her parents explicitly 
suggest that she has questions about the situation that she is unable and forbidden to vocalise. 
For the most part, instead of questioning her parents’ instructions, she obediently complies 
with them, repeatedly consenting “Yego, Maman” (265), “Yego, Papa” (274), or retreating 
into the fringes, silent and silenced. 
   When Monique’s parents return home after the evening on which she is assaulted, for 
instance, Papa “squats and holds [Monique’s] hands,” telling her not to be afraid and 
promising “[he] won’t let them touch [her] again” (274). Immediately following these words, 
Monique tries to hug her father, “but he blocks [her] with his hands” (274). She does not 
comment on this withdrawal of physical comfort, which undermines the promise uttered only 
moments before, but instead responds with silence. She then “search[es her] parents’ faces” 
and, finding that “they’re blank” (274), sits “down [on the sofa] silently” next to Maman 
(274). Shortly thereafter, she “slide[s] over to Maman” but is “pushe[d] away with one hand” 
(274). The abrupt dismissiveness of her parents’ gestures signals their acute distress and 
constitutes a departure from the normal way in which they relate to her. Maman’s reaction is 
perhaps especially noteworthy, because the intention underlying it could be to ensure that 
Monique is not overly reliant on the affection and comfort of a mother who knows she will 
soon be dead. Monique’s desperate need for physical warmth is again emphasised when she 
comments, “I resist, bending like a tree in the wind [towards Maman], then [I return] to my 
position” (274). Confused by Maman’s withdrawal of maternal affection, Monique’s retreat, 
in this quotation, signifies her dawning realisation that her parents are no longer physically or 
emotionally available to her and that, accordingly, she must look to herself for the fulfilment 
of her needs. This realisation, however, only reaches fruition after her mother’s death and her 
father’s abandonment of her and Jean.  
 Monique’s parents’ inability to engage with her needs, although a function of their 
experience of overwhelming terror and their frantic attempts to devise ways of ensuring the 
safety of their children, forces her into a silence which is all the more significant in that it 
does not necessarily mean that she has nothing to say. Notably, the passages in which she is 
silenced hinge upon the heavy suggestiveness of what she is not saying, of what, lacking the 
vocabulary, she is unable to say, and what cannot be said. Her silence is thus provoked by 
both her parents’ reactions and her inability to make sense of or articulate her suffering. For 
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example, their omission of the actual term for her assault is perhaps a way of protecting both 
her and themselves from the reality of rape. This omission is particularly noteworthy, because 
it suggests that the brutality of the event is unspeakable or, alternatively, that assigning a term 
to it makes the event more real. Ironically, however, it is through the suppression of verbal 
articulation that the event’s significance becomes all the more visible. Indeed, as the epigraph 
from Praeg in this chapter implies, assigning a term like “genocide” to an event makes it more 
real, in the sense of reducing it to something which can be described and discussed, while 
simultaneously reflecting the inadequacy of the term. In the case of Monique’s assault, her 
parents’ refusal to ascribe a term to the event attests to the reality that assigning words to 
something traumatic is, as Lyotard would argue, tantamount to a betrayal. 
 Similarly, the ghost motif in “My Parents’ Bedroom” suggests the speaking silences in 
the narrative. From the outset, Monique repeatedly observes that her family home “feels 
haunted, as if [the] ghosts from the Wizard’s stick . . . [are] still inside” (274). In a literal 
sense, these ‘ghosts’ are other Tutsis that her parents have been harbouring in the ceiling: 
these are the “invisible people . . . breathing everywhere” (278).  Ignorant of this arrangement, 
Monique initially assumes that the noises she hears have been conjured by the Wizard to 
torment her. Upon her parents’ return to the house after the first evening, for instance, she 
hears “a sneeze from the kitchen,” a sneeze which, although ignored by her parents, makes 
her feel “a sudden fear enter [her] body” (274).  This corporeal response indicates the extent 
to which the emotion of fear is unfamiliar to her and suggests that she feels invaded by a 
presence which is imperceptible. As a result, the incident increases the sense of unreality she 
has come to adopt as a survival mechanism.  Her parents’ refusal to disclose information 
about the state of affairs and, more specifically, their lack of reaction to the sounds Monique 
hears cause her to speculate: “maybe I am still dreaming, maybe not” (274).  Her suspicion 
that perhaps what she apprehends may indeed not be a fiction is grounded in the sudden 
realisation that the people she once trusted are capable of deceit. This realisation, instigated 
by André lying in order to gain access to the house on the evening on which she is assaulted, 
is reinforced when she later observes her parents hiding Hélène’s body in the ceiling. “Now I 
understand,” she claims, “Nobody is telling me the truth today. Tomorrow I must remind 
them that lying is a sin” (284). Ironically, however, this statement reflects of the cruel reality 
that she does not understand at all, since she is assuming that there is an ethical structure 
governing the intersubjective relations in her family.  
 Furthermore, her adoption of the Wizard’s vocabulary in describing the people in the 
ceiling as ghosts conveys the extent to which subjects, in this context, are both literally and 
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figuratively robbed of their freedom. Implicit in the word “ghost” is the notion that those 
whose movements are constrained, much like those who inhabit the family home, are as good 
as dead. Monique’s awareness of “ghosts” thus reflects the reality that, even though she 
cannot definitively name it, something is dreadfully wrong, a correlation which is horrifically 
realised in the passage in which the ghost motif reaches a climax, culminating in her first 
moment of defiance:  
I see dirty water dripping down the white wall beside me. It is coming 
from the ceiling. At first, it comes down in two thin lines. Then the lines 
widen and swell into one. Then more lines come down, in spurts, like 
little spiders gliding down on threads . . . I touch the liquid . . . Blood. 
(278) 
 
This passage marks the moment at which the spectral presence of Monique’s imagined ghosts 
prefigures the unimaginable atrocity – her mother’s death at the hands of her father – she is 
about to witness. As a result of her shocked realisation, when Papa insists “it’s not blood” 
(278), Monique no longer retreats into her habitual silence denoting consent, but screams: 
“You’re lying! It’s blood! It’s blood!” (278). Her deviation from her previously reverential 
acceptance of her father’s explanations epitomises the shift in her perspective, that is, from 
her confident assertion that “Papa tells me everything” (276), to her insight that “[m]y parents 
are hiding something from me” (278). The looming silence of that which her parents have 
been concealing is thus directly linked to the ghost motif.  
 The image of blood leaking down a white wall in the quote above symbolises the 
extreme violence perpetrated against the bodies of those perceived as other in the Rwandan 
context, a violence which is revealed to be both profoundly shocking and absurd.  The latter is 
particularly demonstrated in the incident in which the Hutu mob mutilate the body of 
Monique’s Twa friend, Hélène, to such an extent that her right foot “dangl[es] on strings, like 
a shoe tied to the clothesline by its lace” (284). Papa asks, in an earlier conversation about 
possibly harbouring Hélène: “how does this crisis concern the Twa?” (282). Implicit in his 
question and the subsequent physical harm done to the child is the suggestion that the 
perpetrators are blindly killing anybody who is not “one of them.” This bloodlust is, however, 
not only restricted to the Hutus since, after leaving the house following her mother’s murder, 
Monique notices another mob of people whom she identifies as being “our people on 
Maman’s side . . . chanting about how they’re going to kill Papa’s people” (288). This mob 
makes its way to what used to be her home and, after dragging out Maman’s corpse, they set 
the house alight: “By the time their fellow Tutsis,” who have been hiding in the ceiling, 
“begin to shout, the fire is unstoppable” (289). Prior to this ironic turn of events, Monique 
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wonders: “If Papa’s people could not spare Maman’s life, why would my mother’s relatives 
spare mine? Or my brother’s?” (288). Both this incident, in which the Tutsi mob unwittingly 
murder their own kind and Monique’s suspicion that they will spare neither her life nor Jean’s 
are reflective of the irrationality of the genocide, and the sense of displacement that the 
children feel as a result. Indeed, the story ends with Monique expressing a new and terrifying 
kind of understanding, indicated by her repetition of the Wizard’s advice: “we want to live; 
we don’t want to die. I must be strong” (289). In spite of this moment of limited insight, 
however, the kind of future envisaged by the story’s ending is far from hopeful. Both 
children’s hands are, in a sense, forever “stained” from the attempt to “raise the dead” (288). 
Their encounter with atrocity has left both of them with “eyes wide open” (288). 
 As “the wind spreads black clouds like blankets across the sky” (289) in the concluding 
paragraph, Monique and Jean, clad in clothes still drenched in their mother’s blood, are forced 
to forage for themselves. The importance of Monique’s new mantra about being invulnerable 
is contrasted with the image of her baby brother “playing with the glow of the crucifix” while 
“babbling Maman’s name” (289). Inherent in this contrast is the impracticality of wishing for 
a moral universe; the all-too-recent trauma of losing Maman and the stability of a family 
environment is replaced with a sense of wandering in the dark wilderness of atrocity. 
Ultimately, the desensitised repetition of “we want to live; we don’t want to die” (289) 
underscores the profound stasis of the story’s ending. While the luminous crucifix may 
partially illumine the dark world the children now consciously inhabit, it cannot provide them 
with the resources they need to survive. I would even go so far as to surmise that the story 
ends in stasis, precisely because it is comprised of an irreconcilable tension between a naïve 
hope for human goodness to prevail, while simultaneously suggesting the implausibility of 
this hope.  
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Chapter 4 
Trauma, Language and Memory in Uwem Akpan’s “Fattening for Gabon” 
 
If one could isolate that space, that damaged chromosome in words, in an 
image, then perhaps one could restore order by naming. Otherwise history is 
only a tangle of wires.   – Anne Michaels (Fugitive Pieces 111) 
 
What went on in my mind at the time lacked forms and I cannot now set 
it down.  – Chinua Achebe (A Man of the People 69) 
 
“Fattening for Gabon,” also from Akpan’s collection Say You’re One of Them, is an attempt 
to represent what Vickroy terms  the “pernicious form of trauma” which arises from “the 
constant stress and humiliation associated with being a person of low socio-economic status” 
(18), particularly in a postcolonial context. It is this stress and humiliation that motivates the 
“smallish, hardworking” Benin-based Fofo Kpee (Akpan 33) to agree to sell Kotchikpa and 
Yewa, his ten-year-old nephew and five-year-old niece, as well as three of their offstage 
siblings, to a child-trafficking ring in Gabon. Initially introduced as a minor criminal with a 
“smuggler’s instinct”, an instinct which he has developed through his work as “an agbero, a 
tout, at the border” (33), Kpee is nevertheless also depicted as a loving uncle with a fine 
sense of humour. In its presentation of a specifically African account of the global 
phenomenon of child trafficking, Akpan’s text highlights the dire social, economic and 
political conditions prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa – conditions which give rise to and 
perpetuate trauma on both an individual and a collective basis.  
 The story begins retrospectively with a depiction of Kpee’s modest household, which 
lacks both food and space, though its occupants (Kpee and his charges, Kotchikpa and Yewa) 
seem relatively content. Kpee is then visited by Big Guy, a man whom the children 
immediately regard with suspicion, who delivers a Nanfang motorcycle and then enquires 
after the additional children he thought he would be meeting on this occasion. This is the first 
of many visits from Big Guy, and sees the first altercation between the two men about the 
children. Kpee is quick to fabricate explanations for Big Guy’s sudden presence in their lives, 
to misrepresent the origins of the motorcycle, and to be evasive about the reasons behind this 
new family friend’s generosity in giving them ‘gifts’. Subsequently, he tells Kotchikpa and 
Yewa that an NGO has taken an interest in them, and that they have to lie about their 
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identities when their new ‘parents’ cross the border with them  into Gabon, where they will 
be provided with an education and a better lifestyle. As the grooming of the children in 
preparation for their new lives unfolds, however, Kpee begins to have doubts about what he 
is doing, doubts which culminate in an attempt to retract his decision to sell the children. By 
the time he feels this remorse, however, it is too late: the trafficking ring Big Guy represents 
will not countenance Kpee’s change of heart, and they keep a close eye on the household. 
After realising he cannot rescind his side of the bargain, Kpee decides to escape with the 
children on the bike in the middle of the night, but is caught, assaulted, and eventually killed 
by men hired by Big Guy. Subsequently, Kotchikpa and Yewa are imprisoned under guard 
and force-fed or “fattened” in preparation for their trip to Gabon and future as sex-slaves. By 
this point, Kotchikpa has grasped the truth of his and Yewa’s circumstances, and he contrives 
a plan to make a getaway. When he manages to prise open a window through which they can 
escape, Yewa, confused and mistrustful of him, begins to yell, thereby alerting the guard to 
their imminent jailbreak. Panic-stricken and desperate, Kotchikpa is forced to flee alone, 
leaving his wailing sister behind. The final sentence of the story records his unbearable 
distress: “I ran and I ran, though I knew I would never outrun my sister’s wailing” (140). 
 The fact that the story is narrated in the past tense by a now seemingly adult 
Kotchikpa raises concerns regarding the nature of traumatic memory and its recovery. Caruth, 
Laub, and Vickroy have argued that, in reality, the recuperation of a traumatic past through 
narrative is an exercise in testimony: in Laub’s terms, it a “process by which the narrator 
reclaims his position as witness” (85). This chapter is primarily concerned with the question 
of the adult Kotchikpa’s recovery of the trauma of having survived Kpee’s plan to sell him 
and Yewa, his subsequent guilt over having himself escaped but having been unable to rescue 
his sister, and the ways in which, retrospectively, he attempts to narrativise this experience, 
but fails. My discussion begins by focusing on the pervasive irony in the text’s dialogical 
interplay between knowing and not knowing and between perception and misperception. I 
then examine the story’s foregrounding of corporeality and the role of the body, an emphasis 
intimated in the use of the word “fattening” in the story’s title. This is followed by an analysis 
of the unknowable aporia of trauma, and the manner in which the narrative conveys the 
ambiguities implicit in Kotchikpa’s attempt both to communicate and to recover trauma’s 
latent and residual effects.  
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4.1 Irony and (Mis)Perception 
 
The opening passage of “Fattening for Gabon” introduces several disjunctive codes (narrative 
distance, temporal dislocations, and misperceptions) which are later reiterated and developed 
in the story:  
Selling your child or nephew could be more difficult than selling other 
kids. You had to keep a calm head or be as ruthless as the Bagardy-Seme 
immigration people. If not, it could bring trouble to the family. What 
kept our family secret from the world in the three months Fofo Kpee 
planned to sell us were his sense of humour and the smuggler’s instinct 
he had developed as an agbero, a tout, at the border. My sister Yewa was 
five, and I was ten. (33)  
 
The use of the past tense in this passage immediately establishes the distance between the 
narrating and the experiencing self. If, as Simon Gikandi argues, “retrospective narration is 
predicated on the problematic assumption that a narrator distanced from events in time and 
place can confer a sense of coherence on past experiences” (110), this assumption is rendered 
especially tenuous by the traumatic nature of the events Kotchikpa relates and the incoherence 
both of his experience and memory of these events. Thus, although the opening passage 
reveals the narrator’s need to tell and hence understand his story, the time lapse between 
experiencing the events and actually telling the story gestures towards the silence at the core 
of witnessing and giving witness to atrocity. This silence Nadine Fresco describes as a 
“gaping, vertiginous black hole of the unmentionable years . . . It [is] a silence [which] 
swallow[s] up the past, all the past, the past before [and after]” (qtd in Laub 64). Even the 
retelling – in that it is selective and fragmented – is as much an act of concealment as of 
revelation or exposition. The resonating silence of Kotchikpa’s narrative is therefore “all the 
more implacable in that it [is] . . . concealed behind a screen of words” (Laub 64), as is 
particularly evident in the diction the narrator employs in the above extract. 
 The blasé tone with which Kotchikpa introduces the clandestine business of child 
trafficking and the characteristics one needs to cultivate in order to perform this deplorable 
activity assumes that the reader accepts that selling children is unexceptional or 
commonplace. It also suggests the extent to which the narrator needs to distance himself from 
his actual feelings in order to tell the story and remember or rehearse the horror he 
experienced at the time and continues to experience. While the first explanation raises 
questions of an ethical, political and socio-economic nature, the second speaks to a survivor’s 
primary symptomatic response to trauma, namely repression and dissociation. Both 
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explanations, however, demonstrate that Kotchikpa’s apparent detachment or desensitisation 
leaves a remainder or supplement. Despite the fact that he does not explicitly express anger, 
indignation and a sense of loss, his light-hearted delivery increases the anticipated horror and 
sense of dread for the implied reader who, no doubt, responds less impassively. This sense of 
foreboding is heightened by Kotchikpa’s seemingly nonchalant reference to his own and 
Yewa’s ages at the time that Kpee attempted to sell them, since their youthfulness suggests 
that neither of them was capable of making sense of the sequence of events and that they were 
especially vulnerable, both to Kpee’s deception and the child trafficker’s manipulation. The 
narrative continues by relating several instances of misperception in Kotchikpa’s experiencing 
self, his sister, and his uncle. The first of these is the discrepancy between the young 
Kotchikpa’s limited access to the truth of his circumstances, Kpee’s apparent myopia, and the 
implied reader’s recognition of the grim reality. In particular, the Nanfang motorcycle, which 
constitutes the first of many material possessions Kpee acquires as a result of having agreed to 
sell the children and is the focus of the opening episode, demonstrates the disjunction between 
the children’s innocence and ignorance and their uncle’s deceit and complicity.   
 For Kotchikpa, the bike is a token of newfound affluence and a harbinger of better 
things to come, such as having regular meals to eat and the promise that he and his sister will 
be sent off to school in Gabon. He is initially overwhelmed by the bike’s “smell of newness” 
(38), and Yewa is so entranced by its appearance that she treats it with the reverence of “a 
voodoo priest at his shrine”: her hands are “afraid to make contact” and her large brown eyes 
“shine out from her lean face, as if the machine’s aura forbids them to blink” (37). The bike 
evokes both wonder and curiosity in the children – to the extent that it follows the young 
Kotchikpa “into the land . . . of dreams.” In one such dream, he relates: 
  I rode my Nanfang until I grew old, but the Nanfang neither aged nor needed 
  repairs. At the end of my life, my people buried me atop it, and I rode that  
  Nanfang straight to heaven’s gate, where Saint Peter gave me an automatic 
  pass. (45) 
 
The bike functions here as a miraculous vehicle that bridges the gap between life and death, is 
invulnerable to wear and tear, guarantees access to heaven, and confers immortality on its 
rider who, through his alignment with the machine, is also impervious to harm.  However, 
while the young Kotchikpa envisions himself liberated from a life of extreme poverty by the 
bike, the implied reader is acutely aware that the bike represents a down-payment on both his 
and Yewa’s future exploitation.  
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 Kpee, despite being privy to the true significance of the bike, is just as delighted at its 
arrival as the children – perhaps because he is naïve or is suppressing the guilt he feels at 
having agreed to sell them. Like Kotchikpa and Yewa, he perceives the Nanfang as a symbol 
of a rise in his socio-economic status: “God done reward our faitfulness,” he claims, “Nous 
irons to be rich” (37). Indeed, the bike generates so much excitement in the domestic and the 
public domains that it is depicted as increasingly dominating both in the opening episodes of 
the story. For instance, Kpee’s small household is cleared to accommodate the bike, and the 
doors and windows are secured to prevent its potential theft. Subsequently, it is blessed at the 
local church, and Kpee throws a thanksgiving party in honour of its acquisition. Throughout 
these elaborate proceedings, Kpee repeatedly lies about the Nanfang’s origins and 
misrepresents its actual meaning in relation to his and the children’s lives. His perception of 
the bike is, somewhat disconcertingly, as guileless as theirs: all three see it as a vehicle 
enabling ‘safe’ travel and conferring a sense of status and freedom. The reality, however, is 
that it has been delivered by Big Guy in exchange for the children, and therefore represents an 
explicit threat to their newfound sense of elation and self-importance. Moreover, it will 
ultimately fail to fulfil its function as a getaway vehicle when Kpee and the children later 
make a desperate attempt to escape from Big Guy and his trafficking gang, and it is the 
payment Big Guy later makes to the men who help him dig the shallow grave in which the 
defiant Kpee is buried. The bike is therefore an ominous material symbol of the children’s 
impending fates and a harbinger of their uncle’s death. Indeed, the potentially menacing aura 
surrounding the bike is suggested when, upon being told that the bike belongs to them at the 
beginning of the story, Yewa circles around it  whispering, “We belong to you . . . You belong 
to us, we belong to you” (37). Her innocent chant is profoundly ironic, in that it unconsciously 
alludes to the deal Kpee has struck, though Yewa herself is oblivious to its role as a bartering 
mechanism. It also reveals the implied author’s intervention; the repeated phrase “we belong 
to you” envelops and overpowers the middle phrase, “you belong to us”, thus linguistically 
enacting the sinister reality that it is indeed the children who belong to the Nanfang now – or, 
at least, to those who bestowed it upon their uncle – and not the obverse. 
 Kpee and the children’s overjoyed reception of the Nanfang thus foregrounds the 
reader’s ironic awareness of the disjunction between perception and misperception, and 
between what the respective characters know (or, in Kpee’s case, choose not to acknowledge) 
and what they do not. Kpee’s intentional obfuscation of the bike’s significance and his 
(perhaps initially endearing) myopia also introduce the story’s dominant theme of seduction 
leading to betrayal, a shift evoked by the bike’s function as a token of the former but, 
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increasingly, the latter. This shift is manifested in the declining attractiveness of the 
Nanfang’s appearance and the gradual change in the young Kotchikpa’s enthusiasm for it. For 
example, he begins to understand that the bike ultimately means something different to his 
uncle than it does to himself and his sister: “In those difficult months, it seemed the machine 
was a source of stability for [Kpee], something he could always be proud of, something he 
would still have when we left for Gabon” (80-81, emphasis added). As the gap between 
ignorance and knowledge decreases – particularly after his uncle’s disturbing and inept 
attempt to groom him and Yewa in sexual matters – Kotchikpa intuitively gleans the 
disturbing reality the Nanfang represents. His growing suspicions, which lead him to a grim 
conclusion: “I hated the Nanfang and vowed never to ride on it again” (97), precede Kpee’s 
midnight confession that he is “no fit sell [Kotchikpa] and Yewa to anybody” (109). 
 Despite his earlier gullibility, Kpee too becomes increasingly more agitated and 
conflicted as the children’s impending removal looms nearer. After witnessing his uncle 
arguing with Big Guy, for example, Kotchikpa senses his uncle’s growing “frustration and 
doubt about our new life” (82), and notes that he is frequently restless and short-tempered 
with Yewa and himself. Kpee’s unease is also literally and symbolically manifested in the 
setting. As indicated earlier, the procurement of the bike necessitates certain security 
measures, such as the installation of padlocks and latches on the windows and back door (83) 
– measures which, on the surface, appear innocent enough. However, in reality Kpee is 
physically confining the children to the house in preparation for their imminent departure: 
with Kotchikpa’s help, for example, he cements in both the inner and the outer walls, “leaving 
no holes” for ventilation (82), and, despite the heat, he inexplicably (to Kotchikpa) keeps the 
windows permanently bolted. “Our home began to feel like an oven,” the narrator observes on 
the first evening of these strictures, and then adds: “we couldn’t sleep, even though we took 
off all our clothes” (83). The house’s transformation into a claustrophobic space increasingly 
comes to mimic the anxiety and foreboding that both Kpee and the children feel, aggravated 
by the unbearable, hellish heat inside the dwelling, especially at night:  
The light [from the lantern] was dim, but the heat in the room made it 
feel as if that flame were the source of our hell. 
Fofo Kpee opened the door to go out for fresh air, and a breath of it 
washed over us before he closed the door and locked it from outside . I 
picked up his towel and started dabbing Yewa and myself, but suddenly 
Fofo came back in as if a demon were pursuing him. He was a restless 
man: he couldn’t be inside; he couldn’t be outside. He took the towel 
from me and started to dab himself, as if the cool air had made him even 
hotter. (85) 
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This restlessness, which marks the beginnings of Kpee’s cognisance of the full implications 
of what he has done, suggests intense internal suffering, guilt and rising panic as he realises 
that he is trapped in a situation over which he has no control. Implicit in his discomfort is the 
sense that his betrayal of the children is also a betrayal of himself. In this regard, then, the 
Nanfang is both the payment he has received in exchange for the children and in exchange for 
his soul or conscience – as the references to Hell in the above passage make clear.  
 Kpee’s almost Faustian bargain is also underlined by the rather dubious and self-
serving Christian rhetoric in the story. When Kpee has the bike blessed at the local church, 
for instance, Pastor Adeyemi exclaims, “the Lord bless you  . . . with a Nanfang. Poverty is a 
curse from Satan . . . Our God is a rich God, not a pauper” (49-50). The pastor’s words –   
which link poverty with misfortune and sin, and affluence with godliness – are unconsciously 
ironic, in that they serve to condone Kpee’s procurement of the bike but are oblivious to the 
human  cost. Again, when Kpee tells the children to lie to their neighbours by claiming that 
the child traffickers are their relatives, Yewa points out, “You lie, Fofo . . . You go hell. You 
lie,” to which her uncle responds, “[i]f you tell a good lie, you no go enter hell. Only de bad 
lies go put you for hell” (55). This duplicitous exchange emphasises the series of lies which 
Kpee has told and will subsequently tell the children, and implies that his later descent into a 
psychological hell is the result of his “bad lies” about the origins of the bike and the 
children’s future prospects in Gabon. Ironically, too, shortly after this conversation, Kpee 
warns them: “dis world est dangereux. Make you no trust anybody” (55). While this advice is 
ostensibly offered in good faith, it also serves to safeguard his most treacherous “bad lie” and 
is highly manipulative. It suggests that he knows that the reason the children believe his lies 
is due to their ignorance and trust – they will not think that ‘anybody’ includes him. That the 
children have implicit trust in Kpee and do not think him capable of deceiving them 
emphasises the extent of his betrayal of them.   
The most distinctive evidence of misperception in the story emerges from Kpee’s 
naïve involvement with the child-trafficking ring. It is clear to the reader from the outset that 
Kpee does not fully recognise the gravity of his betrayal of the children and the implications 
of his agreement to sell them. Significantly, when Big Guy delivers the motorcycle and voices 
his irritation at finding two instead of the five children Kpee promised him, he warns Kpee: 
“you want play wid fire? . . . only dead people dey owe us!” (36). Kpee responds by assuring 
Big Guy that “Everyting dey fine . . . I sure say nobody go die” (36). This interchange 
constitutes one of many instances of situational irony in the text. On the one hand, Big Guy’s 
warning suggests that the business of child trafficking carries ominous consequences, 
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particularly for those who, like Kpee, stand to profit from the exchange, and that the gang Big 
Guy represents is not above murdering those who do not comply with their side of the 
bargain. On the other, Kpee’s responses to Big Guy demonstrate the extent to which he has 
underestimated the seriousness of the criminal activities in which he is now engaged. He 
believes he can defuse the tension underlying the interchange in the same manner he shrugs 
off his minor felonies – by using humour. Furthermore, his insistence that no one is going to 
die is, in retrospect, deeply ironic, since he himself is later murdered by Big Guy when he 
retracts his decision to sell the children and attempts to flee with them in the middle of the 
night.  
 From the moment Kpee accepts the Nanfang into his household, he is not only 
pawning the children’s freedom, but also unwittingly relinquishing the power to change his 
mind – in effect, to control his own destiny. When Big Guy brings the bosses of the child-
trafficking ring to Kpee’s house for the first time, for example, Kotchikpa observes a new 
submissiveness in his uncle: 
His face wore embarrassment . . . I hoped he would crack jokes and ring 
with laughter the whole evening, to entertain everyone . . .  I had hoped 
he would start acting the fool . . . But he didn’t. We were in his house, 
but he didn’t even welcome the guests or introduce them to us. Now, he 
stood around like a new servant who had to rely on an older one, Big 
Guy, to know his bearing. (71)  
 
Implicit in Kpee’s discomfort and anxiety to please is the notion that his household has been 
usurped – both the physical space and its occupants are no longer his preserve. The degree to 
which he is no longer in control of the transaction in which he has involved himself is 
illustrated by his sheepish demeanour and his automatic adoption of a subservient role in the 
presence of the traffickers. These unequal power relations culminate in the form of shocking 
retributive violence when Kpee changes his mind about selling the children and is murdered 
by Big Guy and his cronies. Prior to his death, however, Kpee’s misreading of what 
Kotchikpa recognises is his deference to the trafficking ring leads him to believe he can 
bargain his way out of the transaction. He tells Big Guy he will pay him back, an imploration 
to which the latter responds by bluntly alerting Kpee to the reality that “Dis ting no be about 
money,” but about the children (105). Kpee then seeks to reverse the entire exchange by 
surrendering the Nanfang, only to be met with an equally dismissive: “No way . . . keep de 
machine. Dat na wicked ting . . . You go destroy yourself if you negotiate like dis” (105). Big 
Guy’s responses indicate that the bargain Kpee has struck with the traffickers is irreversible 
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and that he is out of his depth. In addition to losing control of his house and the children’s 
fates, therefore, Kpee also forfeits his personal agency and, ultimately, his very life.  
It is difficult to classify Kpee definitively as either a villain or a victim: his role in the 
selling of the children may best be understood in relation to his socio-economic position and 
opportunism, but also his gullibility. His motives in agreeing to sell his niece and nephew are  
shrouded in ambiguity, an ambiguity which is perhaps best encapsulated by Vickroy’s 
argument that trauma fiction is primarily concerned with “human-made traumatic situations,” 
and that such fiction provides a critique of the manner in which “societies are organised” (4). 
Nevertheless, whilst it is undoubtedly extreme poverty that causes Kpee to fall prey to 
manipulation by the child traffickers, and his agency in this situation is limited, he does 
choose to strike a bargain with them. The fact that he obviously views the children with 
affection but, with Big Guy’s help, fattens them up for the purpose of selling them, suggests 
that he oscillates between treating them as members of his family and as commodities. An 
analogous situation emerges later, when one of the men who guards the room in which the 
children are imprisoned after Kpee’s death tells Kotchikpa: “I no be bad man. Also, me I be 
fader; I get my own children. I no want sell anoder man children. I just dey do my work o” 
(117). The guard’s insistence that he has no choice – that he is forced to suspend or suppress 
his personal feelings in order to “do [his] work” – presents the implied reader with an ethical 
conundrum. On the one hand, perhaps this ‘work’ is the man’s sole means of income: the only 
way he can feed his own children is to participate, however reluctantly, in the exploitation of 
the children of other people. On the other, the loss of personal agency in the service of a crime 
against human – specifically children’s – rights complicates the attribution of personal 
responsibility, since this powerlessness attests to the fractured sense of cohesion or integrity 
underpinning subjects plagued by the trauma of lack and deprivation. It also points to the 
reality that Benin, the setting of Akpan’s story, is unable to provide, in general, for the 
welfare of its citizens. John Kearney observes, for example, that:  
In Benin, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, parents cannot 
resist child traffickers’ promises that their children will earn enough to send 
home large sums of money and will also be given a good education. In reality 
many of the children are smuggled into neighbouring Nigeria and used for 
quarry work. Others are even shipped off to Europe as domestic slaves. Little, 
if any, money is ever paid and some parents often do not see their child for 
years, if ever again. (93) 
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Thus what may appear to be Kpee’s ruthlessness is mitigated by his context: he, like the 
children, is the victim of socio-economic circumstances in Benin, circumstances which make 
its citizens vulnerable to exploitation by those who have money and few scruples. 
   
4.2 Trauma and the Body 
 
I have argued earlier that, while trauma resists linguistic expression, it is manifested through 
the body, since the body is the primary site of subjectivity, and by extension, psychic 
existence. In “Fattening for Gabon”, the body is not only the surface on which Kpee’s guilt 
and anxiety are imprinted, it is also the site upon which violence is enacted against the 
children. The story’s title draws attention to the importance of the body’s role in the 
narrative, primarily because the children are literally fattened up in preparation for  being 
sold in Gabon. One of the manifestations of the theme of seduction in the story is the fact that 
Yewa and Kotchikpa are provided with excessive amounts of junk food – the kind to which 
they normally would have no access, yet nevertheless crave – in order to entice them into 
believing the lies Kpee and his consorts conjure up to explain their journey to Gabon, to force 
them into compliance, and to render them more desirable to would-be ‘owners.’ When the 
child traffickers attempt to convince Yewa to accept the new name they have assigned her, 
she initially resists by asserting: “My name is Yewa Mandabou!” Shortly thereafter, however, 
they lay a spread of delectable treats in front of her and tell her that she can have anything she 
wants, on the condition that she lets them call her Mary. Yewa promptly trades her name for 
a can of Coca-Cola (70). This is followed by Kotchikpa’s disturbing description of the drink 
being “poured into [his] sister’s mouth. Yewa’s face was upturned like a suckling lamb’s” 
(70). The heartbreaking desperation this simile evokes is largely attributable to the archetypal 
symbolism of the lamb as an innocent. In using this symbolism to describe Yewa, therefore, 
the narrator highlights the extreme manner in which the traffickers use Yewa’s innocence 
against her – as, in a sense, they have used Kpee’s too.  
While equally seduced by the sudden availability of food, Kotchikpa is also captivated 
by the possibility of once again having a maternal presence in his life. For example, when the 
woman who calls herself Mama initially arrives at Kpee’s house together with Big Guy, 
Kotchikpa notes that she “squatted, and quietly swept us into a hug, as if the moment were too 
tender for words” (61-62). During this apparent display of affection (in contrast to Yewa, who 
is distracted by the novelty of the visitors’ car), Kotchikpa confesses: “I wanted to hold her 
forever” (62). His response here, read against the backdrop of the children’s untimely physical 
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removal from their HIV-positive parents and Kotchikpa’s subsequent adoption of the 
‘feminine’ roles of cooking, cleaning and mothering Yewa in their uncle’s house, poignantly 
captures the young boy’s need to be shown affection and nurtured.  
 Kotchikpa’s preoccupation with the absence of his own mother and the lack of a 
maternal presence in Kpee’s house not only renders him more vulnerable to exploitation, but 
also suggests the extent to which his assumption of responsibility for Yewa and for the 
domestic tasks in Kpee’s household interferes with his own development as a child. As a 
result of the deprivation of his own emotional needs, the tenderness he attributes to ‘Mama’ is 
no doubt a projection of his desire for a surrogate mother-figure. The ominous quality 
underlying Mama’s presence at Kpee’s household, however, is underlined by the reality that 
she is actually one of the two leaders of the trafficking ring, and is intent on mollifying the 
children before selling them. Significantly, the experiencing self’s misperception of his new 
‘Mama’ is intimated by the odour of her perfume, which overwhelms the room “the way the 
scent of the Nanfang had when it arrived” (63). While enchanted by the woman’s fragrance 
and presence, Kotchikpa simultaneously, if unconsciously, highlights the correspondence here 
between this surrogate mother and the bike, since both initially appeal to his sense of smell. 
Sensory perceptions, then, though they have a powerful impact, are misleading.   
The transformation of the children’s bodies – from malnourished at the beginning of 
the story to bordering on obese towards the end – starkly articulates the extent to which they 
have been fed lies in being fed food. This parallelism is pointedly illustrated in the incident in 
which the traffickers bring two other children they have procured to Kpee’s house for dinner, 
and one of them, Paul, vomits the food he has been forced to eat. Preceding this moment of 
abjection, Paul is presented as a “tall, frail-looking boy,” with a “limp handshake” and “red 
and teary” eyes, who persists in hanging his head (72). In addition to his dejected demeanour, 
Paul is also “as silent and unmoving as a statue” (72). The only decisively assertive utterance 
he makes all evening is “I want to go home” (72), an utterance which confirms that he is an 
unwilling captive of the trafficking ring, and prefigures Yewa and Kotchikpa’s similar fates. 
Paul’s suffering is ultimately expressed corporeally in his vomiting which, like Yewa’s 
wailing at the end of the story, articulates that which exceeds both language and silence. 
Symbolically, too, his expulsion of the food is synonymous with a refusal to accept the lies he 
and the other children have been fed, namely, that they are being offered a better life. Thus 
Paul’s expression of homesickness finds a direct correlative in his nausea and ejection of the 
food he has swallowed. Indeed, after Kpee’s attempt to sexually groom him and Yewa, 
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Kotchikpa confides: “For the first time, I empathized with Paul – and wished I could have 
vomited, like him, all the good food I had ever eaten in the past few months” (97-98).  
Kpee’s body is similarly revealing. Kotchikpa and Yewa’s uncle is “sometimes called 
Smiley Kpee” (34), in part because of his generous sense of humour, but primarily because 
his face has been deformed by a knife scar sustained in a fight during his training to become 
an agbero. The scar extends from his left eye to the edge of his upper lip (34), and 
consequently that eye looks larger than his right one and he cannot completely close his 
mouth. Kpee’s scar and grotesquely lopsided smile suggest the underlying violence of 
survival in this context, a trauma which is concealed behind his sense of humour and his 
permanently distorted smile. Arguably, this physical asymmetry also signifies the duplicity 
which enables him to betray the children, since his face, “split in two by his trademark laugh” 
(45), connotes a schizophrenic identity, reminiscent of Robert Louis Stevenson’s Jekyll and 
Hyde.  
Given that the eye is an organ of perception – of seeing – while the mouth is one of 
articulation – of saying – the scar which joins Kpee’s eye to his mouth functions as a heavy-
handed metaphor which foregrounds the ubiquitous irony of a narrative in which the 
characters’ perceptions are, more often than not, misperceptions, and in which words do not 
always mean what they appear to mean. Kpee’s scar is therefore a bodily expression of the 
unreliability of perception and articulation. It symbolises the glaring disparity between what 
Kpee perceives and what he tells the children, as evidenced in his constant use of laughter as 
a means of covering up the unpalatable truth of his deceitfulness and his shortcomings as a 
minor criminal caught up in more serious felonious dealings. 
 Part of his ‘duties’ towards the child-trafficking gang entail initiating the children 
into the sexual acts they will be required to perform on adults in the future. During the scene 
in which, after much evident reluctance, he strips off his “wrapper” (94) and “part[s] his legs 
and grab[s] his genitals” (96), for instance, Kpee attempts to mask his own discomfort by 
asking the children “You naked, I naked, why you fear? . . . You have it, I have it” (96). 
Despite his words, however, Kotchikpa also perceives that his uncle looks “like a man in 
pain, a man who [cannot] take the heat anymore” (94). Kpee’s indecent exposure is curtailed 
by the children’s horrified reaction and by his nephew’s suggestion: “Maybe we should not 
go to Gabon” (96). The children are so excruciatingly mortified to see their uncle’s genitals 
that, for a long time after the episode, their relationship with Kpee is decisively altered: 
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Since that night when he went naked before us, we were scared to get close to 
him and said very little to him. He said little to us too. Silence grew between 
us like yeast, and the room felt smaller, while his presence seemed to expand. 
We looked forward to his leaving the house, and when he was home, 
sometimes we pretended to be asleep. (98) 
 
Kpee’s failure to induct the children into the sexual roles which they will be expected to 
perform in the future causes a relational rift in the members of the household to the extent 
that Kotchikpa now imagines that the scar on his uncle’s cheek “looked like a worm 
journeying from his eye to his mouth, or vice versa, eating his good humour” (101). The 
association of worms with decay and ingestion not only means that this image signals 
Kotchikpa’s growing suspicion that Kpee is not telling Yewa and him the whole truth, but 
also presages their uncle’s imminent death and burial.  
Akpan’s text further develops its use of the body as a symbol in relation to the theme 
of confinement. After their escape attempt and Kpee’s death, Yewa and Kotchikpa are locked 
up in a dark, unventilated room in which they are force-fed and threatened with physical 
violence. Kotchikpa relates how, on one occasion, Yewa ate so much that, after finishing, she 
“needed to use the toilet” and he “guided her to the pail” (124). He then continues, “soon the 
stink of her shit thickened the stuffiness in the room. When she finished . . . I offered her her 
portion of akara and ogi, but she said she was full, so I quickly ate it” (124). This passage 
highlights, firstly, the gradual transformation of food from a means of seduction to an 
instrument of torture and, secondly, the synchronism of food and faeces, where one is an 
immediate, involuntary by-product of the other. The latter suggests the extent to which the 
children’s bodies have become abject and repulsive, in the sense that they no longer have 
control over anything, including their own bowel movements. The force-feeding also 
reinforces the child traffickers’ perception of the children as commodities. Thus, while the 
feeding of children, beginning with the child suckling on its mother’s breast, is traditionally 
associated with care and nurturing, the coercive feeding of Yewa and Kotchikpa subverts this 
notion and constitutes a form of violence and abuse. Kotchikpa, motivated by fear, eats 
compulsively despite his revulsion to Yewa’s faeces, and his compulsive gorging is 
symptomatic of his loss of control over his own body, the instrumentalisation of which he 
seems to have internalised.  
The various ways in which Akpan’s story focuses on the primacy of the body – the 
seductive temptations of food, sensory perceptions, abjection, facial distortions as an index to 
character – read in relation to the dialogical interplay between perception and misperception 
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discussed earlier, may be regarded as symptomatic of what Gikandi terms “ a dialectic of 
insight and blindness”  (111). Gikandi explains that, when the insights a narrator gains only 
have value “much later when the whole picture [is] clear,” prior to this what the narrator 
believes to be understanding is “also a form of blindness” (111). The experiencing 
Kotchikpa’s dawning awareness of Kpee’s deception and the narrating Kotchikpa’s 
retrospective reassembling of the series of events which led to him to have no choice but to 
abandon his sister reflect Gikandi’s dialectic. More profoundly, however, this process is  
evident in the gap between the young Kotchikpa’s experience of escaping from his captors 
and leaving his sister behind, and the narrating self’s anguished production of story’s closing 
sentence: “I ran and I ran, though I knew I could never outrun my sister’s wailing” (139), 
since this moment of ‘insight’ not only suggests the child Kotchikpa’s misrecognition of the 
immediate psychological impact of leaving Yewa behind, it is also a moment of blindness for 
the narrating self. Thus, whilst the experiencing self has no cognition of the trauma and 
insufficient distance from the moment of his escape to be able to scrutinise it, the narrating 
self, having over time endured the haunting memory of his lost sister’s wailing, has distance 
but still cannot access that which resides beyond Yewa’s wailing – resolution. 
 Indeed, the way in which Kotchikpa ends his story is in fact no conclusion at all, for 
the final line suggests that, even though the young and the adult Kotchikpa occupy different 
temporal spaces, the memory of this trauma is indelible and irresolvable; it will last a lifetime. 
In other words, the story’s ending captures both the elusive absence and the persistent 
presence of the originary traumatic experience. In its conflation of two futures (the one that 
has intervened between the experience and its narration, and the one which succeeds the act of 
narration), the final sentence also “generates narrative possibility just as much as 
impossibility” (Luckhurst 83) – it gestures towards that which has not been articulated, cannot 
be articulated and is, in the final analysis, inarticulable. Contained within the wail, however, is 
the possibility of expressing trauma through that which exists prior to and outside of language 
– namely, a primal and corporeal response to anguish. Paradoxically, then, it is this very 
reversion to the pre-linguistic which draws attention to that which it is impossible to speak of 
in words. The temporal continuity or immanence of Yewa’s wail thus also underlines this 
impossibility, since even the adult Kotchikpa cannot find the vocabulary to signify the 
torment contained in and beyond the wail. It is to theorizations of the aporia of trauma and the 
retroactive and future implications of Kotchikpa’s closing remark that I now turn.  
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4.3 Traumatic Recovery, Haunting and Temporality 
 
According to Laub, trauma constitutes a “malfunction [in the] observing and recording 
mechanisms of the human mind”: the recollection or recovery of traumatic experience thus 
“testifies to an absence” (57). For Jessica Murray, the very nature of trauma emphasises its 
unfathomability, because it defies expression, Nevertheless, she maintains that “fiction opens 
up possibilities for overcoming [such] representational difficulties” (1). The aporetic nature 
of trauma strongly correlates with Maurice Blanchot’s notion of ecstasy, which he articulates 
as follows: 
Ecstasy is without object, just as it is without a why, just as it challenges 
any certainty. One can write that word (ecstasy) only by putting it 
carefully in quotation marks, because nobody can know what it is about 
and above all, whether it ever took place: going beyond knowledge, 
implying un-knowledge, it refuses to be stated other than through 
random words that cannot guarantee it. Its decisive aspect is that the one 
who experiences it is no longer there when he experiences it. (19) 
 
Blanchot’s notion of ecstasy here shares several qualities with trauma, three of which are 
relevant to my discussion. The first of these is ecstasy’s lack of an external object. In The 
Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry argues that, like physical pain, psychological suffering has no 
external object and therefore “no referential content” (5). Secondly, like ecstasy, trauma 
“issues a challenge to the capacities of narrative knowledge. In its shock impact, trauma is 
anti-narrative” (Luckhurst 79). And, lastly, ecstasy’s unfathomability, which “[goes] beyond 
knowledge, implying un-knowledge,” is also synonymous with that of trauma because, as 
Murray claims, it causes a rupture or “malfunction” in the mechanisms by which a human 
being makes sense of both his/her experiences and of him/herself. Blanchot’s conception of 
‘un-knowledge’ suggests not so much a polarity between knowing and not knowing, but 
rather the annihilation of the very notion of knowing. It is the latter which forms an index to  
ecstasy, trauma and the sublime, and unsettles all epistemologies: language can 
circumnavigate, but not capture or render intelligible these extremes of experience. 
 Testimony, as an attempt at releasing the unruly destructive impact of traumatic 
experience located in the past, may potentially be regarded as a move towards a type of relief 
– in literary terms, catharsis. If, as David Carr claims, “lives are told in being lived and lived 
in being told” (51), narrativising or testifying to trauma is a matter not only of attempting to 
gain access to traumatic (un)knowledge, but also, to use Caruth’s expression, of “claiming” its 
occurrence (Unclaimed 10). In other words, testimony is a means by which to allow 
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internalised psychological pain to be transferred “to another outside oneself” (Laub 69). 
Paradoxically, however, by its very unfathomability, testimony is the site upon which the 
excruciating tension between trauma and ecstasy is played out without relief for the victim. In 
other words, testimony brings to the fore that which was not experienced while 
simultaneously highlighting the impossibility of representing that which occurred. Thus, the 
latent effect of trauma is foregrounded, but remains unresolved by the witness. 
 In relation to trauma’s indelible but irrecuperable impact, Caruth observes: 
Traumatic experience, beyond the psychological dimension of suffering 
it involves, suggests a paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent 
event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, 
paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. (Unclaimed 91-2) 
 
It may be deduced from Caruth’s claim that trauma’s violent impact is preserved in a temporal 
crypt, the opening of which is always after the fact, and that the force of what is released in 
testimony is inscrutable. Her observations are, therefore, necessarily connected to the central 
concern of “Fattening for Gabon” – namely, the recovery of a non-experience which has no 
external object or cognitive content, and is characterised by its inaccessibility. The poignant 
question, with regard to the considerations enumerated above, then, is: how does the narrating 
self of this text recover that which can only be described as “an elusive memory that feels as 
if it no longer resembles any reality” (Laub 76)?  
 In essence, first-person past-tense narration always implies two selves: the self 
described as experiencing a past event or series of events, and the self describing or narrating 
the event/s. Arguably, this rupture between the experiencing self and the narrating self is 
inherently traumatic, since the former cannot be recovered or adequated. However, this 
conundrum is further problematised when it is past trauma which is being narrated, since the 
experiencing self was not present at the moment of that experience, but ‘suspended’ or 
obliterated. Consequently, trauma causes a disruption to both the experiencing and narrating 
selves, and resides in a splitting of self. One might even go so far as to say that, in 
Kotchikpa’s testimony, the self is triply split: the initial violence of his original trauma results 
in the first rupture; the second is located in the distance between the narrating and the 
experiencing self; and the third, in the narrating self’s attempt to recollect and make sense 
both of the initial split and its belated and recurring impact in the intervening period. The 
concluding sentence  of “Fattening for Gabon” thus expresses the narrator’s inability to 
articulate his suffering as a result of having been forced to desert Yewa, while simultaneously 
drawing attention to the manner in which both his and her psychological distress was and is 
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contained in her wailing – a non-verbal communication of pain from which Kotchikpa can 
never escape. 
 In its destruction of language, the experience of trauma and pain “brings about an 
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being 
makes before language is learned” (Scarry 4). Yewa’s wailing signifies a nonverbal 
expression of suffering, and forms an index to trauma’s sublimity: it is indicative of her 
incommunicable distress, and that of the narrating and experiencing Kotchikpa. Accordingly, 
the wail occupies the temporal space of the past, haunts the present and, in that the 
inexpressible cannot be resolved, invades the future. Although narrated in the past tense, 
therefore, the story’s contents are not relegated to the realm of the past because they are 
characterised by the inescapable iteration of past trauma in the present and future. 
 The final sentence reveals a memory which cannot be foreclosed upon, and that Kotchikpa’s 
telling of his story has failed since it has not provided and cannot provide resolution. His 
suffering, located in the chasm yet inexpressible simultaneity between his experiencing and 
narrating self, and between the latter and his future self, problematises notions of time, and 
hence ultimately resists his attempt to organise his narrative into a logical sequence of cause 
and effect. 
 Kotchikpa’s closing sentence thus suggests the haunting or belatedness of traumatic 
experience (Caruth, Unclaimed 17). According to Caruth, “ the historical power of  . . . 
trauma is not just that the experience is repeated after its forgetting, but that it is only in and 
through its inherent forgetting that it is first experienced at all” (17). This simultaneous 
presence and absence of an experience which defies cognitive registration, and which undoes 
the very notion of knowing, is contained by Akpan’s narrative in a core of silence – of the 
unsaid and the unsayable – which is paradoxically both imperceptible and yet profoundly felt. 
This silence is attributable to the disarticulation inherent in the experience of trauma. Indeed, 
the fundamental paradox at the heart of trauma narratives is their inability to capture the 
atemporality of trauma because, even in the most aleatory fictions, reading itself is temporally 
structured. As Petra Schweitzer points out, with regards to Holocaust narratives, 
the historical truthfulness of trauma as structurally impossible experience 
resides in our desire to grasp an absent knowledge of the event, as our 
encounter with the ‘missed event’ in the present opens up the possibility 
of testimony. (61) 
 
Schweitzer’s claim here echoes Lawrence Langer’s observation that the narrative voice in 
autobiographical testimony “imposes on apparently chaotic episodes a perceived sequence” 
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(41). Although this claim is made with specific reference to actual witnesses and survivors, it 
may also be applied to Akpan’s fictional narrator’s assumption of the role of ‘witness’ in the  
‘testimony’ he presents, a role which evinces a rhetorical silence. According to Cheryl Glenn, 
silence becomes rhetorical when “it fills out the space in which it appears, [when] it can be 
equated with a kind of emptiness, [and when] it is not the same as absence or erasing” (4). 
The split between the narrating and the experiencing self mimics the fragmentary nature of 
traumatic experience, which “is not fully perceived as it happens” (Caruth 18). While 
applicable to any text involving retrospective narration, the distance between the narrating and 
experiencing self here is characterised by a haunting – Yewa’s wail –  which “comes to taint 
all other experiences, spoiling appreciation of the present” (Vickroy 12). The narrating self is 
plagued by a “tyranny of the past” (12), a past which cannot be grasped, let alone assimilated, 
in the same manner as non-traumatic knowledge. Consequently, the retrospective mode of 
“Fattening for Gabon” is essentially, but paradoxically, premised on the silence and 
inarticulacy to which the final sentence gestures. 
 Inherently, the recovery of traumatic memories through narrative, Laub insists, arises 
because trauma cannot be witnessed from the inside – which is to say that it cannot but be 
witnessed from the outside (82), which, essentially, means it cannot  be witnessed. While 
narrative distance is a necessary requirement for testimony, however, it also functions as an 
instantiation of the unknowable. Furthermore, given the fact that the notion of memory 
connotes a selective and therefore fragmented process of recovery, testimony to trauma 
involves even greater fragmentation and incoherence, as the very content of the memory has 
not and, indeed, could not have been and cannot be cognitively registered. Akpan’s text 
depicts a fictional space in which the “the cognizance, the ‘knowing’ of the [traumatic] event 
is given birth to” through the adult narrator’s return to the unknowable event in his past. The 
attempt to arrive at knowledge is, therefore, paradoxically also an exercise in unknowing for, 
while the narrator attempts to imbue the events with a logical progression and coherence, this 
attempt is undermined by the structure of his memory which is characterised by a 
fragmentation that foregrounds “the failure of things to fit into a preconceived pattern” 
(Gikandi 109). Logically, then, while narrative distance is a necessary requirement for 
testimony, it can hinder the retrieval of traumatic (un)knowledge. It is precisely because 
trauma is devoid of pattern that its recovery, particularly in narrative, is problematic. 
Nevertheless, if trauma, in essence, is unrepresentable, fiction, which is inevitably concerned 
with its own (im)possibilities of representation, does have a role to play: it is, in a sense, 
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always already about expressing the inexpressible and gesturing towards that which is not and 
cannot be expressed. 
 Akpan’s utilisation of irony, narrative distance, temporal dislocation, and symbolism 
reflects the paradoxical absence and simultaneous presence of traumatic experience. 
Kotchikpa’s retrospective narration attests to the manner in which “traumatic memory persists 
in a half-life, rather like a ghost, a haunting absent presence of another time in  . . . time” 
(Luckhurst 81). On the whole, the ending of “Fattening for Gabon” reveals how “the 
impossibility of speaking . . . otherwise than through . . . silence, otherwise than through [the] 
black hole both of knowledge and of words, corresponds to the impossibility of remembering 
and of forgetting” (Laub 65). Indeed, the attempt to recall, re-member or relate traumatic 
memory in Kotchikpa’s narrative cannot rely on the speech act or narrative distance, because 
the narrator’s past, present and future is embedded in the silence which subtends Yewa’s 
wailing. 
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Chapter 5 
“The Seduction of Ash”: 
Mia Couto’s “The Day Mabata-Bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab”  
 
I are sad. No, I’m not mistaken. What I am saying is correct. Or perhaps: 
we am sad? Because inside me, I’m not alone. I’m many. And they all 
fight over my one and only life. We go along reaping our deaths. But we 
have only one birth. That’s where the problem lies. That’s why, when I 
tell my story, I mix myself up, a mulatto not of races, but of existences. 
 
           – Mia Couto (“So You Haven’t Flown Yet, Carlota Gentina?” Voices Made Night 41) 
 
I will die from the pounding of my heart which does not allow me to 
bend or move my arm but turns me into stone, fills my mouth with dry 
leaves, covers me in decay . . . I cry in my sleep, this sleep of death. 
Tomorrow has departed never to return, death has entered my dreaming 
entered my growing turned it into mud, and now I cry one small 
whimper, cry quietly into my memory saying, whispering, I am the 
opposite of life.  
                   – Yvonne Vera (Under the Tongue 104) 
 
Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is merely 
a type of what is dead, and a very rare type. 
 
                       – Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay Science 109) 
 
Chesca Long-Innes argues that Mia Couto’s installation of the fantastic in his short story 
collection, Voices Made Night, may best be understood “not so much as a product of any 
‘magical realist’ poetics, but  as ‘naturalised’, or motivated as a function of the collective 
neurosis of a [Mozambican] society traumatised by its continuing history of poverty and 
extreme violence” (158).  Couto’s use of the fantastic, she adds, encompasses both empirical 
and psychic reality, and both are characterised by instability and elusiveness. The collection, 
she then maintains, constitutes a re-invention or reimagining of subjective realities 
constructed and perpetuated by the social trauma underpinning what she terms the “psycho-
pathology of post-colonial Mozambique, in which the society as a whole is . . . caught in the 
grip of a profound depression or melancholia” (158).  
 Using  Long-Innes’ thesis as a point of departure, I argue that Couto’s short stories 
“The Day Mabata-bata Exploded,” from Voices Made Night (Voices), and “The Bird-
Dreaming Baobab,” from Every Man is a Race (Every Man),  foreground the paradox of 
trauma’s unspeakability and hence all-too-present absence in the Mozambican setting. I begin 
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by highlighting the structural overlap between postcoloniality and trauma fiction in the 
African context, an overlap particularly pertinent to Couto’s use of the fantastic in the 
aforementioned stories. I then provide a close reading of Couto’s use of figurative language 
and symbolic use of landscape in his depictions of violence. As this violence is filtered 
through the consciousness of child protagonists, the focus in my close analysis of the two 
stories here will be on the disparity between their perceptions as opposed to those of adults. 
Finally, I examine the theme of death in both narratives, specifically in relation to the 
fantastical worldview of the children, and argue that the two children’s deaths reveal some of 
the innovative ways in which Couto engages with the enigma of trauma representation in 
fiction.  
 
5.1 Trauma, Magical Realism and Mia Couto’s Mozambique  
 
Couto’s stories conform to Rosemary Jackson’s definition of subversive fantasy, in that they 
are “predominantly realistic . . . [but spiral] through fantastic interludes of unreason, dream, 
violence” (126). “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded,” for instance, opens with a disarmingly 
literal and yet peculiar description of an ox “suddenly . . . burst[ing] without so much as a 
moo,” its carnage falling as “a rain of chunks and slices . . . as if the fruit and leaves” (17). 
This catastrophe is located both within the realms of the realistic (the ox has literally stepped 
on a landmine) and the non-realistic (its flesh transformed into water, fruit and leaves). The 
dualism which emerges is primarily achieved through the juxtaposition of the third-person 
narrator’s perspective with that of the child focaliser, Azarias, and the ox’s explosion 
performs a crucial symbolic role in the representation of trauma and its relation to the themes 
of death and rebirth in the narrative. As the story unfolds, it becomes apparent that this 
viscerally uncanny moment is, at the very least, indicative of a correlation between physical 
violence and psychological trauma in Azarias’ immediate context and Mozambique as a 
whole. The landmine is also both literally and symbolically associated with fire, an element 
which features prominently in Couto’s narratives and which is frequently linked with death.  
 The all-pervasive theme of death in Couto’s fiction has prompted much scholarly 
interest. Lawrence Ngoveni’s reading of Under the Frangipani, for instance, examines this 
theme in relation to issues of popular memory and nationhood, whereas Long-Innes’ analysis 
of the psychopathology of Mozambique, as depicted in Voices, is derived from her 
understanding of the Freudian death-drive and Kristeva’s work on melancholia.  In both 
Voices and Every Man, however, death not only signifies the culmination of suffering in life, 
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but also transcendence through metamorphosis. In the two stories that are the focus of this 
chapter, suffering and trauma’s indelible presence, in both an individual and a collective 
sense, suggest that life in contemporary Mozambique, as Couto presents it, is unbearable, and 
consequently that death, as an alternative to such an existence, is a means of transcendence. 
Thus, what Long-Innes reads as a manifestation of the Freudian death-drive in Couto’s 
characters (168), or a suicidal leaning towards death, paradoxically signifies both the 
negation and the affirmation of life. Transmogrifications and the interanimation of the human 
and natural worlds in Couto’s stories run parallel to the interfusion of the fantastic and the 
real, and signal the “acceptance of the supernatural as actual” (Gaylard 45), an acceptance 
which is conventionally associated with childhood. 
 The fire motif in “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” emphasises a childlike 
interpretation of what initially appears to be an individual experience of trauma, but is, in 
reality, a collective trauma.  Read as manifestations of a recurring collective memory of 
socio-political instability and violence, landmines in the story evoke Lyotard’s concept of the 
sublime, since he posits that an encounter with the sublime is always associated with an 
awareness of  “a terror which is linked with the danger of impending death or destruction” 
(97). In Couto’s oeuvre, the constant dread stirred up by the landmines’ pervasive presence is 
symptomatic of the land’s inability to forget: his characters are haunted by the spectral 
presence of a traumatic history, whether this haunting is acknowledged by the characters 
themselves or not. Azarias’ miscomprehension or misperception of the brutal power 
unleashed by the landmines is thus significant, for it suggests that he and, by extension, all 
Mozambican children are inheritors of a traumatic history and a traumatic present that they 
do not comprehend – that cannot, in fact, be comprehended.  
 Originally colonised by Portugal in the sixteenth century, Mozambique was the 
“scene of the anticolonial war until it was granted independence . . . on 25 June 1975” 
(Rogers 114). Under the leadership of Samora Machel, the country became a one-party state 
which aided the liberation fighters of its neighbouring countries, South Africa and Rhodesia, 
in their respective struggles against their racist governments. The Rhodesian government 
responded to this involvement by funding and equipping the “dissident, capitalist Movimento 
Nacional de Resistência de Moçambique (MNR) in an attempt to destabilise the country so 
that it would be unable to offer aid” to the rebel parties (114). While the liberation 
movements of both South Africa and Rhodesia eventually succeeded in overthrowing their 
racist governments, Mozambique “deteriorated into a full scale civil war,” a war which 
persisted until the country’s first multi-party elections in 1994. Written in the 1990s, Couto’s 
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two short stories are deeply steeped in the legacy of the civil war and the resulting socio-
economic climate of Mozambique, along with its citizens’ psychological inability to 
comprehend and move beyond the collective experience of trauma.  
Lara Buxbaum quotes a line, from The Last Flight of the Flamingo, which refers to 
the ubiquitous presence of landmines in Mozambican soil, “knowing how to tread this ground 
is the difference between life and death,” and then argues that this ominous omnipresence 
denotes the transformation of a “maternal [and] nurturing” earth into a “deadly enemy” (22) 
and signals the persistent and repetitive intrusion of violence into the lives of his characters. 
As the most “visible and heartbreaking relics of the civil war in Mozambique” (Buxbaum 2), 
the landmines potentially release a lethal destructive force which is not only experienced as 
graphically violent, but is also inherently traumatic and resistant to representation. Azarias’ 
encounter with the landmine is distressing, in that the incident affects his subjective 
framework in a manner reminiscent of Richard Kearney’s conception of what occurs to the 
subject in a sublime moment. Using Lyotard as a point of reference, Kearney maintains that 
the subject becomes an “involuntary addressee of some inspiration come to him/her from ‘I 
know not what’” (492-3).   
 Commenting on notions of community and subjectivity in the postcolonial context, 
Gaylard argues that 
  The self in postcolonialism is both multiply connected and multiply 
  alienated, primarily due to the impact of colonialism . . . but also because 
  of the reactions and disasters of the post-independence era. (54) 
 
Gaylard’s observations here share some interesting correlations with the effects of collective 
trauma, and are reminiscent of Erikson’s assertion that collective traumas destabilise and 
disrupt the formation of notions of identity (460). The paradox of connection and alienation 
that Gaylard highlights implies the split or schizophrenic identity which characterises 
contemporary Africa, an identity which emerges clearly in Couto’s representation of 
Mozambique. Indeed, Gaylard maintains that the burgeoning of magical realist narratives in 
the contemporary African literary landscape (50) – of which Couto’s installation of the 
fantastic is an example – is a consequence of this instability, because the expression of 
trauma’s aporetic nature is, in the postcolonial context, further complicated by notions of 
subjectivity and community which have themselves been disrupted.  
 Gaylard also postulates that “postcoloniality is a pause which has been created by 
uncertainty as to how to understand and respond to history” (50), and explains that “one 
reason for pausing seems to be the difficulty of articulating new answers [to questions of 
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identity, subjectivity, and community] and the arbitrariness of the old ones” (57). Where 
postcolonial narrative is concerned, the kind of ‘history’ to which writers respond is thus, by 
definition, always already a traumatic one.  Further, if “African postcoloniality includes . . .  
the magical cosmology of many Africans” (43), the insertion of such mystical elements in 
African literature entails “the modification of an already existent notion of reality to include 
new phenomena” (45) such as “the supernatural, the fantastic, the improbable, the 
implausible” (44). Thus the fantastical elements and the coexistence of the magical and the 
real in Couto’s short stories dissolve conceptual oppositions, such as reason versus unreason, 
reality versus illusion, and the material versus the imaginative. If the realist mode “spurns 
paradox . . . [by seeking] referential (and reverential) equivalence, the one-to-one locking of 
word and thing” (15), the presence of paradox, in the form of the seemingly impossible 
represented as part of the possible, in Couto’s writing is a direct consequence of the 
inaccessibility of his traumatic subject matter, a realist or mimetic literary representation of 
which would itself be paradoxical, if not impossible. 
 Trauma is located neither solely in fact, where ‘fact’ is taken to mean empirical or 
phenomenal reality, nor in fiction, where fiction signifies the imagined or imaginary. Instead, 
it occupies a liminal space between these two ontological realms: it is both material and 
immaterial. Similarly, Couto’s fiction may be read as located between two modes of 
representation: realistic and non-realistic/fantastical, outer and inner, conscious and 
psychic/unconscious. The tension between these modes is dissolved to such an extent that the 
realistic and non-realistic merge or intertwine to form a hybrid ontology governed and 
determined by the laws of both. Geoffrey Hartman, for example, argues that, in literature 
dealing with the subject of traumatic knowledge and the sublime, “shock and dreaminess 
collude. [And] where there is dream there is trauma” (“On Traumatic Knowledge” 6). Couto’s 
narratives are not only oneiric, but also characterised by a curiously hybrid fictional space, a 
space which is inherently syncretic. Rawdon Wilson maintains that the magical realist text, in 
general, may be read as “a model of how different geometries, inscribing boundaries that fold 
and refold like quicksilver, can superimpose themselves upon one another” (210). The 
mercurial quality of Couto’s fictional worlds imbues his narratives with multiple 
significances: they are characterised by what Wilson refers to as the “copresence of oddities, 
the interaction of the bizarre with the entirely ordinary, the doubleness of conceptual codes, 
the irreducibly hybrid nature of experience (210).  
 Moreover, the use of child protagonists who, although inhabiting the ‘real’ world, 
constantly desire the ‘unreal’, in “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming 
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Baobab,” serves as an additional vehicle through which the narratives achieve hybridity. The 
symbolic correlation between the ox’s explosion and trauma in the former story, for example, 
undercuts any strict relegation of the incident to the realm of the ‘real’, since the child’s 
interpretation of the episode is that the ox stepped on some relic of the ndlati bird (bird of 
lightning). This, then, demonstrates the manner in which Couto’s fiction enacts the magical 
realist convention of inscribing “two distinct geometries onto the same space” (Wilson 210). 
Gaylard also notes that magical realism is “perhaps rooted in the remembrance of childhood, 
with its attendant splendour of the world, whose multitudinous variety of actual and potential” 
(72) is accessible to children. This observation may thus be linked to the children’s access to 
the mystical/magical in their interpretations of their realities. Both the tree and the birds in 
“The Bird-Dreaming Baobab” are simultaneously located in the realms of the realistic and the 
fantastical. The baobab tree functions both literally, as a home for the nameless stranger who 
suddenly appears in a small suburban neighbourhood, and symbolically, as a gateway to a 
transcendental existence which can only be achieved through death, and the birds are linked to 
mysticism, freedom and a rebirth into otherworldliness. Both stories thus presuppose, from 
the outset, infinitude in the fictional world represented, since the distinction between what is 
natural and what is supernatural is collapsed, and the two become entangled in an endless 
cycle of becoming.  
 The role of the natural world and of place is central to Couto’s writing. Buxbaum 
argues, for instance, that the notion of place in this author’s oeuvre should be considered as 
more than merely a backdrop or setting, or the product of a magical realist poetics. Working 
from within an ecocritical framework which emphasises that “the relationship between the 
human and the non-human world is one of interanimation” (2), and subscribing to Gotta’s 
claim that “physical environment [is] a presence in its own right” (qtd in Buxbaum 3), 
Buxbaum contends that, in Couto’s writing, “the earth is alive, engaging and interacting with 
the characters” (2). Her emphasis on the role of the environment in Couto’s work is shared by 
many of his critics, including Long-Innes, Ngoveni, and Irene Marques, all of whom read the 
natural environment in relation to Couto’s concern with the socio-political and psychic 
realities of postcolonial Mozambique. Long-Innes and Ngoveni agree that insight into the 
socio-political configurations of Mozambique plays a crucial role in understanding Couto’s 
work. In her survey of scholarship on Couto, Long-Innes cites Patrick Chabal, who observes: 
 
 
87 
 
  Poorly integrated by the Portuguese during the colonial period, badly  
  bruised by the nationalist struggle and torn asunder by civil war,   
  Mozambique is not yet a country in any meaningful sense of the word . . .  
  Mozambique is itself part reality and part fiction.  
                    (qtd in Long-Innes 156)   
 
The crisis of identity, as highlighted by Chabal above, may be read in relation to Neil J. 
Smelser’s contention that 
  In the case of a collective trauma, there is often an interest in   
  representing the trauma as indelible (a national shame, a permanent scar,  
  etc.), and if this representation is successfully established, the memory  
  does in fact take on the characteristics of indelibility and unshakeability. (42) 
 
And Couto himself has stated that, “[i]n a country like Mozambique, misery is the first 
environment” (qtd in Buxbaum 1), an assertion which signifies the ‘unshakeability’ of the 
collective distress this author imaginatively reconstructs. Both Couto’s landscapes and his 
characters symbolically enact the violent psychic scarring of the country’s inhabitants and the 
effects of violence on the basic tissues of community: his stories repeatedly critique and 
attempt to engage with the historical and contemporary social crises of Mozambique, crises 
which nonetheless form an integral part of its collective yet fractured and fraught identity.   
Chabal’s observation regarding the unstable definition of Mozambicanness – that the country 
is itself “part reality and part fiction” – suggests that the ‘real’ is lacking to such an extent that 
it cannot but be supplemented by the imagined, and that, by extension, fiction has a seminal 
role to play in the reconstruction and redefinition of collective identity. Indeed, Hartman 
observes, of notions of truth in historical and fictional accounts of the Holocaust, that when 
confronted with atrocity, “the line that is supposed to distinguish between factual and fictive 
versions of truth becomes a battleground precisely because a distinction that must be made is 
often difficult to make” (25-26). In the face of this dilemma, he posits that “imagination is 
[not] simply an addition to the compound we call reality, rather [it is] part of that reality” (26). 
Similarly, Couto’s fiction not only documents a particular contemporary moment in a 
traumatic Mozambican history, but also, through his use of the imaginary, the mythical and 
the transcendental, is able to negotiate several ways of perceiving and representing this 
moment, so as to engage the implied reader in an alternative  manner of perceiving both 
history and ways of speaking about it. 
 Dolores Herrero and Sonia Baelo-Allué maintain that 
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  Events are not inherently traumatic . . . for an event or situation to acquire the 
  dimension of trauma, it must have destabilized the structures of meaning of a 
  collectivity . . . the event must be associated with a strong negative affect, and 
  be remembered in a culturally relevant way. (xiii) 
 
Couto’s narratives are situated in the context of postcolonial, post-independence and post-war 
Mozambique, and are haunted by the repetitive psychic recollection of atrocity. More 
specifically, as individualised examples of Mozambique’s intolerable social, economic and 
political climate, his characters are possessed by what Vickroy, in another context, terms  a 
material history of “racial, gender and economic oppression [which] distort[s their] formation 
of identity and relational bonds” (37). The instability arising from Mozambican history and 
the memory of the violence which accompanied this history are, in Couto’s fiction, literally 
rooted in the landscape.  
 
5.2 Violence and the Natural Environment 
 
Narrated from the third-person perspective, “The Day Mabata-bata Explode” is the story of a 
young orphan boy, Azarias, who, while herding his uncle’s herd of cows, witnesses the 
explosion of an ox. Afraid of being punished by his uncle for the loss of the ox, Azarias 
decides not to leave the fields to return to his home. Meanwhile, his grandmother notices that 
the boy has not returned and asks her son, the boy’s uncle, to go out to look for him, but Raul 
only wants to have his supper. Shortly after dinner, three soldiers come to warn him that 
“bandits” have been laying landmines around the mountains. Only then does Raul, with 
encouragement from his mother, go searching for his cattle. When he does get to the mountain 
where Azarias is hiding behind the shadows, he tries to coax the child into coming out by 
promising not to punish him. The story then ends with Azarias coming out of from his hiding 
place only to step on a landmine. As intimated earlier, the use of Azarias as both protagonist 
and central focaliser of “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” plays a crucial role in Couto’s 
construction of a hybrid fictional world, since the boy’s interpretation of events consists in an 
overlap between the real and the unreal, a conflation which imbues the text with irony and 
ambiguity. This process is highlighted from the story’s outset: 
  Suddenly, the ox exploded. It burst without so much as moo. In the  
  surrounding grass a rain of chunks and slices fell as if the fruit and leaves of 
  the ox. Its flesh turned into red butterflies. Its bones were scattered  coins. Its 
  horns were caught on some branches, swinging to and fro, imitating life in the 
  instability of the wind. (17) 
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On the surface, this whimsical description of the animal’s violent disintegration seems to 
accord with Azarias’ naïvety and ignorance of death. The metaphors and similes he draws 
between the fleshy shrapnel and rain, fruit, leaves and butterflies, symbols of fertility and 
transformation,  also indicate the story’s treatment of death, rebirth and the imagination. 
Similarly, the parallel the narrator draws between the ox’s bones and monetary currency 
suggests the volatility of life in this rural setting: bones comprise the framework of the ox’s 
anatomy, whereas coins are the rudiments of an exchange economy, and both are necessary 
for survival.  Implicit in the associations of the corporeal with the natural is the notion that 
death is part of the constantly renewing cycle of life. The hauntingly beautiful description of 
the disembodied horns swaying in the branches and seemingly brought alive again by the 
wind may be read as a culmination of the passage’s association of death with transformation, 
since the reanimated horns, previously the means by which the ox attacked and defended 
itself, imply that it has, in some sense, survived in being transmuted, or that death imitates 
life.  
 Azarias has no cognisance of the literal meaning of what he perceives as the 
spontaneous and inexplicable combustion of Mabata-bata:   
  The ndlati, the bird of lightning . . . only takes to the air when the clouds  
  bellow and the sky grates. Then it is that the ndlati rises into the heavens on 
  the wings of its madness. High in the air, it dons its clothes of flame, and  
  casts its burning flight upon the creatures of the earth . . . Maybe Mabata-bata 
  had trodden on some malign vestige of the ndlati . . . He had already seen  
  thunderstruck cattle: they became burnt out carcasses, a pattern of ashes  
  reminiscent of a body. (17-18) 
  
The myth of the bird which emerges in turbulent electric storms symbolically corresponds 
with the ubiquity of landmines during times of socio-political turmoil. Similarly, the thunder 
which provokes the bird’s “wings of madness,” its “clothes of flame,” and its “burning” flight 
may be read in relation to the background conflict which has caused “bandits” (19) to plant 
the landmines. In his ignorance of the correspondences he draws through his interpretation of 
the explosion, Azarias is nonetheless puzzled by certain anomalies: he is, for instance, aware 
that “[f]ire chews slowly, it doesn’t swallow in one go, which is what had happened here” 
(18). Instead of being presented with the charred remains of a body, he has witnessed the ox 
instantaneously “pulverised, like an echo of silence, a shadow of nothingness” (17). While 
natural fire, such as that occasioned by lightning, preserves the form of the dead animal, the 
landmine destroys all evidence of the ox’s existence, leaving only a layered silence rendered 
ominous in that it echoes. What remains of Mabata-bata is “a shadow of nothingness” (17), 
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an image which provocatively indicates that the intention of the landmine is not only to bring 
about an end to life, but also to eradicate any evidence of that life ever having existed. The 
extent to which Azarias is oblivious to the real threat posed by the legacy of a violent, 
conflictual history therefore suggests that he, like Mabata-bata, is in imminent danger of 
being annihilated by forces over which he has no control.    
 The ox’s explosion may thus be read as an embodiment of violence in the 
Mozambican context, and mimics the ferocity with which the psyche ‘splits’ in the face of 
trauma. From Hartman’s perspective, 
  Any general description or modelling of trauma . . . risks being figurative,  to 
  the point of mythic fantasmagoria. Something ‘falls’ into the psyche, or causes 
  it to ‘split’ . . . The inner catastrophe . . . is inscribed with a force proportional 
  to the mediations punctured or evaded. (“On Traumatic Knowledge ” 1) 
 
If the ox incident illustrates the figurative leanings of trauma representation because of its 
symbolic resonances with the ndlati bird, then the annihilation of Azarias, similarly by a 
landmine, at the end of the story signals the causal relationship between public discord and 
private calamity. Azarias’ perspective on the interfusion of life and death, as depicted in his 
interpretation of Mabata-bata exploding in the opening passage has also emerged from his 
own experience of existence. The narrator explains that the young boy 
  had been working [as a cowherd for his Uncle Raul] ever since he had been left 
  an orphan. He would get up when it was still dark so that the cattle might graze 
  . . . Other people’s children were allowed to go to school. Not he, for he was 
  nobody’s son. Work tore him early from his bed and returned him to sleep  
  when there was no longer any trace of childhood left in him. (17-18) 
 
As “nobody’s son,” Azarias is not only stripped of a secure family background, but also 
vulnerable to exploitation from a guardian who perceives him primarily as a “minder for his 
cattle” (21). It is as a result of his instrumentalist view of Azarias as a servant or lackey that 
Raul refuses to send the boy to school, thus depriving him of an education and the 
companionship of his peers. Instead of playing with other children, Azarias “only played with 
animals: swimming the river clinging to the tail of Mabata-bata, making bets when the 
stronger animals fought each other” (18). Implicit in this description and in Raul’s mocking 
observation that Azarias “will surely marry a cow” (19), however, is a recognition of the 
extent of the boy’s communion with the natural environment, based on a mutual intimacy and 
empathy. Azarias’ substitution of human contact for the companionship of the ox and cattle, 
foregrounds his connection with the natural world and his sense that the human and the 
natural are interwoven.  
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  Azarias’ estrangement from the human world, although a direct consequence of his 
orphanhood, is also exacerbated by “mistreatment” (18) from the very people who are 
supposed to “care for his tiny soul” (19). The alienation he endures is expressed in his 
realisation that, in being “nobody’s son” (18), he stands no chance of being treated as other 
children are treated. This is symptomatic of the death of his innocence, an innocence so 
eroded that “there was no longer any trace of childhood in him” (18). The boy’s substitution 
of animals for humans thus connotes a rejection of human society, since his experience of the 
latter has taught him that it is characterised by enmity and ill-treatment.  
 The episode in which Azarias’ uncle, Raul, goes out searching for his cattle and his 
nephew, after learning of the landmine explosion that has killed his prize ox earlier in the day, 
forms a striking illustration of the hostility the boy has come to expect from his uncle. Indeed, 
the child’s decision to run away after the ox explodes is based on the justifiable assumption 
that he will be held responsible for the animal’s death by his uncle. When Raul senses that his 
nephew is hiding somewhere close by, he tries to coax Azarias into coming out of hiding by 
promising him, firstly, that he will let him go to school and, secondly, that he will not hit him. 
As soon as both of these promises are uttered, however, they are undermined by a shift in 
focalisation to Raul’s actual intentions. In the case of the second promise, for instance, Raul 
says: “Show yourself, don’t be scared. I shan’t hit you, I promise,” but immediately thereafter 
he inwardly notes: “He promised lies. He wasn’t going to hit him: he was going to thrash him 
to death when he had finished rounding up the cattle” (20). Raul’s prioritisation of his cattle 
above Azarias is highlighted here, since the primary reason Raul enters the landmine-infested 
fields is to retrieve his stock, and to punish Azarias for the death of his ox. Raul is so obsessed 
with his cattle that he is prepared to postpone hitting the boy until after he secures the 
animals. Moreover, the promises he uses to lure the child out of hiding indicate the extent to 
which he deceitfully attempts to manipulate Azarias’ gullibility, wielding it as a psychological 
weapon. While there is no indication in the text as to whether Azarias believes his uncle or 
not, implicit in Raul’s thinking – that he will agree to Azarias’ demands to be sent to school 
for the moment, but later “correct the boy’s illusions” (21) – is the reality that the relationship 
between the two is founded on the abuse of adult power, a power which is exerted against a 
vulnerable child.  
 Raul’s interaction with Azarias is not only abusive and exploitative, however, it is also 
negligent. When a soldier arrives at the home Raul shares with his mother and nephew, to 
inform him about the ox’s explosion and the landmines which have been laid in the area 
where the cattle and Azarias are now located, Raul’s primary concern is to retrieve what is left 
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of his herd rather than to ensure the safety of the child. The whereabouts and welfare of “that 
son-of-a-bitch Azarias” are of little concern to him, given that “nobody [could] match 
[Azarias] on his knowledge of the land” (20) and his assumption that the boy can therefore 
take care of himself. Nevertheless, Raul’s disregard for familial responsibilities is not shared 
by his mother, who sternly reprimands him for being harsh on Azarias and reminds him that 
he does not know “the meaning of wretchedness” (21) – an indication of her awareness of 
Azarias’ vulnerable social position. Implicit in this reminder, too, is the notion that the degree 
to which one can empathise with another depends of the kinds of experiences one has had. 
Raul’s mother is suggesting that those who have not led a life of deprivation have a 
responsibility – perhaps a greater one than those who have similarly suffered – to at least feel 
empathy for those who have. 
 Raul’s inability to empathise and his mercenary approach to life are further illustrated in 
his treatment of the land. Unlike Azarias, who lives in harmony with both the animals he 
herds and the landscape he inhabits, Raul is depicted as out of place in nature. While engaged 
in his quest to find the cattle, for instance, he aggressively “tear[s] himself on the thorns” of 
the bushes he flounders through and, when he reaches the river, he climbs on the large rocks 
and, at the top of his voice, “issues the command: ‘Azarias, come back, Azarias!’” (20). His 
injunction is “answered” by the river, which responds by “disentombing its gushing voice” 
(20), seemingly in Azarias’ defence. Oblivious to the river, however, Raul continues 
searching for the boy. The arrogance with which his actions are performed suggests that he 
perceives the natural environment in essentially the same manner as he perceives Azarias, that 
is, as a commodity to exploit or as a means to pursue his own ends. His treatment of nature is 
a function of his misplaced notion of entitlement and disregard of others, both human and 
natural.  
 The narrative also suggests, through its depiction of Raul in the natural environment, 
that his antagonistic treatment of both the boy and nature is directly correlated to his own 
dehumanisation. While sitting down and trying to devise a plan to capture his nephew, he is 
described as “a statue of darkness” (20) and, when Azarias refuses to return home, the 
narrator reports that  “Raul began to creep down the rock, cat-like, ready to pounce and seize 
his nephew by the throat” (21). Raul’s malevolence, juxtaposed against the pastoral image of 
Azarias playing with Mabata-bata earlier in the narrative, emphasises the extent of the uncle’s 
detachment from human bonds and a respect for the natural world. This detachment denies 
him access to a nurturing social or natural environment – in other words, his lack of empathy 
isolates him.  
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 Raul’s lack of empathy may be read as a contributing factor in the suicidal ideations 
which accompany the experience of trauma for Azarias, since the latter’s profound depression 
ultimately leads him to embrace death as the only escape from his uncle’s abuse. Like the 
suicide of the hanging woman in “Hitting Budapest,” Azarias can conceive of no other means 
of escaping his circumstances and a context which dooms him to a life of suffering. After 
witnessing his uncle’s prized ox explode, for instance, Azarias initially considers fleeing: 
“There was only one solution: to run away, to travel the roads where he knew nothing more. 
To flee is to die from a place . . . What would he leave behind to regret?” (18). This not only 
reflects Azarias’ fear and his desire to escape abuse, exploitation and estrangement, but also 
suggests that all of these experiences are associated with a particular locale. Hence he feels he 
is “not running away: he is merely starting out along his road” (19). Ultimately, the place that 
causes his misery and isolation is his earthly existence, the alternative to which is a mystical 
transcendence attainable only through an abandonment of that existence. This abandonment is 
elaborated upon in the passage where he acts on his desire to flee: 
  He looked back at the fields he was going to leave behind without any  
  regret . . . He set off in the direction of the river . . . When he arrived at the 
  river he crossed the frontier of water. On the other bank, he stopped without 
  even knowing what he was waiting for. (19)  
 
Azarias shows no sign of regret or sense of loss. Preceding his decision to run away, he 
surveys his meagre possessions and concludes, “so little cannot inspire any remorse” (19). 
This absence of regret or remorse is closely related to the notion of lack or poverty in Couto’s 
foreword to the collection, in which he contends that: 
  The most harrowing thing about poverty is the ignorance it has of itself. Faced 
  by absence of everything, men abstain from dreams, depriving themselves of 
  the desire to be others. There exists in nothingness that illusion of plenitude 
  which causes life to stop and voices to become night.  
 
Within the context of Azarias’ story, life does indeed stop at the very moment he realises that 
he literally has nothing of value to lose and his abandonment of an earthbound life is 
encapsulated in his decidedly symbolic action of crossing the river. The threshold of the river, 
fittingly described as a “frontier” (19), is consistent with the negation of life because the body 
of water literally separates two banks, two places and, by extension, two worlds.  Azarias’ 
hesitation and suspension subsequent to crossing the river therefore suggests that the 
transition from one mode of being to another has not yet fully been realised. This 
transcendence is implied when, having crossed the river, Azarias is described by the narrator 
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as a disembodied name and a voice. Throughout the verbal interchange between Azarias, 
Raul and Grandma Carolina which takes place in the darkness on the banks of the river, the 
boy is depicted only once as emerging “from behind the shadows “ in the form of what the 
narrator describes as a “silhouette” (21). Azarias is thus already becoming insubstantial, and 
his indistinct corporeality prefigures the desertion of his earthly existence. Moreover, there is 
an ominous significance to his disembodied replies to Carolina’s implorations to him to 
return home: he initially asserts “I’m going to run away” (21) but, when she asks where he 
will go, he answers, “I’ve nowhere to go, Grandmother” (21). Azarias’ response suggests that 
he is plagued by a desire to escape and the seeming impossibility of doing so: it is only in the 
story’s final episode when, like Mabata-bata, Azarias is violently obliterated by a landmine, 
that this desire is realised and his transformation is complete.    
  The landmine explosion which ends Azarias’ life is described as “a flash which seemed 
to turn night into the middle of its day” (22), an explosion of such magnitude that its light 
figuratively overtakes the darkness of the boy’s life. Azarias then “swallow[s] all that red, the 
shriek of crackling fire” (22) and, shortly thereafter, sees the ndlati, emerging once again as a 
death omen, and senses “everything [beginning] to close in” (22) as the confines of the 
material world collapse. It is not, however, until “the river offer[s] him passage” by 
“sacrificing its water’s life” (22) that the boy runs towards his death. This description of how 
the natural world yields to and facilitates the boy’s transition from life to a new life in death 
suggests that the kind of transformation Azarias undergoes would not be possible had he not 
experienced intimacy with the natural world. The river, comprised of the transitory and 
dream-like element of water, colludes with the regenerative power of fire to assist Azarias’ 
rebirth into another world. Two interpretations of the landmine’s conflagration in the earlier 
incident of the exploding ox thus seem to converge in the moment when Azarias embraces 
“the passage of . . . flame” (22) at the end of his life – and, indeed, the end of the story. A 
literal interpretation of the destructive force and artificial blaze of the incendiary would 
ascribe a decisive finality and futility to the boy’s death, were it not for the fact that the 
narrative is rescued from such pessimism by Azarias’ earlier interpretation of the 
transmutation of Mabata-bata. The latter interpretation would seem to imply that he, too, will 
be transmogrified by fire, and thus reborn into a different kind of existence. 
 The symbolism in “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” attests to the impossibility of 
representing the “inner catastrophe” of trauma (Hartman “On Traumatic Knowledge” 1). The 
suffering depicted in the text bespeaks the manner in which Couto’s “literary verbalization     
. . . is a basis for making the wound perceivable and the silence[s] audible” (Hartman 
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“Trauma within the Limits of Literature” 2). By introducing symbolism and interfusing the 
literal with the imaginative, Couto’s child protagonists straddle the realistic and mystical 
realms, and destabilise the authority and efficacy of a realism which is linked to the world of 
the adults.  
 
5.3 Beyond Fire and Dreams: “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab” 
 
The estrangement of Couto’s characters and their lack of empathy for others is also evident in 
“The Bird-Dreaming Baobab,” which is characterised by a profound emphasis on the natural 
environment’s symbolic enactment of a dis-location and alienation premised on racial 
difference. The story’s epigraph introduces the ubiquitous bird motif’s association with 
freedom: “Birds, all those who know of no abode on the ground” (31). Implicit in this 
epigraph is the suggestion that those who are earthbound, who are bound by conventional 
notions of belonging and possession, are not free. In the story, the treatment meted out to the 
baobab tree and its inhabitant, the otherworldly birdman, by the descendants of European 
settlers in Mozambique foreground notions of territoriality and exclusion. It is suggested that 
the earthbound are restrained by socio-political norms which govern hospitality and 
inhospitality. The story’s epigraph therefore prefigures the discrimination on racial grounds 
which later plays out in the story: racial discourse determines and distinguishes between 
those who belong and those who do not.  
  “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab” begins with the image of a black man with a variety of 
colourful birds arriving on the streets of a white neighbourhood in order to sell his birds. 
While the children of the community are fascinated by the man, their parents perceive him as 
an intruder and ban their children from interacting with him. One of the children, Tiago, 
despite his parents’ wishes, spends all his time with the birdman, who shares his indigenous 
knowledge of the natural and mystical world with the child. One night, while Tiago is with 
the birdman, the boy’s father together with other men from the neighbourhood arrive, only to 
physically assault and take the perceived intruder to the jailhouse. Tiago follows the men to 
the prison and waits outside where he falls asleep. He wakes up to discover the bird man gone 
and, presuming he has gone back to his baobab, goes there to find him. Meanwhile, the men 
also discover the disappearance of their prisoner and decide to set him and the baobab alight.  
The reader then discovers that the men have in fact set the tree alight while the child is still 
inside. Ultimately, the closing image, in which both the child and the birdman are 
transformed into parts of the baobab, implies that both of them have been killed.  
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 To return to the opening section of the story: the white descendants of the Portuguese 
settlers who colonised Mozambique claim to own and belong to a particular portion of the 
town, which they then attempt to defend against the perceived threat of a black birdman 
whom they feel is an intruder in their territory. Upon the birdman’s first appearance in the 
neighbourhood, the indignant white occupants speculate: 
  Who did that black think he was . . . Who had authorized those grubby feet to 
  dirty the area? No, no, and no again. The black ought to return to his proper 
  place. (31) 
 
This passage indicates not only the sense of privilege and entitlement inherent in racial 
ideology, but also the general policy of exclusion which inheres in the utter refusal to accept 
an other into a restrictive definition of the category of the human. “The black” is identified 
only with reference to his physiognomy and his occupation as a bird-seller: the narrator 
remarks that he “didn’t even have a name to shelter him. They called him the birdman” (31). 
The residents’ indifference towards or elision of the man’s name is perhaps the most telling 
example of his dehumanisation, since it is necessarily connected to a refusal to acknowledge 
his subjective integrity. As someone stripped of the markers of his humanity, the birdman 
remains an alien and unknowable other. This aspect of the representation of the birdman 
echoes Vickroy’s insistence, in her discussion of Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye, that “the 
colonized are . . . denied agency, control and identity within their own cultural spaces” (38).  
Indeed, the association of blackness with dirt or impurity emphasises the birdman’s 
debasement. The insistent repetition of the word ‘no’ in the above passage also reveals a 
decisive rejection of this ‘other,’ and an unwavering negation born of fear  and a nostalgic 
longing to cling to the colonial inheritance of racial entitlement.  The latter, in particular, may 
be inferred from the narrator’s observation that: 
  The whites were concerned at [the birdman’s] disobedience, blaming it on the 
  times. They yearned jealously for the past, when creatures could be tidied  
  away depending on their appearance. The bird seller, by overstepping himself 
  in such a fashion, was leading the world towards other awareness. (33) 
 
As this passage exemplifies, the birdman’s intrusion into the neighbourhood is threatening 
because it destabilises the normative association of whiteness with both authority and 
privilege. According to Vickroy, “colonizers also suffer under their own pathology . . . 
[because] to have such power over other human lives destroys the humanity of the powerful 
as well” (43-44). Thus, in emphasising the birdman’s otherness, the settlers are not only 
creating a distance between him and themselves, they are also unwittingly bringing into 
question their own identity, since that identity is not so much characterised by negation as 
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dependent on it. The removal of the conditions under which negation may be perpetuated, 
destabilises self-definition. The whites’ diminished sense of a coherent identity, which they 
diagnose as arising from ‘the times’ in the above passage, therefore indicates a nostalgic 
yearning for “a strong sense of privilege based on race” (Vickroy 45), a yearning which 
cannot be fulfilled. It is therefore the crisis of having to redefine their identity which 
provokes the settlers to violently resist accepting the birdman. Nonetheless, however much 
they reject the dawning realisation that their identity is unstable and in need of revision, they 
are both affronted and confronted by the black “son-of-a-bitch” who  insists “on existing, 
unaware of the duties of his race” and whose “proper place” (33) is to be out of sight or 
invisible. 
  The racism inherent in this context indicates the residual colonial discourses which 
the settler parents forcibly attempt to transmit to their children. The children, however, resist 
assimilating this ideology, instead perceiving the birdman as a mystical figure enveloped by 
“a cloud of twitters,” who fills their world with “sleepy melodies” and “stories” (31) – a 
description reminiscent of the Pied Piper of Hamelin, who enchanted both animals and 
children alike by playing his flute (Browning 10-96). The children’s curiosity regarding the 
birdman and their consequent defiance of their parents are further emphasised by the 
symbolic parallel the narrative draws between them and the birds. As the narrator observes, 
when the birdman enters the neighbourhood, the birds “flood the street. Joyfulness was 
exchanged: the birds shouted and the children chirped” (31). The inversion of the verbs 
“shouted” and “chirped” suggests not only what Buxbaum refers to as an “interanimation” of 
the human and the non-human (2), but also the extent to which the children are like the birds, 
because they reject the constraints that necessarily accompany the racially exclusive 
discourse which informs their parents’ perceptions. 
 Wendy Woodward argues that the prominence of birds, either as symbols or subjects, 
in Southern African narratives may best be read in relation to “the question of  . . . voice so 
topical in postcolonial debate,” more specifically, the voice of the “colonised  subaltern 
subject” (241). In this regard, the correlation Couto’s narrative draws between the birdman’s 
marginality and his magical ability to attract birds and to entrance children is politically 
suggestive, in that the birds’ melodies speak for the birdman. Although threatened by the 
birdman’s very existence, the settlers are even more baffled by his feathered companions: 
“the Portuguese began to wonder: where in the name of magic did he get such miraculous 
creatures?” (33). And the narrator ironically muses, “might that black have a right to enter a 
world which was closed to [the whites] . . . Could it be that the birds were eroding the 
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residents’ sense of self, turning them into foreigners? (33, emphasis added).The birds elicit 
both fascination and unease in the settlers; their ambivalent reaction suggests that the birds 
are harbingers of an unsettlement of their social position, a position previously assigned with 
reference to racial distinctions. In other words, the mystical birds become the means through 
which the narrative gestures towards the need for a different set of socio-political coordinates. 
This is further evidenced by the fact that the birds are imbued with both agency and 
intentionality, in that they act autonomously and in defiance of social prescriptions – as, for 
example, when they rescue the birdman from the prison cell in which he has been 
incarcerated by the white residents. The birds’ agency undermines their marginality and, by 
extension, that of the birdman with whom they are intrinsically associated. The world which 
is “closed” to the Portuguese but which embraces the birdman is also the world of nature, 
which the settlers have disowned the right to inhabit by virtue of their exploitation of the 
territory and its resources.  Through their taming or domestication of the wild – “they 
themselves had already brought the most distant bushland to heel” (33) – the settlers have, in 
this sense, become agents of their own exclusion. 
 Unlike the birdman’s birds, which are described as inhabiting cages that “didn’t even 
look like a prison” but like “winged cages, cages that might fly away” (31), the children are 
subject to the authority and restrictions imposed by their parents, and are forbidden to play or 
interact with the birdman.  This suggests a crucial contrast: the birdman’s treatment of his 
birds is not characterised by a power differential between the dominant and the dominated, 
whereas the parents’ treatment of their children is, to a large extent, motivated by a desire to 
control. For example, the narrator notes that, “determined to arrest [their children’s] dreams, 
their tiny boundless souls,” the parents decree the street “out of bounds” (34), and forbid the 
children to go out, in an attempt to limit their access to and interaction with ‘the black’. The 
narrator’s evocative description of the children’s souls as both “tiny” and “boundless” again 
corresponds to the portrayal of the birds in the narrative – a parallel which foregrounds the 
children’s relation to the natural world and a mystical or imaginative realm. In addition, the 
parents’ attempt to contain the “boundless” by restricting the children’s movements 
immediately imbues their homes with a prison-like quality. Indeed, the parents are offended 
not only by the birdman “overstepping himself,” but also by his influence on their children: 
“Even the children, thanks to his seduction, were forgetting their behaviour. They were 
becoming more like children of the street than of the home” (33). While the adults’ fears 
derive from prejudice and a resistance to the freedom that accompanies the innocence of the 
imagination, the children’s subsequent rebellion and defiance of their parents’ authority arises 
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from a desire to be free – to be like the birds. Imagination is thus a precursor to the intimation 
and cultivation of alternative modes of being and of ‘being-in-common’ or intersubjectivity, 
modes which threaten the stringencies of a preconceived mode of discrimination and 
exclusion. 
 As indicated above, and as a consequence of the restraints imposed upon them , the 
children actively defy their parents’ authority. One little boy, Tiago, “more than all the others 
disobeyed and devoted himself to the mysterious birdman” (32). Tiago is presented as “a 
dreamy child, whose only gift was to pursue his fancy” (32); by virtue of his fanciful or 
visionary nature, he is more susceptible than most to the mystical aura surrounding the 
birdman. It is the unworldliness or otherworldliness Tiago recognises in the birdman which 
attracts him for, as the narrator notes, the birdman “did not come from a country called life” 
(31). The birdman’s unreal and ephemeral presence may be read as symbolic of the way in 
which the story reflexively critiques its own endeavour imaginatively to reconstruct the 
identity of marginalised. Moreover, it is because life, as Tiago knows it, is characterised by 
constraint that the birdman’s dreamlike quality presents him with the possibility of an 
alternative kind of existence, one which corresponds to his fancy. The kindred familiarity that 
exists between Tiago and the birdman thus signals the collapse of the very notion of 
difference instantiated by the adults’ racial discourse. Furthermore, the nature of Tiago and 
the birdman’s kinship is spiritual, and accordingly transcends the limitations placed upon it 
by an antagonistic socio-political climate.  
 As a mystical symbol closely connected to the birdman’s otherworldliness, the baobab 
tree in which he finds shelter is depicted as a repository of local history.  The narrator reports 
that Tiago informs his parents that it is “a sacred tree. God planted it upside down” (32). The 
tree’s magically transformative potential, indicated by this inversion (it seemingly grows into 
the earth rather than out of it, its ‘roots’ substituting for branches), signifies a spiritual growth 
through the negation of what is deemed ‘natural’ in the material world. Tiago also tells his 
parents: “The tree is capable of great sadness. The old men say that a baobab can commit 
suicide in despair by way of fire. Without anyone setting it alight” (32), a description which 
anthropomorphises the tree through the attribution of the human emotions of sadness and 
despair. Moreover, its potential suicide in reaction to these emotions suggests its propensity 
towards  death,  a death by spontaneous combustion which, like the phoenix and ndlati bird, 
holds a latent potentiality of transformation or re-creation.  
 The anthropomorphisation of the baobab is symbolic of the manner in which the 
natural environment in this story figuratively weeps over the catastrophic state of affairs in 
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postcolonial Mozambique. These circumstances are particularly exemplified by the fact that 
Tiago’s father and his neighbours collectively plot and carry out an assault on the birdman, 
who is subsequently imprisoned. Meanwhile, Tiago has followed the commotion, and 
witnessed the unprovoked attack. This sequence of events, which leads to the climax of the 
story, are encapsulated in the symbolic function of the baobab. When the settlers assault the 
birdman before arresting him, for example, “the flowers of the baobab fell like stars of felt. 
Their white petals turned red on the ground” (35). As this image illustrates, the physical 
violence directed at the birdman, who describes himself as “the natural offspring of the land” 
(35), causes the innocent spirits which inhabit the flowers to die. The red colour the petals 
assume not only suggest blood, but also the extent to which the destructiveness of human 
aggression is palpably re-enacted in the natural environment. Moreover, the quiet anguish of 
the petals’ empathetic response, as was earlier suggested by the elders’ tale of the baobab’s 
suicidal self-combustion, indicates that the tree feels and suffers too. However, the 
pigmentation of the fallen flowers also foreshadows the appearance of the element of fire in 
the form of arson, and draws a direct parallel between this form of wanton destruction and the 
spilling of innocent blood. The image of the falling flowers thus epitomises Tiago’s loss of 
innocence, a loss occasioned by his having witnessed extreme but unprovoked physical 
violence against the birdman, and the latter’s suffering as a result.  
 Following the birdman’s incarceration, Tiago stands dejectedly outside the prison 
playing the birdman’s discarded flute, then falls asleep. Upon waking to find the birdman no 
longer in his cell (unbeknownst to him, the birdman has been rescued by a flock of birds), 
Tiago “decided to return to the tree. There was no longer any place where he might go. No 
street, nor house: only the baobab’s belly” (37). Much like the children who are lured away 
from Hamelin by the Pied Piper because of the unjust treatment he has received from the 
adults of the town (Browning 96-7), Tiago is lured away from his home – both by his 
fascination with and concern for the birdman and as a result of the nonsensical violence he 
has witnessed his father and other neighbours commit. Above all, however, his decision to 
leave home is closely linked to his desire to abandon the material world he inhabits; thus, in a 
sense, he is actively seeking his own death. Significantly, in this regard, the association of the 
baobab’s hollow trunk with a “belly” implies that the tree has maternal qualities and that 
Tiago is returning to the womb.  
 Tiago’s abandonment of his earthly existence is similar to Azarias’, primarily because 
they both meet their respective ends by fire. After the birdman’s gaolers discover that he has 
escaped, like Tiago they assume that he has returned to his abode in the baobab, and set out in 
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a posse. Having reached the tree, in which Azarias and, presumably, the birdman have taken 
refuge, their “vengeful steps  . . .  crush[ ] the flowers underfoot” (37), and they proceed to set 
the baobab alight. The narrator then describes Tiago’s death and transformation into the parts 
of a tree: “the flames licked the ancient bark. Inside, the boy had unleashed a dream: his hair 
was growing into tiny leaves, his legs into timber. His wooden fingers dug rootlike into the 
soil” (37). The correlation the narrator draws between the boy’s death and the release of his 
dream of arborescence confirms the notion that the boy’s corporeal existence imprisons his 
true form, which is here transmuted.  
 The final passage in the story, which describes the culmination of Tiago’s 
transmogrification, is characterised by a dialogical interplay between the real and the 
fantastic, and by the ways in which the central characters and symbols of the story – the 
birdman, Tiago, the baobab, birds, flowers, dreaming and fire – are conflated: 
  The boy was in transit to another realm: he was turning into a tree, consenting 
  to the impossible. And from the dreaming baobab, there rose the birdman’s 
  hands. They touched the flowers, the corollas curled: monstrous birds were 
  born and released, petal-like, on the crest of the flames. (37) 
 
This moment of crisis, in which the baobab, the birdman (who seems to have been hiding in 
the tree), and the child are destroyed by fire and reborn in a transcendent realm, is 
figuratively enacted by the eruption of “monstrous birds,” which signify the release of the 
violence underpinning the postcolonial Mozambican setting. The birds are therefore directly a 
consequence of the settlers’ torches setting fire to the baobab and its occupant, and of the 
tree’s irrevocable anguish when confronted with atrocity and wilful destruction, both of 
nature and the bonds of human intersubjectivity. They are also an expression of fury at the 
atrocity of the accidental killing of a whimsical, innocent child and the intentional murder of 
the harmless birdman. However, the emergence of the birdman’s hands, like branches, from 
the “dreaming” baobab conveys a gesture of hope and resilience and an image of renewal and 
regeneration through fire, conjuring the natural processes by which flames and ash, much like 
the landmine explosions in “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded,” give rise to new growth.  
 Of this fire, the narrator exclaims: 
  The flames? Where were they coming from, invading the remotest frontier of 
  the dream world? That was when Tiago felt the sting of the blaze, the  
  seduction of ash. Then the boy, a convert to the ways of the sap, emigrated 
  once and for all to his newfound roots. (37) 
 
As this passage illustrates, the fire ‘invades’ the sanctity of the dream world, and literally 
kills the young boy who has chosen to be that world’s custodian. The “seduction of ash” – the 
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desire to abandon his corporeal form – is premised on Tiago’s rejection of a material world 
which, because it is marked by violence, threatens and constricts the world of the 
imagination. This rejection, however, signifies his acceptance of a death which provides him 
with an arboreal identity more congruent with his spirit – with “newfound roots”. The 
destruction of the tree thus reflects the failure of the imagination of the earthbound who, 
motivated by prejudice, are unable to transcend the strictures imposed upon them and to 
recognise the interanimation of the human and natural worlds, of the real and the fantastical, 
and children’s receptiveness to the mystical. 
 The use of children as vehicles to expound notions of intersubjectivity and 
responsibility in both “The Day Mabata-Bata Exploded” and “The Bird-Dreaming Baobab” 
serves to amplify the need for revision, healing, and survival in post-traumatic, postcolonial 
Mozambique. Azarias and Tiago’s rejection of the legacy of violence in this society, as 
symbolised by their abandonment of their corporeal existences, implies that the material 
realm is characterised by an unbearable and yet inescapable hostility which threatens life 
itself. Nevertheless, as Long-Innes notes with regards to Couto’s oeuvre, “one of the major 
challenges of literature and art is . . . located in the invisibility of . . . crisis, how to make 
visible in words that which seems impossibly beyond their reach” (179). The endings of these 
stories thus gesture towards that which cannot be articulated, and that which eludes the co-
ordinates by which adults distinguish fantasy from reality. 
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Conclusion 
In an interview about poetics and the act of writing, the South African author and scholar, 
J.M. Coetzee, maintains that, in Africa, “the only address one can imagine is a brutally direct 
one, a sort of pure, unmediated representation; what short-circuits the imagination, what 
forces one’s face into the thing itself, is what I am here calling history” (68). The task of the 
writer in this context, he goes on to say, “becomes imagining this unimaginable” (68). My 
reading of fictional representations of trauma in the African context, and the representational 
difficulties inherent in such writing, has been centrally concerned with the ethical 
commitment of literature on this continent, that is, its effort to do justice to a legacy of 
injustice. This legacy is most obvious in the traumatic socio-political backgrounds which 
inform each of the stories I have analysed. However, their respective emphases on 
specifically child protagonists’ interpretations and subjective responses to the turmoil and 
suffering they experience as a result, entails a particularly demanding act of the imagination, 
on the part of both the (adult) author and reader, since “trauma [is] an indicator of social 
injustice or oppression, as the ultimate cost of destructive sociocultural institutions” (Vickroy 
x)  . In line with Coetzee’s argument, these stories thus illustrate the irresolvable tension 
between literature’s ethical commitment and its representational capacity to “imagine the 
unimaginable,” more especially where children are the victims and focalisers of the trauma 
concerned. In this concluding section, I wish briefly to compare and contrast the ways in 
which the stories’ endings retroactively interrogate their very ability to represent experiences 
that are beyond language. Though they achieve this erasure of their own conditions of being 
in different ways, they all similarly falter on the point of closure and resolution – as, in a 
sense, they must.  
 With regards to narrative, as previously discussed, trauma presents itself as a 
phenomenon that overwhelms language and thereby representation itself. It follows that, 
where narrative mode is concerned, the use of social realism – until recently the dominant 
mode in African writing – has had to contend with the contingency of trauma’s resistance to 
representation, and has therefore had to devise alternative means to intimate – but not 
represent – the aporia that is trauma. Thus, for example, while NoViolet Bulawayo’s “Hitting 
Budapest” is seemingly a direct, present-tense account, in a naturalistic setting, of a plausible 
escapade undertaken by the protagonist, Darling, and her friends, the narrative undermines its 
ostensible transparency through a number of strategies. These include the unconscious ironies 
which result from its being focalised by a child, ironies which undermine her ‘authority’ as a 
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narrator, and the fact that it is saturated with symbolic meanings and namings which alert the 
reader to its implied author’s critique of the efficacy of language – and, more specifically, the 
language of humanitarianism, human rights, and philanthropy. This critique is extended by 
the story’s introduction of a reflexivity with regards to representations of Africa and Africans 
– particularly photographic images, but also, implicitly, its own – which then positions the 
reader uncomfortably as a consumer of such representations, and raises ethical questions in 
regard to his/her own implicatedness. Ultimately, the story attests to both the vulnerability 
and resilience of the children involved, and asks the reader to interrogate/re-evaluate his/her 
response. The closing episode, in which the children steal the shoes from a dead woman’s 
corpse in order to trade them for some bread, is particularly striking in this regard, since it 
amplifies the gravity of the children’s need and demonstrates their resourcefulness in a 
context characterised by extreme poverty – a context in which survival overrules scruples. 
Moreover, as the anticipated sale of the shoes and purchase of the  bread are not depicted in 
the narrative itself, Bulawayo’s closing description of the children running and laughing, in 
what seems to be both excitement and fear, is profoundly thought-provoking. It signals the 
possibility that the children’s hunger will not (ever) be satiated: since there is no indication of 
what they are running towards, the action captures a hope or desire which might be thwarted 
at any moment. Indeed, the symbolism in the story has conveyed an overriding pessimism 
with regard to the children’s future prospects. Trauma’s resistance to language is thus 
revealed through the narrative’s reliance on structural and symbolic ironies which are beyond 
the child-narrator’s grasp and left to the implied reader to intuit. 
  In my opening chapter I proposed that trauma fiction, specifically in the African 
context, is the locus upon which historiography, public and private memory converge. An 
obvious example of this nexus is found in Uwem Akpan’s “My Parents’ Bedroom”, which is 
also focalised and narrated by a pre-pubescent child, but presented in the past tense. While set 
against the backdrop of the historical trauma of the Rwandan genocide, the story itself 
focuses on the annihilation of a particular family, and the children, Monique and Jean’s 
struggle to comprehend witnessing the forced slaying of their mother by their father and the 
subsequent death of the latter. The story ends with the destruction of the family home, and the 
children, having narrowly escaped certain death themselves, are left stranded and homeless in 
the wilderness of an apocalyptic setting which visibly reflects nonsensical violence on an 
unimaginable scale. The narrator’s closing mantra, “we want to live; we don’t want to die” 
(289), echoes the reality confronting the children at the end of Bulawayo’s story, and asserts 
a similar mixture of vulnerability and the instinct to survive. Akpan’s narrative is also 
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similarly open-ended: an escape which both is and is not an escape, since the trauma of the 
immediate present will torment the children’s future. “My Parents’ Bedroom” personalises 
the experiences of a multitude of children during the Rwandan genocide. In narrativising the 
historical facts, it humanises the atrocity, but it presents the reader with an unforgettably 
haunting closing image which speaks to an unimaginable reality. 
 In an interview about trauma, the South African novelist and literary academic, Zöe 
Wicomb, draws a correlation between South African trauma fiction and Holocaust and slave 
narratives. Of Toni Morrison’s notion of re-memory in her novel, Beloved, Wicomb observes: 
It records the tragic event and the struggle to represent it, but whilst it is 
an act of remembering, the novel is also about the importance of 
forgetting; whilst the story is about healing, it negates at the same time 
the possibility of healing . . . In other words [Morrison] problematizes 
our received view of memory and narrative; memory is also bound up 
with forgetting. (19) 
 
As with mourning, in trauma fiction concerned with testimony, the possibility of a future “is 
contingent on being able to transform a surplus of yesterdays . . . into some kind of story” 
(Durrant 8). In Akpan’s “Fattening for Gabon,” the narrator-focaliser Kotchikpa’s account of 
his trauma is caught in this interface between remembering and forgetting, where forgetting, 
paradoxically, depends on remembering. It is thus remembering the trauma which is 
problematised by Kotchikpa’s account, since the possibility of healing is constantly deferred 
as the narrative voice attempts to recover that which eludes him. The word “re-member” 
implies putting together or assembling, and could thus be regarded as the opposite of “dis-
member”. “Dismemberment” not only recalls the images of corpses, blood, and death in both 
Bulawayo’s “Hitting Budapest” and Akpan’s “My Parents’ Bedroom,” but also goes hand in 
hand with trauma and the inability to ‘re-member’ in “Fattening for Gabon”. The sexual 
violations perpetrated against Chipo and Monique are, in a sense, acts of dismemberment 
because they violate notions of the body and subjectivity as whole and complete. Recalling 
trauma therefore must be an attempt to re-member a dis-membered subjectivity. In “Fattening 
for Gabon” it is significant that Kotchikpa says he could never “outrun” rather than “forget” 
Yewa’s wailing, since this suggests that he is being endlessly pursued by the sound. His 
‘escape’ is thus physical, not emotional or psychological, since the trauma will never leave 
him. As Langer contends,  the survivor “does not travel a road from the bizzare back to the 
normal, but from normal to bizzare back to a normalcy so permeated by the bizzare . . . that it 
can never be purified again” (119). 
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As has been established, trauma is an unfathomable wound to the psyche which is 
experienced as the sublime, that is, the inexpressible or unrepresentable. In the interview 
cited earlier, and speaking in the midst of South Africa’s collective trauma of Apartheid, for 
instance, Coetzee aptly points out that “there is now too much truth for art to hold, truth by 
the bucketful, truth that overwhelms and swamps every act of the imagination” (99).  The two 
stories I have analysed by Mia Couto – “The Day Mabata-bata Exploded” and “The Bird-
Dreaming Baobab” – illustrate the distinctive impression made by atrocity and a ubiquitous 
trauma on cultural production itself. ‘Truth’, when taken to refer to the impact of a legacy of 
civil unrest and violence on both the material, lived realities and the psychological wellness 
of Mozambican citizens, as represented in Couto’s fictions, is paradoxically both revealed 
and concealed by the mystical, that which resides beyond the realm of rationality and the 
known. The endings of both stories are particularly evocative and impressionistic, since they 
illustrate the ways in which Couto compensates for the irrecuperability of atrocity and the 
representational difficulties inherent in such recovery by interfusing the fantastical and the 
material realms, and the human and natural worlds. This magical realism imbues the 
narratives with a suggestiveness they would not otherwise have. Both Azarias and Tiago’s 
violent deaths would be meaningless, essentially confirming a sense of the futility, 
helplessness and hopelessness of life in contemporary Mozambique, were it not for the 
transformative and mystical energy of the natural world which, in both cases, forms a 
gateway to the fantastical and transcendental. It is in this revision of the effects of civil war 
on the collective imagination of Mozambican citizens that Couto gestures at the fact that 
“trauma lies beyond the bounds of ‘normal’ conception” (Tal 15), and thus requires 
alternative ‘sense’-making mechanisms in fiction. 
 In highlighting each author’s engagement with the impossibility of directly 
representing trauma, I have attempted to identify the strategies they employ to attempt to 
transcend the limitations imposed upon fiction by the very nature of this phenomenon. I have 
also outlined the effect of using a child’s perspective to uncover the paradoxes which lie at the 
very heart of trauma itself – more specifically, in the social, economic and political legacy of 
the postcolonial African context from which these short stories emerge. At the very beginning 
of my thesis, I used, as an epigraph, a quote from Gikandi, who argues that the function of 
African literature is as “an instrument that . . . imagines alternative configurations of our ‘real 
histories’ either to affirm or transcend them” (2).  In similar vein, Gaylard maintains that: 
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Postcolonialists attempt to imagine new narratives so as not to become 
victim to narrative conventions. Whatever type of narrative is invented or 
chosen, its form is likely to be characterised by the urge to confound a 
naturalising logic and a linear time, an urge underlying the quest for both 
dystopian destruction and utopian creation. (112) 
 
In light of these statements, I believe that Bulawayo, Akpan and Couto’s stories reveal a 
growing trend in narratives arising from this continent which attempt to document and 
engage the reader in ethical issues surrounding the subjective experience of African children.  
These narratives compensate for the invisibility of crisis by evoking symbolism involving the 
body and abjection. Indeed, the open-ended conclusions of the stories are particularly 
significant because they imply the inconclusiveness of both the children’s futures (which are 
not foreclosed upon) and African fiction’s potential to engage the reader in an ethical 
dialogue with the text and, ultimately, with an all-too-intimate reality.  
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